Use–mention distinction

The use–mention distinction is a foundational concept of analytic philosophy,[1] according to which it is necessary to make a distinction between using a word (or phrase) and mentioning it,[2][3] and many philosophical works have been "vitiated by a failure to distinguish use and mention".[2] The distinction is disputed by non-analytic philosophers.[4]

The distinction between use and mention can be illustrated for the word cheese:[2][3]

  • Use: Cheese is derived from milk.
  • Mention: 'Cheese' is derived from the Old English word ċēse.

The first sentence is a statement about the substance called "cheese": it uses the word 'cheese' to refer to that substance. The second is a statement about the word 'cheese' as a signifier: it mentions the word without using it to refer to anything other than itself.

Grammar

In written language, mentioned words or phrases often appear between single or double quotation marks (as in "'Chicago' contains three vowels") or in italics (as in "When I say honey, I mean the sweet stuff that bees make"). In philosophy, single quotation marks are typically used, while in other fields (such as linguistics) italics are much more common. Style authorities such as Strunk and White insist that mentioned words or phrases must always be made visually distinct in this manner. On the other hand, used words or phrases (much more common than mentioned ones) do not bear any typographic markings. In spoken language, or in absence of the use of stylistic cues such as quotation marks or italics in written language, the audience must identify mentioned words or phrases through semantic and pragmatic cues.[5]

If quotation marks are used, it is sometimes customary to distinguish between the quotation marks used for speech and those used for mentioned words, with double quotes in one place and single in the other:

  • When Larry said, "That has three letters", he was referring to the word 'bee'.
  • With reference to 'bumbershoot', Peter explained that "The term refers to an umbrella."

A few authorities recommend against using different types of quotation marks for speech and mentioned words and recommend one style of quotation mark to be used for both purposes.[6]

In philosophy

The general phenomenon of a term's having different references in different contexts was called suppositio (substitution) by medieval logicians.[7] It describes how one has to substitute a term in a sentence based on its meaning—that is, based on the term's referent. In general, a term can be used in several ways. For nouns, they are the following:

  • Properly with a concrete and real referent: "That is my pig" (assuming it exists). (personal supposition)
  • Properly with a concrete but unreal referent: "Santa Claus's pig is very big." (also personal supposition)
  • Properly with a generic referent: "Any pig breathes air." (simple supposition)
  • Improperly by way of metaphor: "Your grandfather is a pig". (improper supposition)
  • As a pure term: "'Pig' has only three letters". (material supposition)

The last sentence contains a mention example.

The use–mention distinction is especially important in analytic philosophy.[8] Failure to properly distinguish use from mention can produce false, misleading, or meaningless statements or category errors. For example, the following sentences correctly distinguish between use and mention:

  • 'Copper' contains six letters, and is not a metal.
  • Copper is a metal, and contains no letters.

The first sentence, a mention example, is a statement about the word 'copper' and not the chemical element. Notably, the word is composed of six letters, but not any kind of metal or other tangible thing. The second sentence, a use example, is a statement about the chemical element copper and not the word itself. Notably, the element is composed of 29 electrons and protons and a number of neutrons, but not any letters.

Stanisław Leśniewski was perhaps the first to make widespread use of this distinction and the fallacy that arises from overlooking it, seeing it all around in analytic philosophy of the time, for example in Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica.[9] At the logical level, a use–mention mistake occurs when two heterogeneous levels of meaning or context are confused inadvertently.

Donald Davidson told that in his student years, "quotation was usually introduced as a somewhat shady device, and the introduction was accompanied by a stern sermon on the sin of confusing the use and mention of expressions." He presented a class of sentences like

Quine said that "quotation has a certain anomalous feature."

which both use the meaning of the quoted words to complete the sentence, and mention them as they are attributed to W. V. Quine, to argue against his teachers' hard distinction. His claim was that quotations could not be analyzed as simple expressions that mention their content by means of naming it or describing its parts, as sentences like the above would lose their exact, twofold meaning.[10]

Self-referential statements mention themselves or their components, often producing logical paradoxes, such as Quine's paradox. A mathematical analogy of self-referential statements lies at the core of Gödel's incompleteness theorem (diagonal lemma). There are many examples of self-reference and use–mention distinction in the works of Douglas Hofstadter, who makes the distinction thus:

When a word is used to refer to something, it is said to be being used. When a word is quoted, though, so that someone is examining it for its surface aspects (typographical, phonetic, etc.), it is said to be being mentioned.[11]

Although the standard notation for mentioning a term in philosophy and logic is to put the term in quotation marks, issues arise when the mention is itself of a mention. Notating using italics might require a potentially infinite number of typefaces, while putting quotation marks within quotation marks may lead to ambiguity.[12]

Some analytic philosophers have said the distinction "may seem rather pedantic".[2]

In a 1977 response to analytic philosopher John Searle, Jacques Derrida mentioned the distinction as "rather laborious and problematical".[4]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ Wheeler (2005) p. 568
  2. ^ a b c d Devitt and Sterelny (1999) pp. 40–1
  3. ^ a b W.V. Quine (1940) p. 24
  4. ^ a b "Derrida". 1977. p. 79. Retrieved 13 April 2018.
  5. ^ Wilson, Shomir (2011). "A Computational Theory of the Use-Mention Distinction in Natural Language". Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Maryland. Retrieved 16 February 2013.
  6. ^ For example, Butcher's Copy-Editing: the Cambridge Handbook for Editors, Copy-editors and Proofreaders. 4th edition, by Judith Butcher, Caroline Drake and Maureen Leach. Cambridge University Press, 2006. Butcher's recommends against the practice, but The Chicago Manual of Style, section 7.58 (15th edition, 2003), indicates that "philosophers" use single quotes for a practice akin to the use/mention distinction, though it is not explained in this way.
  7. ^ See Read, Stephen (2006). Medieval Theories: Properties of Terms. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  8. ^ "Quotation". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 16 July 2005. Retrieved 5 October 2009.
  9. ^ Simons, Peter (2006). "Leśniewski, Stanisław". In Borchert, Donald M (ed.). Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition (e-book ed.). Thomson Gale. p. 292. ISBN 0-02-866072-2.
  10. ^ Davidson, Donald (March 1979). "Quotation". Theory and Decision. 11 (1): 27–40. doi:10.1007/BF00126690. ISSN 0040-5833. Retrieved 8 December 2010.
  11. ^ Hofstadter, Douglas R. (1985). Metamagical Themas. p. 9.
  12. ^ Boolos, George (1999). Logic, Logic, and Logic. p. 398. In this 1995 paper, Boolos discussed ambiguities in using quotation marks as part of a formal language, and proposed a way of distinguishing levels of mentioning using a finite number of marks, using "′" to modify the succeeding "°", as in:
     According to W. Quine,
     Whose views on quotation are fine,
      °Boston° names Boston,
      and ′°°Boston°′° names °Boston°,
     But 9 doesn't designate 9.

References

Further reading

External links

Contrastivism

Contrastivism, or the contrast theory of meaning, is an epistemological theory proposed by Jonathan Schaffer that suggests that knowledge attributions have a ternary structure of the form 'S knows that p rather than q'. This is in contrast to the traditional view whereby knowledge attributions have a binary structure of the form 'S knows that p'. Contrastivism was suggested as an alternative to contextualism. Both are semantic theories that try to explain skepticism using semantic methods.

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong proposed in a paper titled "A Contrastivist Manifesto" a variant of contrastivism that, he argues, differs from contextualism, invariantism, and Schaffer's contrastivism.

Ernest Gellner in Words and Things "terms derive their meaning from the fact that there are or could be things which fall under them and that there are others which do not." (Emphasis in original.)

Conventionalism

Conventionalism is the philosophical attitude that fundamental principles of a certain kind are grounded on (explicit or implicit) agreements in society, rather than on external reality. Although this attitude is commonly held with respect to the rules of grammar, its application to the propositions of ethics, law, science, mathematics, and logic is more controversial.

Index of analytic philosophy articles

This is a list of articles in analytic philosophy.

A. C. Grayling

A.P. Martinich

Abstract particulars

Actualism

Alfred Jules Ayer

Analysis

Analytic-synthetic distinction

Analytic philosophy

Analytic reasoning

Arda Denkel

Arthur Danto

Australian Realism

Avrum Stroll

Begriffsschrift

Berlin Circle

Bernard Williams

Bertrand Russell

Brainstorms

Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon

C. D. Broad

Cahiers pour l'Analyse

Carl Gustav Hempel

Ramsey sentence

Charles Sanders Peirce

Chinese room

Cognitive synonymy

Contemporary Pragmatism

Contrast theory of meaning

Cooperative principle

Cora Diamond

Daniel Dennett

Darwin's Dangerous Idea

David Braine (philosopher)

David Kellogg Lewis

Depiction

Descriptivist theory of names

Dialectica

Direct reference theory

Doctrine of internal relations

Donald Davidson (philosopher)

Doxastic logic

Elbow Room (book)

Elliott Sober

Erkenntnis

Ernst Mach

Eternal statement

F. C. S. Schiller

Family resemblance

Felicity conditions

Form of life (philosophy)

Frank P. Ramsey

Freedom Evolves

Friedrich Waismann

G. E. M. Anscombe

George Edward Moore

Gilbert Ryle

Gottlob Frege

Gricean maxims

Gustav Bergmann

Hans Hahn

Hans Reichenbach

Hans Sluga

Harvey Brown (philosopher)

Herbert Feigl

Holism

Hypothetico-deductive model

Indeterminacy of translation

Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy

Isaiah Berlin

J. L. Austin

Jeff Malpas

Jerry Fodor

John Hick

John Rawls

John Searle

John Wisdom

Jules Vuillemin

Karl Menger

Kit Fine

Kurt Grelling

Kwasi Wiredu

Language, Truth, and Logic

Logical atomism

Logical form

Logical positivism

Lorenzo Peña

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Mark Addis

Mark Sacks

Max Black

Mental representation

Metaphor in philosophy

Michael Dummett

Michael Tye (philosopher)

Modal realism

Moritz Schlick

Naming and Necessity

Nelson Goodman

Neurophilosophy

Nonsense

Norman Malcolm

Oets Kolk Bouwsma

Olaf Helmer

Olga Hahn-Neurath

On Certainty

On Denoting

Ordinary language philosophy

Original proof of Gödel's completeness theorem

Ostensive definition

Otto Neurath

P. F. Strawson

Paradox of analysis

Paul Churchland

Paul Grice

Per Martin-Löf

Peter Hacker

Peter Simons

Philipp Frank

Philippa Foot

Philosophical analysis

Philosophical Investigations

Philosophy of engineering

Philosophy of technology

Pieranna Garavaso

Postanalytic philosophy

Preintuitionism

Principia Ethica

Principia Mathematica

Private language argument

Process philosophy

Radical translation

Richard von Mises

Robert Audi

Rose Rand

Round square copula

Rudolf Carnap

Rupert Read

Ryle's regress

Speech act

Stephen Laurence

Susan Stebbing

The Bounds of Sense

The Logic of Scientific Discovery

The Mind's I

Theodore Drange

Þorsteinn Gylfason

Tore Nordenstam

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Two Dogmas of Empiricism

UCLA Department of Philosophy

Use–mention distinction

Verification theory

Verificationism

Victor Kraft

Vienna Circle

Wilfrid Sellars

Willard Van Orman Quine

William James Lectures

William L. Rowe

William W. Tait

Wolfgang Stegmüller

Word and Object

Zeno Vendler

Index of philosophy of language articles

This is an index of articles in philosophy of language

A.P. Martinich

Aboutness

Adolph Stöhr

Alexis Kagame

Alfred Jules Ayer

Alphabet of human thought

Ambiguity

Analytic-synthetic distinction

Anaphora

Andrea Bonomi

Applicative Universal Grammar

Archie J. Bahm

Arda Denkel

Aristotle

Artificial intelligence

Association for Logic, Language and Information

Avrum Stroll

Barry Loewer

Berlin Circle

Bertrand Russell

Bob Hale (philosopher)

Calculus ratiocinator

Carl Gustav Hempel

Ramsey sentence

Categorization

Category mistake

Causal theory of reference

César Chesneau Dumarsais

Cheung Kam Ching

Circular definition

Claude Lévi-Strauss

Cognitive synonymy

Colloquial language

Computational humor

Concept

Concept and object

Conceptual metaphor

Context-sensitive grammar

Context principle

Contextualism

Contrast theory of meaning

Contrastivism

Cooperative principle

Cora Diamond

Cratylism

Dagfinn Føllesdal

David Efird

David Kellogg Lewis

De dicto and de re

Definition

Denotation

Descriptivist theory of names

Direct reference theory

Direction of fit

Discourse ethics

Disquotational principle

Donald Davidson (philosopher)

Donkey pronoun

Dramatism

Duns Scotus

Empty name

Engineered language

Enumerative definition

Epistemicism

Ethics and Language

Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy

European Summer School in Logic, Language and Information

Exemplification

Extensional definition

F. H. Bradley

Family resemblance

Felicity conditions

Ferdinand Ebner

Failure to refer

Form of life (philosophy)

Franz Rosenzweig

Frege's Puzzle

Friedrich Waismann

Function and Concept

G. E. M. Anscombe

Gareth Evans (philosopher)

Genus–differentia definition

George Orwell

Gilbert Ryle

Gordon Park Baker

Gottlob Frege

Grammatology

Hans Kamp

Hector-Neri Castañeda

Henri Bergson

Ideal speech situation

Illocutionary act

Implicature

Indeterminacy (philosophy)

Indeterminacy of translation

Indexicality

Indirect self-reference

Inferential role semantics

Ingeborg Bachmann

Intension

Intensional definition

Internalism and externalism

Interpretation (logic)

J. L. Austin

Jacques Bouveresse

James F. Conant

Jody Azzouni

John Etchemendy

John McDowell

Jonathan Bennett (philosopher)

Journal of Logic, Language and Information

Karl-Otto Apel

Katarzyna Jaszczolt

Keith Donnellan

Kent Bach

Kit Fine

Language-game

Language and thought

Language of thought

Language, Truth, and Logic

Latitudinarianism (philosophy)

Lexical definition

Lexis (Aristotle)

Linguistic determinism

Linguistic relativity

Linguistic turn

Linguistics and Philosophy

List of philosophers of language

Logical atomism

Logical form

Logical positivism

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Marilyn Frye

Martian scientist

Max Black

Meaning (linguistics)

Meaning (non-linguistic)

Meaning (philosophy of language)

Meaning (semiotics)

Mediated reference theory

Meinong's jungle

Mental representation

Mental space

Metalanguage

Metaphor in philosophy

Michael Devitt

Michael Dummett

Modal property

Modistae

Modularity of mind

Moritz Schlick

Mumbo Jumbo (phrase)

Naming and Necessity

Nelson Goodman

New Foundations

Nino Cocchiarella

Noam Chomsky

Nomenclature

Nominalism

Non-rigid designator

Nonsense

Norm (philosophy)

Object language

On Denoting

Ontological commitment

Operational definition

Ordinary language philosophy

Ostensive definition

Otto Neurath

P. F. Strawson

Paradigm-case argument

Paralanguage

Paul Boghossian

Paul Grice

Performative contradiction

Performative text

Performative utterance

Persuasive definition

Peter Abelard

Peter Millican

Philosophical interpretation of classical physics

Philosophical Investigations

Philosophy and literature

Philosophy of language

Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer

Plato's Problem

Port-Royal Grammar

Pragmatics

Precising definition

Principle of charity

Principle of compositionality

Private language argument

Proper name (philosophy)

Proposition

Psychologism

Quotation

Radical translation

Rational reconstruction

Redundancy theory of truth

Reference

Relevance theory

Rhetoric of social intervention model

Richard von Mises

Rigid designator

Robert Brandom

Robert Maximilian de Gaynesford

Robert Stalnaker

Round square copula

Rudolf Carnap

S. Morris Engel

Saul Kripke

Scalar implicature

Scientific essentialism

Sebastian Shaumyan

Secondary reference

Self-reference

Semantic externalism

Semantic holism

Semantics

Semeiotic

Semiotics

Sense and reference

Sense and Sensibilia (Austin)

Shabda

Sign

Singular term

Slingshot argument

Social semiotics

Speech act

Sphota

Stanley Cavell

Statement (logic)

Stipulative definition

Structuralism

Supposition theory

Susan Stebbing

Swampman

Symbiosism

Symbol

Symbol grounding

Syntax

The Naturalization of Intentionality

Theoretical definition

Theory of descriptions

Þorsteinn Gylfason

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Transparency (linguistic)

True name

Truth-conditional semantics

Truth-value link

Truthbearer

Two Dogmas of Empiricism

Type physicalism

Universal grammar

Universal language

Universal pragmatics

Use–mention distinction

Vagueness

Verification theory

Verificationism

Vienna Circle

Virgil Aldrich

Walter Benjamin

Willard Van Orman Quine

William Alston

William C. Dowling

William Crathorn

Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language

Word and Object

Word sense

Yehoshua Bar-Hillel

Zeno Vendler

Zhuangzi

List of philosophers of language

This is a list of philosophers of language.

Virgil Aldrich

William Alston

G. E. M. Anscombe

Karl-Otto Apel

Saint Thomas Aquinas, OP

Aristotle

J. L. Austin

Alfred Jules Ayer

Joxe Azurmendi

Jody Azzouni

Kent Bach

Ingeborg Bachmann

Archie J. Bahm

Yehoshua Bar-Hillel

Walter Benjamin

Jonathan Bennett

Henri Bergson

Max Black

Paul Boghossian

Andrea Bonomi

Jacques Bouveresse

F. H. Bradley

Robert Brandom

Berit Brogaard

Cardinal Thomas Cajetan, OP

Herman Cappelen

Rudolf Carnap

Hector-Neri Castañeda

Stanley Cavell

David Chalmers

Cheung Kam Ching

Noam Chomsky

Alonzo Church

Nino Cocchiarella

James F. Conant

William Crathorn

Donald Davidson

Arda Denkel

Michael Devitt

Keith Donnellan

William C. Dowling

César Chesneau Dumarsais

Michael Dummett

David Efird

S. Morris Engel

John Etchemendy

Gareth Evans

Kit Fine

Dagfinn Føllesdal

Gottlob Frege

Marilyn Frye

Robert Maximilian de Gaynesford

Peter Geach

Alexander George

Allan Gibbard

Gongsun Long

Nelson Goodman

Paul Grice

Jeroen Groenendijk

Samuel Guttenplan

Þorsteinn Gylfason

Susan Haack

Jürgen Habermas

Peter Hacker

Ian Hacking

Axel Hägerström

Bob Hale

Oswald Hanfling

Gilbert Harman

John Hawthorne

Jaakko Hintikka

William Hirstein

Richard Hönigswald

Jennifer Hornsby

Paul Horwich

Wilhelm von Humboldt

Carrie Ichikawa Jenkins

David Kaplan

Jerrold Katz

Saul Kripke

Mark Lance

Stephen Laurence

Ernest Lepore

David Kellogg Lewis

John Locke

Béatrice Longuenesse

Paul Lorenzen

William Lycan

John McDowell

Colin McGinn

Merab Mamardashvili

Ruth Barcan Marcus

José Medina

Maurice Merleau-Ponty

John Stuart Mill

Ruth Millikan

Richard Montague

Charles W. Morris

Adam Morton

Stephen Neale

William of Ockham

Jesús Padilla Gálvez

Peter Pagin

L.A. Paul

Charles Sanders Peirce

Carlo Penco

John Perry

Gualtiero Piccinini

Steven Pinker

Plato

Hilary Putnam

Willard Van Orman Quine

Adolf Reinach

Denise Riley

Richard Rorty

Roscellinus

Jay Rosenberg

Bertrand Russell's views on philosophy

Bertrand Russell

Gilbert Ryle

Robert Rynasiewicz

Mark Sainsbury

Nathan Salmon

Stephen Schiffer

Duns Scotus

John Searle

Susanna Siegel

Brian Skyrms

Quentin Smith

Scott Soames

David Sosa

Robert Stalnaker

Jason Stanley

John of St. Thomas, OP (John Poinsot)

Jaun Elia

Stephen Yablo

P. F. Strawson

Alfred Tarski

Kenneth Allen Taylor

Ernst Tugendhat

Michael Tye

Zeno Vendler

Vācaspati Miśra

Friedrich Waismann

Brian Weatherson

Michael Williams

Timothy Williamson

John Wisdom

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Crispin Wright

Georg Henrik von Wright

Edward N. Zalta

Eddy Zemach

Paul Ziff

Dean Zimmerman

Masked-man fallacy

In philosophical logic, the masked-man fallacy (also known as the intensional fallacy and the epistemic fallacy) is committed when one makes an illicit use of Leibniz's law in an argument. Leibniz's law states that, if one object has a certain property, while another object does not have the same property, the two objects cannot be identical. The fallacy is "epistemic" because it posits an immediate identity between a subject's knowledge of an object with the object itself.

Mediated reference theory

A mediated reference theory (also indirect reference theory) is any semantic theory that posits that words refer to something in the external world, but insists that there is more to the meaning of a name than simply the object to which it refers. It thus stands opposed to the theory of direct reference. Gottlob Frege is a well-known advocate of mediated reference theories. Similar theories were widely held in the middle of the twentieth century by philosophers such as Peter Strawson and John Searle.

Mediated reference theories are contrasted with theories of direct reference.

Saul Kripke, a proponent of direct reference theory, in his Naming and Necessity dubbed mediated reference theory the Frege–Russell view and criticized it. Subsequent scholarship refuted the claim that Bertrand Russell's views on reference theory were the same as Frege's, since Russell was also a proponent of direct reference theory.

Metatheorem

In logic, a metatheorem is a statement about a formal system proven in a metalanguage. Unlike theorems proved within a given formal system, a metatheorem is proved within a metatheory, and may reference concepts that are present in the metatheory but not the object theory.A formal system is determined by a formal language and a deductive system (axioms and rules of inference). The formal system can be used to prove particular sentences of the formal language with that system. Metatheorems, however, are proved externally to the system in question, in its metatheory. Common metatheories used in logic are set theory (especially in model theory) and primitive recursive arithmetic (especially in proof theory). Rather than demonstrating particular sentences to be provable, metatheorems may show that each of a broad class of sentences can be proved, or show that certain sentences cannot be proved.

Notion (philosophy)

A notion in philosophy is a reflection in the mind of real objects and phenomena in their essential features and relations. Notions are usually described in terms of scope and content. This is because notions are often created in response to empirical observations (or experiments) of covarying trends among variables.

Notion is the common translation for Begriff as used by Hegel in his Science of Logic (1816).

Philosophical logic

Philosophical logic refers to those areas of philosophy in which recognized methods of logic have traditionally been used to solve or advance the discussion of philosophical problems. Among these, Sybil Wolfram highlights the study of argument, meaning, and truth, while Colin McGinn presents identity, existence, predication, necessity and truth as the main topics of his book on the subject.Philosophical logic also addresses extensions and alternatives to traditional, "classical" logic known as "non-classical" logics. These receive more attention in texts such as John P. Burgess's Philosophical Logic, the Blackwell Companion to Philosophical Logic, or the multi-volume Handbook of Philosophical Logic edited by Dov M. Gabbay and Franz Guenthner.

Philosophy of logic

Following the developments in formal logic with symbolic logic in the late nineteenth century and mathematical logic in the twentieth, topics traditionally treated by logic not being part of formal logic have tended to be termed either philosophy of logic or philosophical logic if no longer simply logic.

Compared to the history of logic the demarcation between philosophy of logic and philosophical logic is of recent coinage and not always entirely clear. Characterisations include

Philosophy of logic is the area of philosophy devoted to examining the scope and nature of logic.

Philosophy of logic is the investigation, critical analysis and intellectual reflection on issues arising in logic. The field is considered to be distinct from philosophical logic.

Philosophical logic is the branch of study that concerns questions about reference, predication, identity, truth, quantification, existence, entailment, modality, and necessity.

Philosophical logic is the application of formal logical techniques to philosophical problems.This article outlines issues in philosophy of logic or provides links to relevant articles or both.

Principle of compositionality

In mathematics, semantics, and philosophy of language, the principle of compositionality is the principle that the meaning of a complex expression is determined by the meanings of its constituent expressions and the rules used to combine them. This principle is also called Frege's principle, because Gottlob Frege is widely credited for the first modern formulation of it. However, the idea appears already among Indian philosophers of grammar such as Yāska, and also in Plato's work such as in Theaetetus.

Besides, the principle was never explicitly stated by Frege, and it was arguably already assumed by George Boole decades before Frege's work.

Quasi-quotation

Quasi-quotation or Quine quotation is a linguistic device in formal languages that facilitates rigorous and terse formulation of general rules about linguistic expressions while properly observing the use–mention distinction. It was introduced by the philosopher and logician Willard van Orman Quine in his book Mathematical Logic, originally published in 1940. Put simply, quasi-quotation enables one to introduce symbols that stand for a linguistic expression in a given instance and are used as that linguistic expression in a different instance.

For example, one can use quasi-quotation to illustrate an instance of substitutional quantification, like the following:

"Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white.

Therefore, there is some sequence of symbols that makes the following sentence true when every instance of φ is replaced by that sequence of symbols: "φ" is true if and only if φ.Quasi-quotation is used to indicate (usually in more complex formulas) that the φ and "φ" in this sentence are related things, that one is the iteration of the other in a metalanguage. Quine introduced quasiquotes because he wished to avoid the use of variables, and work only with closed sentences (expressions not containing any variables). However, he still needed to be able to talk about sentences with arbitrary predicates in them, and thus, the quasiquotes provided the mechanism to make such statements. Quine had hoped that, by avoiding variables and schemata, he would minimize confusion for the readers, as well as staying closer to the language that mathematicians actually use.Quasi-quotation is sometimes denoted using the symbols ⌜ and ⌝ (unicode U+231C, U+231D), or double square brackets, ⟦ ⟧ ("Oxford brackets"), instead of ordinary quotation marks.

Quotation marks in English

In English writing, quotation marks or inverted commas, also known informally as quotes, talking marks, speech marks, quote marks, quotemarks or speechmarks, are punctuation marks placed on either side of a word or phrase in order to identify it as a quotation, direct speech or a literal title or name. They are also used to indicate that the meaning of the word or phrase they surround should be taken to be different from (or, at least, a modification of) that typically associated with it (e.g. in the sentence the elite, composed by people of mixed ancestry, embraced their "whiteness" – the quotation marks modify the word whiteness to pertain to European culture rather than the colour white); in this way, they are often used to express irony. They also sometimes appear to be used as a means of adding emphasis, although this usage is usually considered incorrect.Quotation marks are written as a pair of opening and closing marks in either of two styles: single (‘...’) or double (“...”). Opening and closing quotation marks may be identical in form (called neutral, vertical, straight, typewriter, or "dumb" quotation marks), or may be distinctly left-handed and right-handed (typographic or, colloquially, curly quotation marks); see quotation mark glyphs for details. Typographic quotation marks are usually used in manuscript and typeset text. Because typewriter and computer keyboards lack keys to directly enter typographic quotation marks, much typed writing has neutral quotation marks. The "smart quotes" feature in some computer software can convert neutral quotation marks to typographic ones, but sometimes imperfectly.

The typographic closing double quotation mark and the neutral double quotation mark are similar to—and sometimes used to represent—the ditto mark and the double prime symbol. Likewise, the typographic opening single quotation mark is sometimes used to represent the ʻokina while either the typographic closing single quotation mark or the neutral single quotation mark may represent the prime symbol. All these characters are different, however, and are given different Unicode code points. In contrast, the neutral single quotation mark and the typographic closing single quotation mark are, respectively, the same characters as the neutral apostrophe and the typographic apostrophe. (Although the neutral single quotation mark and the two typographic single quotation marks have different code points, at least one source holds that there is a unique "true single quote" character with multiple glyphs.)

Sense and reference

In the philosophy of language, the distinction between sense and reference was an innovation of the German philosopher and mathematician Gottlob Frege in 1892 (in his paper "On Sense and Reference"; German: "Über Sinn und Bedeutung"), reflecting the two ways he believed a singular term may have meaning.

The reference (or "referent"; Bedeutung) of a proper name is the object it means or indicates (bedeuten), its sense (Sinn) is what the name expresses. The reference of a sentence is its truth value, its sense is the thought that it expresses. Frege justified the distinction in a number of ways.

Sense is something possessed by a name, whether or not it has a reference. For example, the name "Odysseus" is intelligible, and therefore has a sense, even though there is no individual object (its reference) to which the name corresponds.

The sense of different names is different, even when their reference is the same. Frege argued that if an identity statement such as "Hesperus is the same planet as Phosphorus" is to be informative, the proper names flanking the identity sign must have a different meaning or sense. But clearly, if the statement is true, they must have the same reference. The sense is a 'mode of presentation', which serves to illuminate only a single aspect of the referent.Much of analytic philosophy is traceable to Frege's philosophy of language. Frege's views on logic (i.e., his idea that some parts of speech are complete by themselves, and are analogous to the arguments of a mathematical function) led to his views on a theory of reference.

Statement (logic)

In logic, the term statement is variously understood to mean either:

(a) a meaningful declarative sentence that is true or false, or

(b) the assertion that is made by a true or false declarative sentence.In the latter case, a statement is distinct from a sentence in that a sentence is only one formulation of a statement, whereas there may be many other formulations expressing the same statement.

Symbiosism

Symbiosism is a philosophy about the mind and man's place in nature. It is a Darwinian theory, which considers language an organism residing in the human brain and claims that language is a memetic life form. Symbiosism is defined by the Leiden School.

Theological noncognitivism

Theological noncognitivism is the position that religious language – specifically, words such as "God" – are not cognitively meaningful. It is sometimes considered synonymous with ignosticism.

Use

Use may refer to:

Use (law), an obligation on a person to whom property has been conveyed

Use–mention distinction, the distinction between using a word and mentioning it

Use (liturgy), a special form of Roman Catholic ritual adopted for use in a particular dioceseor to:

Consumption, whether economic (i.e. microeconomic), or indicative of devouring or occupying

Depletion, use to the point of lack of supply

Psychological manipulation, in a form that treats a person is as a means to an end

Utilization, quantification of the use of assets to be continuously let

Philosophers
Theories
Concepts
Related articles

This page is based on a Wikipedia article written by authors (here).
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 3.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.