Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) were two rounds of bilateral conferences and corresponding international treaties involving the United States and the Soviet Union, the Cold War superpowers, on the issue of arms control. The two rounds of talks and agreements were SALT I and SALT II.

Negotiations commenced in Helsinki, Finland, in November 1969.[1] SALT I led to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and an interim agreement between the two countries. Although SALT II resulted in an agreement in 1979, the United States Senate chose not to ratify the treaty in response to the Soviet war in Afghanistan, which took place later that year. The Soviet legislature also did not ratify it. The agreement expired on December 31, 1985 and was not renewed.

The talks led to the STARTs, or Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, which consisted of START I (a 1991 completed agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union) and START II (a 1993 agreement between the United States and Russia, which was never ratified by the United States), both of which proposed limits on multiple-warhead capacities and other restrictions on each side's number of nuclear weapons. A successor to START I, New START, was proposed and was eventually ratified in February 2011.

West and East Germans at the Brandenburg Gate in 1989

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SALT I Treaty

SALT I is the common name for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreement signed on May 26, 1972. SALT I froze the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers at existing levels and provided for the addition of new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers only after the same number of older intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and SLBM launchers had been dismantled.[2] SALT I also limited land-based ICBMs that were in range from the northeastern border of the continental United States to the northwestern border of the continental USSR.[3] In addition to that, SALT I limited the number of SLBM capable submarines that NATO and the United States could operate to 50 with a maximum of 800 SLBM launchers between them. If the United States or NATO were to increase that number, the USSR could respond with increasing their arsenal by the same amount.

The strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States were changing in character in 1968. The total number of missiles held by the United States had been static since 1967 at 1,054 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs but there was an increasing number of missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads being deployed. MIRVs carried multiple nuclear warheads, often with dummies, to confuse ABM systems, making MIRV defense by ABM systems increasingly difficult and expensive.[2] Both sides were also permitted to increase their number of SLBM forces, but only after disassembling an equivalent number of older ICBMs or SLBM launchers on older submarines.

One clause of the treaty required both countries to limit the number of deployment sites protected by an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system to one each. The idea of this system was that it would prevent a competition in ABM deployment between the US and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had deployed such a system around Moscow in 1966 and the United States announced an ABM program to protect twelve ICBM sites in 1967. After 1968, the Soviet Union tested a system for the SS-9 missile, otherwise known as the R-36 missile.[4] A modified two-tier Moscow ABM system is still used. The United States built only one ABM site to protect a Minuteman base in North Dakota where the "Safeguard" Program was deployed. This base was increasingly more vulnerable to attacks by the Soviet ICBMs, because of the advancement in Soviet missile technology.

Negotiations lasted from November 17, 1969, until May 1972 in a series of meetings beginning in Helsinki, with the US delegation headed by Gerard C. Smith, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Subsequent sessions alternated between Vienna and Helsinki. After a long deadlock, the first results of SALT I came in May 1971, when an agreement was reached over ABM systems. Further discussion brought the negotiations to an end on May 26, 1972, in Moscow when Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed both the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Interim Agreement Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.[5]

The two sides also agreed to a number of basic principles regrading appropriate conduct. Each recognized the sovereignty of the other and agreed to the principle of non-interference while at the same seeking to promote economic, scientific, and cultural ties of mutual benefit and enrichment.[6][7][8]

Nixon was proud that thanks to his diplomatic skills, he achieved an agreement that his predecessors were unable to reach. Nixon and Kissinger planned to link arms control to détente and to the resolution of other urgent problems through what Nixon called "linkage." David Tal argues:

The linkage between strategic arms limitations and outstanding issues such as the Middle East, Berlin and, foremost, Vietnam thus became central to Nixon’s and Kissinger’s policy of détente. Through employment of linkage, they hoped to change the nature and course of U.S. foreign policy, including U.S. nuclear disarmament and arms control policy, and to separate them from those practiced by Nixon’s predecessors. They also intended, through linkage, to make U.S. arms control policy part of détente....His policy of linkage had in fact failed. It failed mainly because it was based on flawed assumptions and false premises, the foremost of which was that the Soviet Union wanted strategic arms limitation agreement much more than the United States did.[9]


Carter Brezhnev sign SALT II
Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev signing the SALT II treaty, June 18, 1979, at the Hofburg Palace in Vienna.

SALT II was a series of talks between United States and Soviet negotiators from 1972 to 1979 which sought to curtail the manufacture of strategic nuclear weapons. It was a continuation of the SALT I talks and was led by representatives from both countries. SALT II was the first nuclear arms treaty which assumed real reductions in strategic forces to 2,250 of all categories of delivery vehicles on both sides.

The SALT II Treaty banned new missile programs (a new missile defined as one with any key parameter 5% better than in currently deployed missiles), so both sides were forced to limit their new strategic missile types development and construction, such as the development of additional fixed ICBM launchers. Likewise, this agreement would limit the number of MIRVed ballistic missiles and long range missiles to 1,320.[10] However, the United States preserved their most essential programs like the Trident missile, along with the cruise missiles President Jimmy Carter wished to use as his main defensive weapon as they were too slow to have first strike capability. In return, the USSR could exclusively retain 308 of its so-called "heavy ICBM" launchers of the SS-18 type.

A major breakthrough for this agreement occurred at the Vladivostok Summit meeting in November 1974, when President Gerald Ford and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev came to an agreement on the basic framework for the SALT II agreement. The elements of this agreement were stated to be in effect through 1985.

An agreement to limit strategic launchers was reached in Vienna on June 18, 1979, and was signed by Leonid Brezhnev and Carter at a ceremony held in the Redoutensaal of the imperial Hofburg Palace.[11]

Six months after the signing, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and in September of the same year, the United States discovered that a Soviet combat brigade was stationed in Cuba.[12] Although President Carter claimed this Soviet brigade had only recently been deployed to Cuba, the unit had been stationed on the island since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.[13] In light of these developments, the treaty was never ratified by the United States Senate. Its terms were, nonetheless, honored by the U.S. until 1986.[14] SALT II was superseded by START I in 1991.[15]

See also


  1. ^ Paterson, Thomas G (2009). American foreign relations: a history. Vol. 2 Vol. 2 (7 ed.). Wadsworth. p. 376. ISBN 9780547225692.
  2. ^ a b SALT I, 1969-1972, US State Department's Foreign Relations Series (FRUS)
  3. ^ "Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I)" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on May 2, 2014. Retrieved April 27, 2015.
  4. ^ Smart, Ian (1970). "The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks". The World Today. 26 (7): 296–305. JSTOR 40394395.
  5. ^
  6. ^ "SALT 1 | Détente | National Curriculum | Schools & Colleges | National Cold War Exhibition". Royal Air Force Museum. Archived from the original on 2018-08-14. Retrieved 2019-03-07.
  7. ^ Sargent, Daniel J. (2015). A Superpower Transformed : The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s. Oxford University Press. pp. 62–63. ISBN 9780195395471. The basic principles agreement affirmed that the superpowers would conduct their relations on "principles of sovereignty, equality, [and] non-interference in internal affairs.
  8. ^ Nixon, Richard M. Richard Nixon: 1972 : Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President. pp. 633–635.
  9. ^ David Tal, " 'Absolutes' and 'Stages' in the Making and Application of Nixon’s SALT Policy." Diplomatic History 37.5 (2013): 1090-1116, quoting pp 1091, 1092. Nixon himself later wrote, "[W]e decided to link progress in such areas of Soviet concern as strategic arms limitation and increased trade with progress in areas that were important to us -– Vietnam, the Mideast, and Berlin. This concept became known as linkage.” Richard Nixon (1978). RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. p. 346.
  10. ^ Formigoni, Guido (2006). Storia della politica internazionale nell'età contemporanea (in Italian). Il Mulino. p. 463. ISBN 9788815113900.
  11. ^ Schram, Martin (19 June 1979). "Carter and Brezhnev Sign SALT II". The Washington Post. Retrieved 23 March 2017.
  12. ^ Peters,Gerhard; Woolley, John T. "Jimmy Carter: "Peace and National Security Address to the Nation on Soviet Combat Troops in Cuba and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.," October 1, 1979". The American Presidency Project. University of California - Santa Barbara.
  13. ^ Gaddis, John Lewis (2007). The Cold War: a new history. Penguin Books. p. 203. ISBN 1594200629.
  14. ^ "U.S. to Break SALT II Limits Friday". The Washington Post. 27 November 1986. Retrieved 23 March 2017.
  15. ^ "Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) | Treaties & Regimes | NTI". Retrieved 23 March 2017.


  • Ambrose, Matthew, The Control Agenda: A History of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2018). [1]
  • Burr, William (ed.), The Secret History of The ABM Treaty, 1969-1972, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 60, The National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., 8 November 2001,
  • Calvo-Goller Karin and Calvo Michel, The SALT AGREEMENTS: Content, Application, Verification, Brill, 1987, 428 p, [2] at Google Books
  • Clearwater, John Murray, Johnson, McNamara, and the Birth of SALT and the ABM Treaty, 1963-1969 (Dissertation.Com, 1999) ISBN 978-1581120622
  • Garthoff, Raymond L., "Negotiating SALT," Wilson Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 5, Autumn 1977, pp. 76–85, JSTOR 40255284
  • Garthoff, Raymond L., Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994), esp. pgs. 146-223
  • Haslam, Jonathan and Theresa Osborne, SALT I: The Limitations of Arms Negotiations. U.S.-Soviet Talks Leading to the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, 1969-1972, Pew Case Studies in International Affairs, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 1987
  • Mahan, Erin R. and Edward C. Keefer (eds.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010),
  • Newhouse, John, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973)
  • Payne, Samuel B. The Soviet Union and SALT (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1980)
  • Savel'yev, Alexander' G. and Nikolay N. Detinov, The Big Five: Arms Control Decision-Making in the Soviet Union (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995)
  • Smart, Ian. "The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks." The World Today, vol. 26, no. 7, 1970, pp. 296–305. JSTOR 40394395
  • Smith, Gerard C., Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I by the Chief American Negotiator (New York: Doubleday, 1980)
  • Smith, Gerard C., Disarming Diplomat: The Memoirs of Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, Arms Control Negotiator (Toronto, Ontario: Madison Books, 1996)
  • Tal, David. " 'Absolutes' and 'Stages' in the Making and Application of Nixon’s SALT Policy." Diplomatic History 37.5 (2013): 1090-1116.
  • Tal, David, US Strategic Arms Policy in the Cold War: Negotiation and Confrontation over SALT, 1969-1979 (New York: Routledge, 2017). [3]
  • Talbott, Strobe, Endgame: The Inside Story of Salt II (New York: Harpercollins, 1979)

External links


The 53T6 (NATO reporting name: ABM-3 Gazelle, previously SH-08) is a Russian anti-ballistic missile. Designed in 1978 and in service since 1995, it is a component of the A-135 anti-ballistic missile system.

The missile is able to intercept incoming re-entry vehicles at a distance of 80 km. The 53T6 is a two-stage solid-propellant rocket armed with a 10 kt thermonuclear weapon. The missile is about 10 meters in length and 1.8 meters in diameter. Its launch weight is 10 tons.The 53T6 missile is kept in a silo-based launch container. Prior to launch its cover is blown off.

The missile achieves speeds of approximately Mach 17 (20,826 km/h; 12,941 mph; 5.7849 km/s). Maximal load manoeuvre capability is 210 g longitudinal and 90 g transverse.

Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War

The Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement was created to reduce the danger of nuclear war between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The agreement was signed in Washington, D.C., on June 22, 1973, during a relative period of détente. The United States and the U.S.S.R. agreed to reduce the threat of a nuclear war and establish a policy to restrain hostility.

In reality, the agreement had little impact, with Henry Kissinger doubting whether it was "worth the effort" and describing the outcome as only "marginally useful".

Albert Carnesale

Albert Carnesale (born July 2, 1936) is an American academic and a specialist in arms control and national security. He is a former chancellor of the University of California, Los Angeles, provost of Harvard University, and dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. In November 1994, while serving as dean and provost, Carnesale was appointed acting president of Harvard while President Neil L. Rudenstine was on leave. He served in that position for three months. He has also been active in international diplomacy on nuclear arms control and nuclear non-proliferation. From 1970-72, he was a member of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) with the Soviet Union—a major step towards controlling nuclear weapons. Carnesale teaches undergraduate and graduate courses at UCLA on topics relating to U.S. national security.

Dangerous Capabilities

Dangerous Capabilities: Paul Nitze and the Cold War is a biography of Paul Nitze, the Cold War strategist and diplomat. It was published by HarperCollins in 1990 and written by David Callahan.

Drama theory

Not to be confused with dramatic theory—theories about theatre and drama.

Drama theory is one of the problem structuring methods in operations research. It is based on game theory and adapts the use of games to complex organisational situations, accounting for emotional responses that can provoke irrational reactions and lead the players to redefine the game. In a drama, emotions trigger rationalizations that create changes in the game, and so change follows change until either all conflicts are resolved or action becomes necessary. The game as redefined is then played.

Drama theory was devised by Professor Nigel Howard in the early 90s and, since then, has been turned to defense, political, health, industrial relations and commercial applications. Drama theory is an extension of Howard's metagame analysis work developed at the University of Pennsylvania in the late 1960s, and presented formally in his book "Paradoxes of Rationality", published by MIT Press. Metagame analysis was originally used to advise on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

Gerald W. Johnson (nuclear expert)

Gerald Woodrow Johnson (September 16, 1917 – April 7, 2005) was born in Spangle, Spokane County, Washington. He attended Washington State University where he got his master's degree; earned a PhD in 1947 from the University of California, Berkeley. in the 1950s he oversaw nuclear testing in Nevada and in the Pacific. He became director of Project Plowshare, researching the uses of peaceful nuclear explosions. In the late '70s he was a representative to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II and to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty negotiations.

Gerard C. Smith

Gerard Coad Smith (May 4, 1914 – July 4, 1994) was the chief U.S. delegate to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in 1969 and the first U.S. Chairman of the Trilateral Commission. He was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom on January 16, 1981 by President Jimmy Carter.

Smith was born in New York City. His father, John Thomas Smith, was a lawyer who served as general counsel of General Motors Corporation for many years. Gerard Smith graduated from Yale College in 1935 and Yale Law School in 1938 and became a practicing attorney in New York City. During World War II he served as a procurement officer for the Department of the Navy in Washington, D.C. In 1950 he returned to government service as a special assistant to Thomas E. Murray, a member of the Atomic Energy Commission. Smith became an expert in the international aspects of the use of nuclear energy and helped brief the members of the AEC on President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace proposal in 1953.

In 1954 Smith transferred to the Department of State and became a special assistant for atomic energy matters to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. He continued to work on the international aspects of atomic energy and followed the disarmament negotiations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union which were being handled by Harold Stassen. In 1957 Smith was promoted to Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning, and became director of the policy planning staff. In this position he was responsible for developing policy on a wide range of international matters, much of these related to sensitive areas of east-west relations. While in this role he proposed that a direct communications link between Moscow and Washington be established. President Kennedy would later credit Smith for the establishment of the so-called "hot line."

Smith returned to private life in 1961. He served as a consultant to a number of organizations and started his own magazine, Interplay, which promoted an internationalist viewpoint. During the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations he also served as a special consultant to the Department of State on the Multilateral Force (MLF), an unsuccessful proposal to develop a military force in Western Europe.

At the start of the Nixon administration Smith was appointed director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). He led the U.S. negotiating team during the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union which resulted in the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972.

Gerard C. Smith was North American Chairman of the Trilateral Commission from 1973 to 1977.In 1973, following completion of the treaty, Smith again resigned from the government. David Rockefeller recruited him to help develop the Trilateral Commission, an organization which encouraged Japanese businessmen to become more active in American and European affairs. Smith served as chairman of the North American delegation to the Commission. In this position he became acquainted with Jimmy Carter, the governor of Georgia, who was also active in the Commission.

In 1977, after Carter became president, he invited Smith to serve as a special presidential representative for non-proliferation matters. Smith traveled to a number of underdeveloped countries, including India,

Pakistan, Brazil and South Africa, in an effort to discourage the countries from developing nuclear weapons. He also worked with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure that spent nuclear fuel was not diverted to weapons.

Smith resigned from the government for the last time in 1980. He organized a private consulting firm, the Consultants International Group, which specialized in advising companies on international investments. He also retained an interest in disarmament and was active in educational and lobbying organizations such as the Arms Control Association and the Washington Council on Non-Proliferation. He strongly opposed President Ronald Reagan’s proposed Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI; popularly known as“Star Wars”) which he felt violated the 1972 ABM Treaty, and together with George Kennan, McGeorge Bundy and Robert McNamara co-authored an article in Foreign Affairs calling upon the US to declare a policy of "no first use" of nuclear weapons.

John Newhouse

Wilfred John Newhouse (February 6, 1929 – December 10, 2016) was an American journalist and author. He was best known as the author of the book War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, published in 1989 as companion to a PBS television series.

List of weapons of mass destruction treaties

A variety of treaties and agreements have been enacted to regulate the use, development and possession of various types of weapons of mass destruction. Treaties may regulate weapons use under the customs of war (Hague Conventions, Geneva Protocol), ban specific types of weapons (Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention), limit weapons research (Partial Test Ban Treaty, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty), limit allowable weapons stockpiles and delivery systems (START I, SORT) or regulate civilian use of weapon precursors (Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention). The history of weapons control has also included treaties to limit effective defense against weapons of mass destruction in order to preserve the deterrent doctrine of mutual assured destruction (Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty) as well as treaties to limit the spread of nuclear technologies geographically (African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty).

Moscow Summit (1972)

The Moscow Summit of 1972 was a summit meeting between President Richard M. Nixon of the United States and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It was held May 22–30, 1972. It featured the signing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), and the U.S.–Soviet Incidents at Sea agreement. The summit is considered one of the hallmarks of the détente at the time between the two Cold War antagonists.

Nick Parkinson

Sir Nicholas Fancourt "Nick" Parkinson (5 December 1925 – 12 September 2001) was a senior Australian Public Servant. He was Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs between February 1977 and September 1979.

Paul Nitze

Paul Henry Nitze (January 16, 1907 – October 19, 2004) was an American statesman who served as United States Deputy Secretary of Defense, U.S. Secretary of the Navy, and Director of Policy Planning for the U.S. State Department. He is best known for being the principal author of NSC 68 and the co-founder of Team B. He helped shape Cold War defense policy over the course of numerous presidential administrations.


RSL-3, in Cavalier County, North Dakota near Concrete, was listed on the National Register of Historic Places in 2018.It is located at 12329 ND 5.

It is a Remote Sprint Launch facility, part of the Safeguard missile defense program.

According to the Minot Daily News,RSL-3 near Concrete is one of four Remote Sprint Launch sites that were built as part of the Stanley R. Mickelsen Safeguard Complex in northeastern North Dakota. The complex was the only anti-ballistic missile defense facility ever built in the United States. Its existence has been credited by Cold War historians as playing a major role in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Treaties with the Soviet Union. The site is significant at the national level for its role in the Cold War and the advancements in technology that stemmed from the project.

Roger Molander

Roger Carl Molander (November 20, 1940 – March 25, 2012) was an American government official and activist.

Safeguard Program

The Safeguard Program was a U.S. Army anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system designed to protect the U.S. Air Force's Minuteman ICBM silos from attack, thus preserving the US's nuclear deterrent fleet. It was intended primarily to protect against the very small Chinese ICBM fleet, limited Soviet attacks and various other limited launch scenarios. A full-scale attack by the Soviets would easily overwhelm it, a deliberate point to ensure the Soviets did not consider it a strategic threat. It was designed to allow gradual upgrades to provide similar lightweight coverage over the entire United States over time.

Safeguard was the ultimate development of an ever-changing series of designs produced by Bell Labs that started in the 1950s with the LIM-49 Nike Zeus. By 1960 it was clear that Zeus offered almost no protection against a sophisticated attack using decoys. A new design emerged, Nike-X, with the ability to defend against attacks with hundreds of warheads and thousands of decoys, but the cost of the system was enormous. Looking for alternatives, the Sentinel program offered a lightweight cover that would protect against limited attacks. Sentinel began construction in 1968 but ran into a firestorm of protest over its bases being placed in suburban areas. In March 1969, incoming president Richard Nixon announced that Sentinel would be cancelled and redirected to protect the missile farms, and that its bases would be placed well away from any civilian areas.

The debate about ABM protection of US ICBMs had been going on for over a decade when Safeguard was announced, and the arguments against such a system were well known both in the military and civilian circles. In military circles, the most basic argument against Safeguard was that adding an ABM requires the Soviets to build another ICBM to counter it, but the same is true if the US builds another ICBM instead. The Air Force was far more interested in building more of their own ICBMs than Army ABMs, and lobbied against the Army continually. In the public sphere, opinion by the late 1960s was anti-military in general, and in an era of ongoing Strategic Arms Limitation Talks the entire concept was derided as sabre rattling. Safeguard had been developed to calm opposition but found itself just as heavily opposed. Nixon pressed ahead in spite of objections and complaints about limited performance, and the reasons for his strong support remains a subject of debate among historians and political commentators.

Through the Safeguard era, talks between the US and Soviet Union originally started by Johnson were continuing. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 limited the US and Soviet Union to two ABM sites each. Safeguard was scaled back to sites in North Dakota and Montana, abandoning initial work at a site in Missouri, and cancelling all other planned bases. Construction on the two remaining bases continued until 1974, when an additional agreement limited both countries to a single ABM site. The Montana site was abandoned with the main radar partially completed. The remaining base in North Dakota, the Stanley R. Mickelsen Safeguard Complex, became active on 1 April 1975 and fully operational on 1 October 1975. By that time the House Appropriations Committee had already voted to deactivate it. The base was shut down on 10 February 1976.

Thomas Graham Jr.

Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr. is a former senior U.S. diplomat. Graham was involved in the negotiation of every single international arms control and non-proliferation agreement from 1970 to 1997. This includes the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT Treaties), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START Treaties), the Anti-ballistic missile (ABM) Treaty, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) Treaty, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT), Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). In 1993, Ambassador Graham served as Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) from January to November, 1993 and Acting Deputy Director from November, 1993 to July, 1994. From 1994 through 1997, he was president Bill Clinton's special representative for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and Disarmament. Graham successfully led the U.S. government efforts to achieve the permanent extension of the NPT in 1995. Graham also served for 15 years as the general counsel of ACDA. Throughout his career, Thomas Graham has worked with six U.S. Presidents including Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton. Ambassador Graham worked on the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention and managed the Senate approval of the ratification of the Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical and biological weapons in war, as well as the Biological Weapons Convention. Graham is also the Director and Board Chairman of CanAlaska Uranium, a mining exploration company. Thomas Graham is a member of the New York, the District of Columbia and Kentucky Bar Associations and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. From 1986 to 1994 he chaired the committee on Arms Control and Disarmament of the American Bar Association. Graham is also the executive chairman of the Lightbridge Corporation and a National Advisory Board member of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, the research arm of Council for a Livable World.

Tom Dine

Tom Dine (Thomas A. Dine) previously served as a senior policy advisor at Israel Policy Forum (IPF), assisting with policy, programming, and development decision-making in the Washington office. Dine had served as chief executive officer of the Jewish Community Federation of San Francisco, president of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in Prague, and as Assistant Administrator for Europe and the New Independent States of Eurasia at USAID.

Most notably, he was the executive director of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) from 1980 through 1993. Alhurra has hired Tom Dine as a consultant.

Ulbricht Doctrine

The Ulbricht Doctrine, named after East German leader Walter Ulbricht, was the assertion that normal diplomatic relations between East Germany and West Germany could occur only if both states fully recognised each other's sovereignty. That contrasted with the Hallstein Doctrine, a West German policy which insisted that West Germany was the only legitimate German state.

East Germany gained acceptance of its view from fellow Communist states, such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria, which all agreed not to normalise relations with West Germany until it recognised East German sovereignty.

West Germany eventually abandoned its Hallstein Doctrine, instead adopting the policies of Ostpolitik. In December 1972, a Basic Treaty between East and West Germany was signed that reaffirmed two German states as separate entities. The treaty also allowed the exchange of diplomatic missions and the entry of both German states to the United Nations as full members.

William Van Cleave

William R. Van Cleave was a former advisor to President Ronald Reagan, the United States Department of Defense, and Department of State as well as Emeritus Professor, former head, and the founder of Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies (DSS). The DSS program is now located in Fairfax, VA, 10 miles from Washington D.C. He was also advisory council member of the Center for Security Policy, board advisor of the American Center for Democracy and National Institute for Public Policy. As a strategic thinker, he is remembered as a leading Cold Warrior and long-standing hawkish policy advocate.

Frozen conflicts
Foreign policy
See also
Nuclear weapons limitation treaties

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