In the context of the Iraq War, the surge refers to United States President George W. Bush's 2007 increase in the number of American troops in order to provide security to Baghdad and Al Anbar Province.
The surge was developed under the working title "The New Way Forward" and was announced in January 2007 by Bush during a television speech. Bush ordered the deployment of more than 20,000 soldiers into Iraq (five additional brigades), and sent the majority of them into Baghdad. He also extended the tour of most of the Army troops in country and some of the Marines already in the Anbar Province area. The President described the overall objective as establishing a "...unified, democratic federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the War on Terror." The major element of the strategy was a change in focus for the US military "to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security". The President stated that the surge would then provide the time and conditions conducive to reconciliation between communities.
Initiated against strong domestic opposition and after the Republican defeat in the 2006 midterm elections, the surge was considered extremely politically difficult. One White House staffer explained the political rationale succinctly: "If you're going to be a bear, be a grizzly." In retrospect, Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama and other critics of the surge have acknowledged that it was successful.
The phrases "New Way Forward", "The New Way Forward" and "A new way forward in Iraq" were widely used by White House Press Secretary Tony Snow and the news media prior to the President's speech on January 10, 2007 announcing the policy change. The US press also refers to the increase as a "surge" or "Iraq troop surge". Following the speech, some Democrats began using the term "escalation" rather than "surge," though others in the party use the terms interchangeably.
Polls showed that after the 2006 general election, "A substantial majority of Americans expect Democrats to reduce or end American military involvement in Iraq if they [won] control of Congress". This view of the election as a referendum on the war was endorsed by Democratic leader Nancy Pelosi who in the final days of the campaign said, "This election is about Iraq. If indeed it turns out the way that people expect it to turn out, the American people will have spoken, and they will have rejected the course of action the president is on." The news media viewed the Democratic victory in both houses of the US Congress as "punishing President George W. Bush and his Republicans over ethics scandals in Washington and a failing war in Iraq."
After her party's victory then House Speaker-elect Nancy Pelosi (who would a month later make clear her disdain for the "surge proposal" wrote an article entitled "Bringing the War to an End is my Highest Priority as Speaker". The article explained that after visiting wounded Iraq War veterans at the Bethesda Naval Medical Center, "I left there more committed than ever to bringing the war to an end. I told my colleagues yesterday that the biggest ethical issue facing our country for the past three and a half years is the war in Iraq. ...When the House reconvenes on January 4, 2007, Democrats will take power and I will take the gavel knowing the responsibility we have to you and to the country. The new Democratic Congress will live up to the highest ethical standard... [we] are prepared to lead and ready to govern. We will honor the trust of the American people; we will not disappoint."
Following the 2006 United States midterm elections where the Republicans lost control of the House and Senate, a Heritage Foundation conference was chaired by Republican whip Rep. Roy Blunt (R-MO) under the title "The New Way Forward: Refocusing the Conservative Agenda" on November 9, 2006 to analyze "setbacks" from the election results. Blunt bemoaned the fact Republicans had "become the defenders rather than the challengers of business as usual."
Blunt opened his speech listing the oft voiced explanations of his party's defeat which included that the results were in part "a referendum on the war in Iraq". He dismissed the notion that any one single reason explained the loss, saying "Different candidates lost for different reasons." He saw a bright side in events saying "The good news is that even with these shortcomings, low presidential approval numbers, and uncertainty about Iraq, our candidates saw, even with all those things happening, their ideas taking hold in the final days of their campaigns. A shift of 78,000 votes in the entire country would have changed the outcome. Our ideas didn't get beat; in fact, we did." He applauded the Constitutional system saying the defeat proves "that no one party has a permanent claim to power...This means any viable political movement, such as ours, can never afford to become stagnant or complacent. We must constantly refresh our ideas, assess our performance, and make corrections when necessary. This is a great moment to do all three of those things. For a generation Reagan conservatives have consistently demonstrated an ability to do just that. Nowhere has this been more evident than in our response to the threats of Islamic totalitarianism and the fight with our terrorist enemies." He said "While the threats of Islamic totalitarianism at times require different tactics, we are approaching those challenges with the same resolve that allowed us to defeat communism. I am convinced that in this fight we will also prevail because the American people understand the need to win. We must continue to lead the fight against Islamic totalitarianism and sustain the will to win the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. ...[On the war and on domestic issues] Our plan must avoid the mistakes of the past several years. ...I am confident that we will successfully move forward."
In January 2005, the National Defense University applied its "Senturion" predictive analysis software to the Iraqi elections in order to determine which factions would support the elections, which would oppose them, and which would remain neutral. Senturion's forecasts were largely borne out by the actual course of events. Among other things, Senturion predicted that "increased coalition military strength in Iraq would have improved the attitudes of Iraqi stake holders toward the election by making them feel more secure." The simulations indicated that a 50% increase in troop strength was optimal, though a 25% increase would have been sufficient to capture the support of "neutral Iraqis". It also determined that due to Iraqi perceptions, the use of United Nations peacekeepers in place of US or coalition forces could achieve the same results with a smaller troop increase. These analyses were "performed and briefed to senior government decisionmakers well in advance of events."
On December 6, 2006 the Iraq Study Group presented their report, which recommended both external and internal approaches for achieving positive progress in Iraq. Among other approaches, the report suggested that the "United States should significantly increase the number of U.S. military personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in and supporting Iraqi Army units." However, this language is not specifically included in any of the report's 79 recommendations. The ISG report mentioned a possible 10,000-20,000 troop increase for training but only until early 2008. Co-chairman James Baker said that since "events in Iraq could overtake what we recommend...[members] believe that decisions should be made by our national leaders with some urgency." Upon receiving the report Bush told the group "we will take every proposal seriously, and we will act in a timely fashion."
Later in the day White House spokesman Tony Snow told CNN's Larry King that Bush was comparing recommendations "by the Iraq Study Group with pending studies by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Security Council." Once the review was finished, Snow believed that the President would be able to "announce a new way forward" in Iraq by the end of the year.
On December 11, 2006 Bush met with Senior State Department advisers (including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice) "on how to shape U.S. policy in Iraq as part of Bush's mission to come up with a new strategy." He reiterated his intent to communicate that strategy to the nation before Christmas 2006, and said "There is no question we've got to make sure that the State Department and the Defense Department– the efforts and their recommendations are closely coordinated, so that when I do speak to the American people, they will know that I've listened to all aspects of government and that the way forward is the way forward to achieve our objective: to succeed in Iraq."
Later on December 11, 2006 Bush met "with a group of Iraqi experts, including historians and former generals, in the Oval Office." The Washington Post reported that among the panel of experts were retired four-star generals Barry McCaffrey, Wayne A. Downing, and John Keane; along with academics Stephen Biddle and Eliot Cohen, who panned the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group. The Post went on to say "The group disagreed on the key issue of whether to send more troops to Iraq, with retired Gen. John M. Keane arguing that several thousand additional soldiers could be used to improve security in Baghdad, and others expressing doubt about that proposal." The group also suggested Bush change personnel in his national security team. One panel member reported that "All of us said they have failed, that you need a new team." The President thanked the panel and told reporters "I appreciate the advice I got from those folks in the field. And that advice is . . . an important component of putting together a new way forward in Iraq."
The CIA's top counterinsurgency experts conducted an assessment that found the presence of US forces was key to stability. Brett H. McGurk added that "when we have a presence we are able to help resolve local disputes before they get out of control, police illegal conduct by Iraqi forces, and ultimately help the Iraqis develop their own patterns of interaction."
On December 13, 2006 Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney met with the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for "more than an hour," discussing different military options for Iraq. While "no dramatic proposals" were put forward, "a pragmatic assessment of what can and cannot be done by the military" was offered.
They did "not favor adding significant numbers of troops to Iraq" but saw "strengthening the Iraqi army as pivotal to achieving some degree of stability." They pressed for "greater U.S. effort on economic reconstruction and political reconciliation." They stressed the need for "employment programs, reconstruction and political reconciliation...[as] key to pulling young men from the burgeoning militias." They said there was "no purely military solution for Iraq" and "without major progress on the political and economic fronts, the U.S. intervention is simply buying time." They also urged "that any new strategy be sensitive to regional context, particularly the impact of political or military decisions." They fear that throwing too much support to the Shiite majority may lead Sunni nations in the region to step up support of Sunni insurgents, and that a crackdown on Iraq's largest Shiite militia, the Mahdi army, may instigate more interference by Iran.
General George William Casey Jr., the top US commander in Iraq, was reported to be "reviewing a plan to redefine the American military mission there: U.S. troops would be pulled out of Iraqi cities and consolidated at a handful of U.S. bases while day-to-day combat duty would be turned over to the Iraqi army." It was said that he was "still considering whether to request more troops, possibly as part of an expanded training mission to help strengthen the Iraqi army." These options were laid out by the outgoing US ground commander, Lt. Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli. Under the Chiarelli plan "the military would shift about half of its 15 combat brigades away from battling insurgents and sectarian violence and into training Iraqi security forces as soon as the spring of 2007. ... About 4,000 U.S. troops are now serving on 11-person military training teams embedded with Iraqi forces. The new plan would add 30 troops to each team, allowing them to provide supervision and mentoring down to the level of Iraqi army companies. ... the remaining seven to eight brigades of U.S. combat forces would focus on three core missions: striking al-Qaeda, strengthening security along Iraq's borders, and protecting major highways and other routes to ensure U.S. forces freedom of movement in Iraq. ...The plan would not allow for any major reduction in U.S. troops in Iraq over the next year– nor would it call for any surge in troops". Military spokesman Maj. Gen. William Caldwell said that "In northern and western Iraq, U.S. commanders are already moving troops out of combat missions to place them as advisers with lower-level Iraqi army units."
The Chiefs expressed "concern about the erosion of the U.S. military's ability to deal with other crises around the world because of the heavy commitment in Iraq and the stress on troops and equipment". They told Bush that there was "significantly increased risk to readiness in the event of a new emergency".
Speaking to reporters afterward Bush said "Our military cannot do this job alone. Our military needs a political strategy that is effective." He also stressed his ongoing commitment to securing Iraq, saying "If we lose our nerve, if we're not steadfast in our determination to help the Iraqi government succeed, we will be handing Iraq over to an enemy that would do us harm." When pressed for when he would announce his new way forward, he said he would not be "rushed" into a decision and was still reviewing his options.
On December 14, 2006, when pressed by reporters for more information on his thinking on the matter Bush said "I am listening to a lot of advice to develop a strategy to help you succeed, a lot of consultations. I will be delivering my plans after a long deliberation, after steady deliberation. I'm not going to be rushed into making a decision." He stated that he had heard some "interesting" ideas. He also said he heard some "ideas that would lead to defeat...[and] I reject those ideas. Ideas such as leaving before the job is done. Ideas such as not helping this (Iraqi) government take the necessary and hard steps to be able to do its job." He said he wanted the incoming Defense Secretary Robert Gates "to have time to evaluate the situation" and come up with his own suggestions. That same day Iraqi President Jalal Talabani issued a written statement saying that he had received Bush's assurances that "he would make no decisions on his new Iraq strategy that would be 'against your interests'...[and his pledge] to work with Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki on his efforts to implement a Baghdad security plan". CNN reported that "Administration officials say Bush is 'not satisfied' with some of the information he has been getting and 'is asking people to get him more' information on various options in Iraq."
Though originally scheduled for late 2006, the announcement on "the new way forward" was delayed to give the President "more time" to gather information. Press secretary Tony Snow said the administration was hoping for the president to deliver the speech before Christmas, although he said the timing was not nailed down.
This American Enterprise Institute surge study referenced is listed as having been posted December 14, and was called the "real Iraq Study Group report" by its author. The draft was presented on December 14 by Frederick Kagan, AEI, General Jack Keane, and Kenneth Pollack. AEI released its final report to the press on January 5, 2007, under the title "Iraq: A Turning Point (With Reports from Iraq from Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman)". The event description stated the following:
The study calls for a large and sustained surge of U.S. forces to secure and protect critical areas of Baghdad. Mr. Kagan directed the report in consultation with military and regional experts, including General Keane, former Afghanistan coalition commander Lieutenant General David Barno, and other officers involved with the successful operations of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tal Afar. An interim version of the report was released on December 14, 2006. At this event, Mr. Kagan and General Keane will present their final report, which outlines how the United States can win in Iraq and why victory is the only acceptable outcome.
Andrew Ross of the San Francisco Chronicle also connects Bush's strategy to this American Enterprise Institute report, saying "In addition to the changing of the military guard and moving ahead with the 'surge' option, President Bush's Iraq strategy involves more money for reconstruction, job creation, and for 'moderate Iraqi political parties as a means of building a centrist political coalition to support Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki,' according to the Wall Street Journal. This more holistic approach– reportedly entitled 'The New Way Forward'– echoes in many ways a paper from the American Enterprise Institute, authored by Frederick Kagan, better known as the prime mover of the 'surge option.'"
Bush was expected to announce a "surge" in forces that some sources say could be up to 20,000 troops. According to Reuters, "While Bush is to announce a complete overhaul of his Iraq policy, including economic and political components, the possibility of a troop increase has gained the most attention. Despite a divide on the issue, Bush in recent days has hinted toward a preference for increasing troop strength by saying he wanted to help Iraqis gain control of the security situation there. "One thing is for certain, I will want to make sure that the mission is clear and specific and can be accomplished," Bush said on Thursday when asked about a troop increase." In fact, Bush's proposed increase was 21,000 US troops, 4000 of which would be Marine Corps focused on the Anbar province while the others would be embedded into Iraqi units to provide security to Baghdad.
Just before the 110th Congress convened on January 4 some Democrats said they planned to call Defense Secretary Robert Gates before the Senate Armed Services Committee "to explain, if not try to defend, the president's plan"
Prior to the speech, US Senator Jack Reed (D-RI), a member of the Armed Services Committee, held a press conference with former NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Wesley Clark and Jon Soltz, Senator Chuck Schumer (D-NY), Senator Patty Murray (D-WA) and together called on Bush "to listen to the advice of his generals and the American people and offer a new plan to change course in Iraq."
In a nationally televised address on January 10, Bush stated "America will change our strategy to help the Iraqis carry out their campaign to put down sectarian violence and bring security to the people of Baghdad. This will require increasing American force levels. So I've committed more than 20,000 additional American troops to Iraq. The vast majority of them– five brigades– will be deployed to Baghdad".
On the same day of the speech, ABC News announced that ninety advance troops from the 82nd Airborne Division had already arrived in Baghdad.
In advance of the State of the Union address, Bush gave several promotional speeches to Belo television and Sinclair television, suggesting that the surge "should be given a chance" and challenged critical lawmakers to offer an alternative.
On the night of Tuesday, January 23, the president had this to say on the troop increase in Iraq, outlining its purpose in supporting the Iraqi government's maintenance of control:
In order to make progress toward this goal, the Iraqi government must stop the sectarian violence in its capital. But the Iraqis are not yet ready to do this on their own. So we're deploying reinforcements of more than 20,000 additional soldiers and Marines to Iraq. The vast majority will go to Baghdad, where they will help Iraqi forces to clear and secure neighborhoods, and serve as advisers embedded in Iraqi Army units. With Iraqis in the lead, our forces will help secure the city by chasing down the terrorists, insurgents, and the roaming death squads. And in Anbar Province, where al Qaeda terrorists have gathered and local forces have begun showing a willingness to fight them, we're sending an additional 4,000 United States Marines, with orders to find the terrorists and clear them out. (Applause.) We didn't drive al Qaeda out of their safe haven in Afghanistan only to let them set up a new safe haven in a free Iraq.
The substance of the debate that followed the speech reflected "widespread disagreement with the Bush administration over its proposed solution, and growing skepticism that the United States made the right decision in going to war in the first place". Some issues of contention were divisions over the advisability of committing more troops versus complete withdrawal, the 'winnability' of the Iraq War regardless of a surge, and framing of the issue.
The New York Times reported that Former Massachusetts Gov. Mitt Romney and former New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani backed Bush on the troop increase. McCain did the same, saying on January 12 that "The presence of additional coalition forces would allow the Iraqi government to do what it cannot accomplish today on its own: impose its rule throughout the country."
Immediately following Bush's January 10 speech announcing the plan, Democratic politicians, including Ted Kennedy, Harry Reid and Dennis Kucinich, called on Congress to reject the surge. Senator Dick Durbin issued the Democratic response which called upon Iraqis to "disband the militias and death squads." On January 18, Xinhua News Agency reported that "whitehouse hopefuls" Sens. Hillary Clinton, D-N.Y., Barack Obama, D-Ill., Chris Dodd, D- Conn., Joe Biden, D-Del, and Sam Brownback, R-Kansas, all voiced their discontent January 13 with the course of events in Iraq
On January 17, Moveon.org released an ad that identified the surge strategy as "McCain's idea". The NYT reported that presidential candidate John Edwards had "taken to referring to the administration proposal as 'the McCain Doctrine.'"
On January 18, the Los Angeles Times released a Bloomberg poll that said 60 percent of those polled opposed the troop surge, 51 percent wanted Congress to try to block Bush from sending more soldiers, and 65 percent disapproved of the president's handling of the war. Meanwhile, a Fox News Poll reported that 59 percent to 36 percent, Americans opposed sending more US troops to Iraq.
On January 16, Republican Chuck Hagel, Delaware Democrat Joe Biden (Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair), and Michigan Democrat Carl Levin (Armed Services Committee chair) co-sponsored a non-binding resolution that said it was "not in the national interest of the United States to deepen its military involvement in Iraq."
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi said Democrats in her chamber would back a non-binding resolution "declaring that President Bush's decision to send additional troops to Iraq is 'not in the national interest of the United States.'" The Washington Times reported Pelosi "has made clear her disdain for the 'surge' proposal" since before Bush unveiled it last week, but her latest remarks "were her first indication of the language that she will want the House to approve."
Following passage in the House, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) convened an unusual Saturday session of the Senate on February 17, 2007, to consider an identically-worded resolution. However, the measure was tabled when a cloture motion failed on a 56-34 vote (four votes short of the 60 votes needed to end debate).
Pelosi announced that despite opposition to the surge, she would not push for blocking congressional funding for additional troops.
Although then-Senator Hillary Clinton opposed the surge, she later allegedly said in private that her opposition to the surge had been for domestic political reasons.
In conjunction with the surge, the Bush administration implemented several personnel changes, as follows:
The six US Army brigades committed to Iraq as part of the surge were
This brought the number of US brigades in Iraq from 15 to 20. Additionally, 4,000 Marines in Al Anbar had their 7-month tour extended. These included Marines from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, the 2nd Battalion 4th Marines, the 1st Battalion 6th Marines and the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines. Most of the 150,000 Army personnel had their 12-month tours extended as well. By July, 2007, the percentage of the mobilized Army deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan was almost 30%; the percentage of the mobilized Marine Corps deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan was 13.5%.
The plan began with a major operation to secure Baghdad, codenamed Operation Fardh al-Qanoon (Operation Imposing Law), which was launched in February 2007. However, only in mid-June 2007, with the full deployment of the 28,000 additional US troops, could major counter-insurgency efforts get fully under way. Operation Phantom Thunder was launched throughout Iraq on June 16, with a number of subordinate operations targeting insurgents in Diyala province, Anbar province and the southern Baghdad Belts. The additional surge troops also participated in Operation Phantom Strike and Operation Phantom Phoenix, named after the III "Phantom" Corps which was the major US unit in Iraq throughout 2007.
Counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq changed significantly under the command of General Petraeus since the 2007 troop surge began. The newer approach attempted to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people through building relationships, preventing civilian casualties and compromising with and even hiring some former enemies. The new strategy was population-centric in that it focused in protecting the population rather than killing insurgents. In implementing this strategy, Petraeus used experienced gained while commanding the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul in 2003. He also explained these ideas extensively in Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency, which he assisted in the writing of while serving as the Commanding General of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the US Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) located there.
Instead of seeing every Iraqi as a potential enemy, COIN strategy focused on building relationships and getting cooperation from the Iraqis against Al Qaeda and minimizing the number of enemies for US forces. The belief was that maintaining a long term presence of troops in a community improves security and allows for relationships and trust to develop between the locals and the US military. Civilian casualties are minimized by carefully measured use of force. This means less bombing and overwhelming fire-power, and more soldiers using restraint and even sometimes taking more risk in the process.
Another method of gaining cooperation is by paying locals, including former insurgents, to work as local security forces. Former Sunni insurgents have been hired by the US military to stop cooperating with Al Qaeda and to start fighting against them.
To implement this strategy, troops were concentrated in the Baghdad area (at the time, Baghdad accounted for 50% of all the violence in Iraq). Whereas in the past, Coalition forces isolated themselves from Iraqis by living in large forward operating bases far from population centers, troops during the surge lived among the Iraqis, operating from joint security stations (JSSs) located within Baghdad itself and shared with Iraqi security forces. Coalition units were permanently assigned to a given area so that they could build long-term relationships with the local Iraqi population and security forces.
However, opponents to occupation such as US Army Col. David H. Hackworth (Ret.), when asked whether he thought that British soldiers are better at nation-building than the Americans, said "They were very good at lining up local folks to do the job like operating the sewers and turning on the electricity. Far better than us -- we are heavy-handed, and in Iraq we don't understand the people and the culture. Thus we did not immediately employ locals in police and military activities to get them to build and stabilize their nation."
CNN war correspondent Michael Ware, who has reported from Iraq since before the US invasion in 2003 had a similar dim view of occupation saying, "there will be very much mixed reaction in Iraq" to a long-term troop presence, but he added, "what's the point and will it be worth it?" Mr. Ware contended that occupation could, "ferment further resentment [towards the U.S]."
For the first few months of the surge, violence increased. However, by the fall of 2007, the security situation had improved significantly. U.S. military deaths fell from a peak of 126 in May 2007 to 23 in December, and during the period after the surge (June 2008 to June 2011), the monthly average was less than 11. In May 2007, over 1,700 Iraqi civilians were killed, compared to approximately 500 in December. The average from June 2008 to June 2011 was approximately 200.
On September 10, 2007, David Petraeus delivered his part of the Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq. He concluded that "the military objectives of the surge are, in large measure, being met." He cited recent consistent declines in security incidents, which he attributed to recent blows dealt against Al-Qaeda in Iraq during the surge. He added that "we have also disrupted Shia militia extremists, capturing the head and numerous other leaders of the Iranian-supported Special Groups, along with a senior Lebanese Hezbollah operative supporting Iran's activities in Iraq." He argued that Coalition and Iraqi operations had drastically reduced ethno-sectarian violence in the country, though he stated that the gains were not entirely even. He recommended a gradual drawdown of US forces in Iraq with a goal of reaching pre-surge troop levels by July 2008 and stated that further withdraws would be "premature".
While Petraeus credited the surge for the decrease in violence, the decrease also closely corresponded with a cease-fire order given by Iraqi political leader Muqtada al-Sadr on August 29, 2007. Al-Sadr's order, to stand down for six months, was distributed to his loyalists following the deaths of more than 50 Shia Muslim pilgrims during fighting in Karbala the day earlier.
Michael E. O'Hanlon and Jason H. Campbell of the Brookings Institution stated on December 22, 2007 that Iraq's security environment had reached its best levels since early 2004 and credited Petraeus' strategy for the improvement. CNN stated that month that the monthly death rate for US troops in Iraq had hit its second lowest point during the entire course of the war. Military representatives attributed the successful reduction of violence and casualties directly to the troop surge. At the same time, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior reported similar reductions for civilian deaths.
However, on September 6, 2007, a report by an independent military commission headed by General James Jones found that the decrease in violence may have been due to areas being overrun by either Shias or Sunnis. In addition, in August 2007, the International Organization for Migration and the Iraqi Red Crescent Organization indicated that more Iraqis had fled since the troop increase.
On February 16, 2008, Iraqi Defense Minister Abdel Qader Jassim Mohammed told reporters that the surge was "working very well" and that Iraq has a "pressing" need for troops to stay to secure Iraqi borders. He stated that "Results for 2007 prove that– Baghdad is good now".
In the month of July, 2008, US forces lost only 13 soldiers, the lowest number of casualties sustained by US troops in one month since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Also, a report by the US embassy in Baghdad, given to Congress in May 2008, and published July 1, stated that the Iraqi government had met 15 of the 18 political benchmarks set out for them.
The Surge allowed troops to have more control over urban areas previously held by insurgents allowing for an overall slowdown of the fighting.
The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported on September 2, 2007 that the Iraqi government had only met three of the eighteen benchmarks created by the US Congress in June 2006. Two other government reports measuring progress in Iraq, a National Intelligence Estimate and an independent commission assessment by retired general James L. Jones, were published for Congress in fall 2007. USA Today compared the findings. The New York Times also did so. Another GAO report stated that the Iraqi Government did not meet 11 of the 18 benchmark measures as of August 30, 2007. On September 14, a White House survey reported "satisfactory" progress on 9 of the 18 benchmarks.
Lionel Beehner of the nonpartisan Council of Foreign Relations has called the benchmarks "vague because the metrics to measure them are imprecise." The New York Times stated on May 13 that "Nobody in Washington seems to agree on what progress actually means– or how, precisely, it might be measured." General David Petraeus, commander of the Multinational force in Iraq, has stated that his recommendations on troop strength are not dependent on the Iraqi government's ability to meet the benchmarks.
On December 2, 2007, the Sunni Arab Iraqi Accord Front called for the end to their boycott of the Iraq Parliament. On January 20, 2008, Iraq's parliament passed a law to let members of the Ba'ath party return to public life, a major US congressional benchmark for the success of Iraqi government. That month, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stated that Iraq's economy would expand significantly from the previous year's lows. Mohsin Khan, the IMF's director for the Middle East, said Iraqi oil production was forecast to climb by 200,000 barrels per day (32,000 m3/d) to 2.2 million barrels per day (350,000 m3/d) in 2008. Also reported by the IMF was that Iraq's gross domestic product growth is expected to jump significantly up to over 7 percent, in 2008 and 2009, from just 1.3 percent in 2007
On December 22, 2007, Michael E. O'Hanlon and Jason H. Campbell of the Brookings Institution called Iraq's economy and political system to be "only marginally better than a year ago". The envoy to Iraq reported on the dialogue between the Sunni and Shia communities and praised the government's work in late 2007. The envoy, Staffan de Mistura, said he would present a positive picture of progress in Iraq in a report to the UN Security Council despite earlier serious misgivings. He said, "At the beginning of ... we were genuinely concerned by the lack of progress on national dialogue, today that has substantially changed. It has changed our mind from being worried or from being pessimistic." The UN report would, he said, "compliment" Iraq's government on its work at fostering reconciliation.
In January 2008, Council of Foreign Relations fellow Michael E. O'Hanlon stated that "Overall, Iraq's political system probably merits a grade of roughly C for its performance over the last 12 months." He also stated that "the pace of progress is finally picking up."
On February 13, 2008, the Iraqi parliament passed three pieces of legislation that were considered contentious. The three measures were an amnesty law, a law that defines the scope of provincial powers, and the budget for 2008. The amnesty law was one of the benchmarks set by Bush. The provincial powers law includes a provision for provincial elections, another key benchmark. And the budget should pave the way for the creation of up to 700,000 new jobs for Iraqis.
USA Today stated on February 17, 2008 that US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker "may be hard-pressed to argue that Iraqis have met political benchmarks Congress sought" and contrasted the political progress with the recent military progress.
These questions can be stated with some precision. They begin with the issue of how to interpret the comparative reduction in violence since the surge of United States troops began nearly a year ago. Does the decrease show that more troops on the ground were necessary to impose effective control over territory and persuade insurgents to back down? Or is the reduced violence a sign instead that the prospect of imminent United States withdrawal has made Iraqis more hesitant to foment a civil war from which the United States will not save them? Whatever the answer, the practical consequences are huge: either we keep troop levels relatively stable, drawing down slowly while we consolidate increasing stability, or we accelerate withdrawal to underscore our seriousness about leaving.
Both critics of the surge and independent news services have stated that the conventional wisdom in the United States media is that the surge 'worked'. Many Democratic political leaders have acknowledged the same.
In June 2008, correspondents on Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer stated that "few would argue about the success of the so-called surge in Iraq". Time has stated that "the surge is a fragile and limited success, an operation that has helped stabilize the capital and its surroundings." The New York Times has stated that "The surge, clearly, has worked, at least for now... The result, now visible in the streets, is a calm unlike any the country has seen since the American invasion".
Peter Mansoor, General Petraeus's executive officer and author of the Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander's War in Iraq, stated in an August 2008 The Washington Post op-ed that "The Iraq war is not over, but our war effort is on a firmer foundation... The surge has created the space and time for the competition for power and resources in Iraq to play out in the political realm, with words instead of bombs." Blogger and independent reporter Michael Yon, who has been embedded with the troops in Iraq for years, had suggested the surge strategy before it was formalized. In his book, Moment of Truth in Iraq, Yon argued that Petraeus had turned defeat into victory in Iraq and that the surge had succeeded. In July 2008, Yon stated in a New York Daily News editorial that "'The war in Iraq is over... the Iraqi people won."
Historian Larry Schweikart argued in his book America's Victories: Why the U.S. Wins Wars, that the surge's success, in part, came from the incredible casualties the US military inflicted on al-Qaeda in Iraq and on the "insurgents" from 2003 to 2006---some 40,000 killed, about 200,000 wounded, 20,000 captured, and nearly 10,000 deserted. He has stated that those levels of attrition on an enemy the estimated size of al-Qaeda were substantial and deeply damaging, not only to the terrorists' efforts in Iraq, but had the effect of depleting them worldwide. Moreover, Schweikart argued, virtually all estimates of enemy casualties were severely under-counted (as are all numbers of guerilla casualties) given the inability to identify bodies which were completely annihilated by explosives or to count carcasses dragged away, as well as how many would die later after attempted medical treatment by other Al Queda sympathizers.
Senator John McCain argued on air September 11, 2014 at CNN @THISHOUR WITH BERMAN AND MICHAELA that the surge was a victory and reached its goal of providing substantial security and stability in resolving government agendas between various groups within Iraq. That it was more less an aftermath of pulling troops out after the "surge" that resulted in increase terrorist operations and the presence of ISIS currently in Iraq. "We had it won, thanks to the surge. It was won. The victory was there. All we needed was a force behind to provide support, not to engage in combat, but to supply support, logistics, intelligence. And, by the way, the Korean war we left troops behind; Bosnia, we left troops behind, not to fight, but be for a stabilizing force."
Journalist Patrick Cockburn has stated that the reduction in violence was a direct result of ethnic cleansing by the Shia-led Iraqi government and Shia militias against Sunnis. He has stated that "the battle for Baghdad in 2006-07 was won by the Shia, who now control three-quarters of the capital. These demographic changes appear permanent; Sunnis who try to get their houses back face assassination." UCLA professor of geography John Agnew released a study in mid-September 2008 stating that violence has declined in Baghdad "because of intercommunal violence that reached a climax as the surge was beginning," said that "By the launch of the surge, many of the targets of conflict had either been killed or fled the country, and they turned off the lights when they left."
Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward has interviewed US government sources according to whom the US "surge" was not the primary reason for the drop in violence in 2007-2008. Instead, according to his view, the reduction of violence was due to new covert techniques by US military and intelligence officials to find, target and kill insurgents.
Some, such as then Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, have credited the Iranian government for all or part of the reduction in violence. Pelosi stated in May 2008 that "some of the success of the surge is that the goodwill of the Iranians-they decided in Basra when the fighting would end, they negotiated that cessation of hostilities-the Iranians." Cockburn has also stated that the Iranians played the major role.
Other commentators have pointed to the Sunni Awakening (which started in 2005) as the most important reason for the decline in Iraqi violence. David Kilcullen, General Petraeus's counterinsurgency and troop surge adviser, believes that "the tribal revolt was arguably the most significant change in the Iraqi operating environment in several years."
One article mentions that "Currently, the dominant U.S presence in Iraq allows the rest of the world to avoid responsibility for stability in and around Iraq even as everyone realizes the stakes involved". In addition "A plan to draw down U.S forces would therefore contribute to the success of a larger diplomatic strategy, prompting Middle Eastern states, European governments, and the UN to be more constructive and proactive in working to salvage stability in the Persian Gulf"
On April 20, 2007, four months after the surge went into effect, Senator Harry Reid made a statement on the floor of the US Senate that the US had already lost the war in Iraq and that the surge would accomplish nothing, stating "I believe myself that the secretary of state, secretary of defense and - you have to make your own decisions as to what the president knows - (know) this war is lost and the surge is not accomplishing anything as indicated by the extreme violence in Iraq yesterday."
Congressional Democrats believed military progress has been made in Iraq but that the political progress that President Bush gave as the primary reason for the surge has not occurred. They continued to call for a withdrawal of American troops. In February 2008, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi told reporters that "God knows, anytime our military men and women go into a military exercise, we want them to succeed, and they did. The politics did not follow. So they can paint whatever picture they want on it; the goal has not been accomplished. The tragedies, the casualties continue. We are going in the wrong direction in Iraq." Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, having already voted to support Petraeus, now stated on Fox News Sunday that month that "the so-called surge was designed to give the Iraqi government the space and time to make the tough decisions that only the Iraqis can make for themselves. ... And I think that putting forward a very clear objective of beginning to withdraw our troops is the best way to get the Iraqis to take responsibility."
An early February 2008 Gallup Poll found that 43% of Americans thought the troop increase is "making the situation there better". A CNN poll conducted during the same period found that 52% think that US forces are "making progress in improving conditions in Iraq and bringing an end to the violence in that country" while 45% disagree. A poll released by the Pew Research Center on the same day found that 48% of those polled believed the war to be going well, up from 30% a year earlier, with a similar number supporting keeping troops in Iraq "until the situation has stabilized". A majority still believed the war to be a wrong decision in the first place. A commentary on the poll by National Public Radio called some of its results a "sign that the troop surge is being seen as successful." Nonetheless, an Opinion Research Corporation poll conducted in June 2008 found that 68% of Americans were opposed to the war in Iraq and that 64% of Americans want to see the next President remove most troops from Iraq within a few months of taking office. A Summer 2008 CBS News poll found that 46% think it improved the situation in Iraq while 11% think it made it worse and 32% think it had no impact.
A March 2008 poll of Iraq found that 42% of Iraqis call attacks on US forces acceptable and that only 4% of Iraqis believe that US forces are responsible for the drop in violence. The poll also found that 61% believed that the presence of US troops in Iraq was actually worsening the security situation. In July 2008, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki and Iraqi National security advisor Muwaffaq Al-Rubaie both sought a timetable for the withdrawal of foreign troops.
A CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll conducted September 1–2, 2010 revisited this question "As you may know, the US. sent 20,000 combat troops to Iraq in 2007 in what was called a surge. Based on what you have read or heard, do you think that surge of U.S. troops to Iraq was a success or a failure?" 60% responded as success, 33% failure and 7% depends or unsure.
After talking to some Afghan leaders, it was said that the Iran's would be revolting if more troops were to be sent to Iran.Retrieved on 28 January 2015
[T]he Obama team itself, including Clinton, have repeatedly confirmed that they understand that the surge was successful. Clinton even conceded to former Defense Secretary Robert Gates: 'The surge worked.'
Obama said the surge of U.S. troops has 'succeeded beyond our wildest dreams.'
In 2014, Secretary of Defense Gates related that after Clinton had left the Senate and become Secretary of State, she told President Obama that her opposition to the 2007 Iraq surge had been political, due to her facing a strong challenge from the anti-Iraq War Obama in the upcoming Democratic presidential primary. Gates also quotes Clinton as saying, 'The Iraq surge worked.'
The 11th Infantry Division is a formation (military) of the Iraqi Army. Its headquarters is located in the former Ministry of Defence building in Baghdad.
42nd Infantry Brigade ('Tigers') - Adhamiyah (NE Baghdad) (former 2nd Brigade, 6th Division)
43rd Infantry Brigade - Western Baghdad
44th Infantry Brigade - Sadr City
45th Infantry Brigade - Eastern Baghdad (planned to be operational in 2008)The 11th Division was put in place at the end of 2007 as part of the Iraq War troop surge of 2007 and the Baghdad Security Plan. It was formed from an experienced brigade, the 2nd Brigade, 6th Division (which became its 1st Brigade) and received the help of the 4th Brigade of the 1st Division (which is still operating in Baghdad au côté de la 11th Division), to which were added two newly formed brigades and one still forming at the time. It played a significant role in the Siege of Sadr City from April 2008. The division's area of responsibility is the east of Baghdad. Its soldier numbers are low compared to a standard infantry division and it may become an armoured division.
First Gulf War (1990-1991):
The Iraqi 11th infantry division occupied Kuwait City during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait from 1990 to 1991. There it participated in the Battle of Kuwait International Airport.22 January 2007 Baghdad bombings
The 22 January 2007 Baghdad bombings was a terrorist attack that occurred when two powerful car bombs ripped through the Bab Al-Sharqi market in central Baghdad, killing at least 88 people and wounding 160 others in one of the bloodiest days since the US invasion of Iraq. The attack occurred two days after the start of the 10-day Shiite festival leading up to Ashoura. It also coincided with the arrival of 3,200 additional troops into Baghdad as part of the Iraq War troop surge of 2007.Anthony Zinni
Anthony Charles Zinni (born September 17, 1943) is a former United States Marine Corps general and a former Commander in Chief of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM). In 2002, he was selected to be a special envoy for the United States to Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
While serving as special envoy, Zinni was also an instructor in the Department of International Studies at the Virginia Military Institute. Currently, he is an instructor at the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University, a public speaker, and an author of best-selling books on his military career and foreign affairs, including Battle for Peace. As of 2005, he was involved in the corporate world, joining M.I.C. Industries as its president for International Operations in 2005.
Zinni also serves or has served on the advisory boards of a number of companies, including the security testing firm, Mu Dynamics, based in Sunnyvale, California. He joined Duke University's Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy in Spring 2008 as the Sanford Distinguished Lecturer in Residence and taught a new course in the Hart Leadership Program. Zinni also serves on the board of directors for Caliburn International, a military contracting conglomerate that includes operations for Homestead Temporary Shelter for Unaccompanied Children.He has been credited for foresight in predicting the dangers of terrorism coming out of Afghanistan before the September 11 attacks of 2001 and supporting the Iraq War troop surge of 2007. In October 2009 he came out firmly in support of General Stanley A. McChrystal's request for up to 40,000 additional troops in Afghanistan.Clarissa Ward
Clarissa Ward (born January 30, 1980) is an American television journalist who is currently chief international correspondent for CNN. She was formerly with CBS News, based in London. Before her CBS News position, Ward was a Moscow-based news correspondent for ABC News programs.Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee
The Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee, also referred to as the Defense Policy Board (DPBAC or DPB), is a federal advisory committee to the United States Department of Defense. Their charter is available online through the office of the Director of Administration and Management of the Department of Defense. The committee type is discretionary.
Richard Perle was the chairman of the committee during the initial years of the George W. Bush administration.
Excerpt of Objectives and Scope of Activities from charter:
1. The Defense Policy Board will serve the public interest by providing the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy with independent, informed advice and opinion concerning major matters of defense policy. It will focus upon long-term, enduring issues central to strategic planning for the Department of Defense and will be responsible for research and analysis of topics, long or short range, addressed to it by the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Announcements for upcoming meetings of the DPBAC are published in the Federal Register.
Historically, the DPBAC has mostly served as a method for the Pentagon to leverage consulting expertise in the private sector. However, the DPBAC served a very powerful and influential role in foreign policy in the George W. Bush presidency. Former Chairman Richard Perle was an influence in the decision to go to war in Iraq, and Jack Keane was instrumental in the implementation of the Iraq War troop surge of 2007.
On 1 July 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announced a new lineup that Matthew B. Stannard said offered a look at Gates' defense priorities.Expeditionary energy economics
Expeditionary energy economics (e3) is an emerging field of energy economics that addresses energy management in the military expeditionary environment or as part of the disaster response stage of the emergency management cycle. The term was first introduced in 2018 in an article by U.S. Army Major Ion A. Iftimie, a research fellow within the Strategic Analysis Department of the NATO Energy Security Center of excellence in Vilnius, Lithuania. Major Iftimie proposed that the successful megacity counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns of the twenty-first century will depend on fast solutions to critical energy infrastructure (CEI) vulnerabilities within individual communities. The practice of energy management in the military expeditionary environment (EMMEE) is not new. The US Marine Corps has an Expeditionary Energy Office, and NATO uses the new field to test the applicability and value of a draft military adaptation of ISO 50001:2011 (Energy management systems – Requirements with guidance for use).The successful implementation of e3 theory requires that COIN practitioners have a basic understanding of CEI. Iftimie proves his hypothesis with personal vignettes from his time as an infantry platoon leader during the Iraq War troop surge of 2007. In Baghdad, before the 2007 surge, the unreliability of CEI created a safe haven and power base for insurgents. During the surge, however, the effects of military units promoting community based economics (CBE) and high-risk/high-impact innovation (HRH2I) as a solution to local energy supply shortages on Haifa Street were a significant increase in the standard of living, a decrease in ethno-sectarian violence, and an increase in support for the Coalition Forces. The Haifa Street case study shows that one of the most vital elements of successful megacity COIN is facilitating rapid access of the urban community to affordable and reliable energy sources—which is a matter of managing both security of CEI and security of supply.Jon Soltz
Jon Soltz served as a United States Army officer in the Iraq War and is chairman and co-founder of the 220,000 member VoteVets.org. In 2011, he took a one-year leave of absence from VoteVets, while deployed as part of Operation New Dawn in Iraq. Also, as a member of the U.S. Army, he served in both the Kosovo campaign in 2000 and later in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. Soltz was an outspoken critic of Operation Iraqi Freedom and its execution.Jurf Al Nasr
Jurf Al-Nasr (Arabic: جرف النصر) or formerly known as Jurf Al Sakhar (Arabic: جرف الصخر) until late 2014 and its reconquest by the Iraqi Government forces from the neo-Baathist-supported ISIS forces – also spelled Jurf al-Sakhar — is a small town in Iraq, located about 60 kilometers southwest of Baghdad. It is near Musayyib and approximately 80 kilometers east of Fallujah.
At the start of 2014, it had about 89,000 people, mostly Sunni Muslims from the Al-Janabi tribe. Ever since the Sunni Arab population of the town and surrounding countryside have been made to leave after the retaking of the town from ISIS. The former residents are now largely refugees in Fallujah, Yusofiyya, Al Musayyib. Due to its prime strategic location on the main approaches to the Shia holy city of Karbala from Fallujah, it is doubtful that any Sunni residents will be allowed back into Jurf in the future.
At Jurf Al Sakhar was a large military complex including the Al Hakum facility, at one time Iraq's most sophisticated and largest biological weapons (BW) production factory.
During the Iraq War troop surge of 2007, Jurf Al Sakhar was one of the first towns under the "concerned citizens" program, in which the local populace was paid to secure the town via checkpoints along its roads, funded by money supplied by the U.S. military. The influx of money led to an almost instantaneous decrease in violence in the area. It is also the location of some of the most bitter fighting during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Nine medals for valor were awarded to the paratroopers of Apache Company, 1st Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment (Geronimo), for their actions in and around the town. The unit was also awarded the Valorous Unit Award, the second highest unit award in the US Army.List of Palestinian Americans
This is a list of notable Palestinian Americans, including both original immigrants who obtained American citizenship and their American descendants.
The list is ordered by category of human endeavour. Persons with significant contributions in two fields are listed in each of the pertinent categories, to facilitate easy lookup.
To be included in this list, the person must have a Wikipedia article showing they are Palestinian American or must have references showing they are Palestinian American and are notable.Multi-National Division - Baghdad
Multi-National Division Baghdad (MND-B) was a division of Multi-National Force Iraq.
It was headquartered by the 1st Cavalry Division, based at Camp Victory (primary component of the Victory Base Complex), north of Baghdad International Airport. The division controlled those brigades in greater Baghdad that are responsible for areas within the city itself. Of the brigades controlled by the 1st Cavalry Division, one was north of the city at Taji, one was in the northeastern part in Adhamiya, one at Camp Liberty in the west, one in the "International Zone" or "Green Zone" at the heart of the city, one on the southern outskirts, and a sixth in the southeast near Rasheed airfield. Following the Iraq War troop surge of 2007, most of the brigades' troops were dispersed at battalion- and company-level "combat outposts" and "joint security stations." The headquarters of MND-B was previously provided by HQ 1st Armored Division (2003–2004), HQ 1st Cavalry Division (2004–2005), HQ 3rd Infantry Division (2005), 4th Infantry Division (2006 & 2008-2009) and 1st Cavalry Division (2007).Peter Mansoor
Peter R. Mansoor (born February 28, 1960) is a former United States Army officer and a military historian. He is known primarily as the executive officer to General David Petraeus during the Iraq War, particularly the Iraq War troop surge of 2007. He is an associate professor at the Ohio State University, where he holds the Raymond E. Mason, Jr. Chair of Military History.
Mansoor has published two memoirs of his service in Iraq. Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander’s War in Iraq (2008) details his service as commander of the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division from 2003 to 2005. Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War (2013) focuses on his service under Petraeus. He is also the author of The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945 (1999), which received the Society for Military History distinguished book award in 2000.Siege of Sadr City
The Siege of Sadr City was a blockade of the Shi'a district of northeastern Baghdad carried out by U.S. and Iraqi government forces in an attempt to destroy the main power base of the insurgent Mahdi Army in Baghdad. The siege began on 4 April 2004 – later dubbed "Black Sunday" – with an uprising against the Coalition Provisional Authority following the government banning of a newspaper published by Muqtada Al-Sadr's Sadrist Movement. The most intense periods of fighting in Sadr City occurred during the first uprising in April 2004, the second in August the same year, during the sectarian conflict that gripped Baghdad in late 2006, during the Iraq War troop surge of 2007, and during the spring fighting of 2008.Simone Wilkie
Major General Simone Louise Wilkie, (née Burt, born 1964) is an Australian Army officer who was the Australian Deputy National Commander in the War in Afghanistan in 2011 and 2012. She was Assistant Chief of Staff to General David Petraeus during the Iraq War troop surge of 2007, and was the first female Commanding Officer of the Royal Military College, Duntroon and Commandant at the Army Recruit Training Centre at Kapooka. In March 2013 the Minister for Defence, Stephen Smith, announced her promotion to major general to take over as Commander of the Australian Defence College in July 2013.Steven A. Boylan
Steven Arthur Boylan (born September 30, 1965), formerly a U.S. military spokesman in Baghdad for General David Petraeus in the prosecution of the Iraq War troop surge of 2007 from February, 2007 to September, 2008. After leaving Iraq, he became the public affairs officer and the senior public affairs observer/trainer for the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas according to U.S. News & World Report.The Gamble (book)
The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008 is a 2009 book by journalist Thomas E. Ricks about the Iraq War. It covers the 2006-2008 period where his last book Fiasco left off. A primary focus is the Iraq War troop surge of 2007, along with the ascension to command of Gen. David Petraeus and the change in approach of Gen. Ray Odierno towards the use of counter-insurgency strategies. Ricks believes that the troop surge was successful in reducing violence in Iraq and "reviv[ing] American prospects in the war," but that it was a failure based on its initial goal of bringing about a political reconciliation in Iraq.
Ricks states in the first chapter of the book (page 8):
In revisiting the U.S. approach to the Iraq war, Petraeus found tactical success--that is, improved security--but not the clear political breakthrough that would have meant unambiguous strategic success. At the end of the surge, the fundamental political problems facing Iraq were the same ones as when it began. At the end of 2008, two years into the revamped war, there was no prospect of the fighting ending anytime soon. But it was almost certain that whenever it did end, it wouldn't be with the victory that the Bush administration continued to describe, of an Iraq that was both a stable democracy and an ally of the United States. Nor was that really the goal anymore, though no one had said so publicly. Under Petraeus, the American goal of transforming Iraq had quietly been scaled down. But even his less ambitious target of sustainable security would remain elusive, with no certainty of reaching it anytime soon.
Ricks also predicted that the US will have combat troops in Iraq until at least 2015,. The last combat troops left with the war's end in December 2011, only to return three years later during the American-led intervention in Iraq (2014–present).
Ricks appeared to promote the book on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart on 10 February, 2009.Timeline of the Iraq War troop surge of 2007
Timeline of the Iraq War troop surge of 2007Withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq
The withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq began in December 2007 with the end of the Iraq War troop surge of 2007 and was completed by December 2011, bringing an end to the Iraq War. The number of U.S. military forces in Iraq peaked at 170,300 in November 2007.
The withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq was a contentious issue in the United States for much of the 2000s. As the war progressed from its initial invasion phase in 2003 to a nearly decade-long occupation, American public opinion shifted towards favoring a troop withdrawal; in May 2007, 55% of Americans believed that the Iraq War was a mistake, and 51% of registered voters favored troop withdrawal. In late April 2007 Congress passed a supplementary spending bill for Iraq that set a deadline for troop withdrawal but President Bush vetoed this bill, citing his concerns about setting a withdrawal deadline. The Bush Administration later sought an agreement with the Iraqi government, and in 2008 George W. Bush signed the U.S.–Iraq Status of Forces Agreement. It included a deadline of 31 December 2011, before which "all the United States Forces shall withdraw from all Iraqi territory". The last U.S. troops left Iraq on 18 December 2011, in accordance with this agreement.In 2014, the advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) from Syria to Iraq's western provinces prompted the U.S. to intervene again, alongside other militaries, to combat ISIL. In January 2019, Secretary Pompeo put the number of U.S. troops in Iraq at approximately 5,000.