Intention

Intention is a mental state that represents a commitment to carrying out an action or actions in the future. Intention involves mental activities such as planning and forethought.[1]

Definition

Folk psychology explains human behavior on the basis of mental states, including beliefs, desires, and intentions.[2][3] Mental mechanisms, including intention, explain behavior in that individuals are seen as actors who have desires and who attempt to achieve goals that are directed by beliefs.[4] Thus, an intentional action is a function to accomplish a desired goal and is based on the belief that the course of action will satisfy a desire.[4]

There is also a theoretical distinction between intentionality (intentional actions), and a mental state of intention for the future.[5] Searle (1983) labeled these as intention-in-action and prior intention respectively. Prior intentions reflect forethought about intentions-in-action; prior intentions do not need to be carried out to be considered intentions.[5] An unfulfilled intention is a prior intention that has no action associated with it.[5]

Astington (1993)[2] outlined the connections between mental states (desires, beliefs, and intentions) and actions carried out by an individual in order to reach a goal; these connections are referred to as the Intentional Chain. The proposed connective chain is that desire causes intention, which causes action, which causes outcome. The Intentional Chain maps the linking of a desire to the satisfaction of a goal via the intermediary intention.[2]

The development of an understanding of intention

Psychological research suggests that understanding intentions of others may be a prerequisite for a higher-level understanding of other people's minds or theory of mind.[6] Theory of mind research attempts to map how children come to understand the mind as a representational device for the world.[7] This research has focused on the development of knowledge that others have beliefs, desires, and intentions that are different from one's own. A basic ability to comprehend other people's intentions based on their actions is critical to the development of theory of mind.[6]

Understanding intention is thought to be pivotal in understanding social contexts in numerous ways. First, acquiring an understanding of intention is important for development in that it helps children conceptualize how people and animals differ from objects. Much of behavior is caused by intentions, and understanding intentions helps to interpret these behaviors.[8] Second, intentions are integral to an understanding of morality.[9] Children learn to assign praise or blame based on whether actions of others are intentional. Intention is also necessary to understand and predict the plans and future actions of others.[1] Understanding the intentions and motives of others aids in the interpretation of communication,[10][11] and the achievement of cooperative goals.[12] Social, cognitive and developmental psychological research has focused on the question: How do young children develop the ability to understand other people's behaviors and intentions?

Intentional acts in infancy and childhood

From an early age, typically-developing children parse human actions in terms of goals, rather than in terms of movements in space, or muscle movements.[13] Meltzoff (1995)[14] conducted a study in which 18-month-olds were shown an unsuccessful act. For instance, children watched an adult accidentally under or over shoot a target, or attempt to perform an action but his hand slipped. The aim of the study was to determine whether the children were able to interpret the intention of the adult, regardless of the actual action performed. Young children have a tendency to imitate other people's actions. The outcome measure was what the child chose to re-enact—the actual event (literal motions), or the adult's goal, which was not accomplished.[14] The results of the study suggested that 18-month-olds are able to infer unseen goals and intentions of others based on their actions. Infants who saw unsuccessful attempts at a target act and infants who saw the target act imitated the act at a higher rate than infants who saw neither the act nor an attempt.[14] Similar paradigms were conducted with children 9 months old and 15 months old. Nine-month-olds did not respond to the unsuccessful attempt demonstrations; however, 15-month-olds acted similarly to the 18-month-olds. This suggests that between 9 months and 15 months of age the ability to infer intentions in other people develops.[13]

The development of understanding intention has also been studied in toddlers. As mentioned previously, an intentional action is based on the belief that the course of action will satisfy a desire.[7] In that case, what was intended can be interpreted as a function of an understanding for what was desired. When outcomes are achieved without the action of the individual directed at the goal, intention is not attributed to the actor; rather, the event is considered an accident.[5] Research by Astington and colleagues (1993)[2] found that 3-year-olds are skilled at matching goals to outcomes to infer intention. If another individual's goals match an outcome, 3-year-olds are able to conclude that the action was done “on purpose.” Conversely, when goals do not match outcomes, the children labeled the individual's actions as accidental.[2] Children may come to distinguish between desire and intention when they learn to view the mind as a medium for representations of the world.[15] Astington argues that initially desire is undifferentiated from intention in that both function as a goal state. Children then develop a more mature command of understanding other's intentions when they are able to represent an action as caused by a prior intention that is separate from desire.[15]

Thus, research suggests that by the age of fifteen months, humans are capable of understanding intentional acts in others.[13] The ability to distinguish between intention and desire develops in early childhood. Gestures and object-directed actions have also been studied in connexion with the development of the understanding of intention. The development of the ability to use gestures and object-directed actions in social situations has been studied from numerous perspectives, including the embodiment perspective and the social-cognitive perspective.

Gestures and object-directed intentions

Gestures are often recognized as a tool indicative of higher social reasoning. In order to engage in or understand a gesture, an individual has to recognize it as an indicator of an object or event separate from the self or the actor. It is thought that pointing, especially declarative pointing (i.e. pointing intended to direct and share intention rather than request an object), reveals the understanding of others as attentional and intentional agents (e.g. Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2007[16]). This understanding is indicated by object-directed reactions to pointing (rather than focusing on the hand).[17] Pointing is also thought to denote perspective-taking ability and understanding of intention, as the individual must be able to understand that the actor is attending to the object and, perhaps most importantly, that the actor is attempting to communicate information regarding the referent.[17] The development of pointing is thought to reach a critical stage at around 9 to 12 months in normally developing children (e.g. Leung & Rheingold, 1981; Moll & Tomasello, 2007; Schaffer, 2005[18][19][20]). Liszkowski and colleagues (2004)[21] found that human children begin to point at around one year of age and do so with a multiple motives, including sharing attention and interest.[21] Earlier pointing may be different in nature and is thought to develop from a learned association between reaching and adult responsiveness to the child's desire for a referent object.[22]

Thus, it seems pointing may be more complex than a straightforward indicator of social understanding. Early pointing may not indicate an understanding of intention; rather it may indicate an association between the gesture and interesting objects or events.[23][24][25] However, an understanding of intention may develop as the child develops a theory of mind and begins to use pointing to convey meaning about referents in the world.

Embodiment perspective

The embodiment hypothesis holds that cognition arises out of an individual's physical interactions with the environment. In this way, environment and behavior are an integral part of cognition and what psychologists conceive of as ‘mental representations’ are indistinguishable from perception and action (e.g. Smith, 2005[26]). The ontogenetic development of social cognition may be thought of as intertwined with the development pointing actions. According to this perspective, gestures are not just indicators of development but play a key role in how children come to develop advanced social cognition, including understanding of object-directed relations and human intention. In particular, engaging in physical actions oneself may provide insight into the structure of another's actions (eventually leading to a more nuanced understanding of another's mind).[14][23]

One method of determining developmental relations between actions and an understanding of social nuances behind actions is to assess correlations between infants’ reactions to actions and the frequency with which infants produce actions.[27] Children are generally able to produce actions around the same time they are considered to be capable of understanding the actions in others. For instance, Woodward and Guajardo (2002)[17] found a correlation between children's ability to produce points (either during the experience or based on parental report of pointing at home) and their understanding of object-directed pointing (as evidenced by a preference for looking at a new object rather than a new hand path in a habituation paradigm) by 12 months. In addition, Brune and Woodward (2007)[28] found that infants who produce object-directed points tended to have an understanding of pointing and infants who engaged in shared attention tended to have an understanding of eye gaze. Although the findings are correlational, they support the idea that actions may facilitate cognitive understanding. It is unclear whether self-produced pointing gestures causally influence an understanding of pointing as relational; however, there is experimental evidence which suggests that infants supported in a new action skill will subsequently develop an understanding of that action.[27] For instance, infants allowed to grasp objects with Velcro mittens gained an understanding of object-directed grasping.[29]

Social-cultural perspective

A social-cultural perspective includes the notion that not just actions, but partaking in social interactions and cooperation (both observing and acting) are key to both ontogenetic social development and responsible for larger cultural institutions, symbol systems, and other human social abilities (e.g. Moll & Tomasello, 2007; Tomasello et al., 2005[19][30]).

This social-cultural perspective is derived from the Vygotskian view that higher cognitive functions originate in relations between individuals. The strict version of this view is that these functions are social actions that have been internalized.[31] Pointing, according to Vygotsky, starts out as an attempt to grab a desired object. Then, a transitional gesture develops in which the individual reaches toward the object when it is desired as a cue to another to retrieve it. This transitional gesture, says Vygotsky, is an important step toward language in that participation in these social interactions are internalized and become an understanding of the psychological functions of others. Thus, pointing is an example of the internalization process that occurs over a long series of developmental events. These gestures help children to gain an understanding of triadic interactions, as the gestures go from being simply about the objects to being specifically directed at people and conveying intention toward others.[31]

Tomasello and colleagues proposed a social-cultural perspective for understanding human affinity for advanced social cognition (e.g. Moll & Tomasello, 2007; Tomasello et al., 2005[19][30]). This view takes from Vygotsky's theory the idea that social interactions (such as pointing) are not just indicative of higher cognitive functions, such as understanding intention, but play an important role in shaping them. They argue that advanced cognitive abilities are derived from the tendency to cooperate and engage in collaborative activities (e.g. Moll & Tomasello, 2007; Tomasello et al., 2005[19][30]).

It was originally suspected that such foundational cognitive skills leading to advanced social understanding lie in the human ability to understand another's intention. Humans seem to have an affinity for figuring out what others are perceiving, intending, desiring, believing, etc. For example, the use of symbols requires the ability to understand another's action and attention on an entity in the world.[32] However, understanding intentions is unlikely to be a species-specific ability.[30]

Tomasello and colleagues argue that it is possible to break down the advanced understanding of shared intentionality into two developmental pathways that eventually become intertwined:

  1. The ability to understand others as goal-directed and intentional agents and
  2. A species-unique tendency to share emotions, events, and activities. Other species, such as great apes, understand the basics of intentionality; however, they do not exhibit behavior that suggests a willingness to engage in shared attention.[30]

This claim may be further investigated by examining the functional origins of pointing. It is possible that the pointing exhibited by other species is different in purpose and origin from the pointing said to be indicative of a developing psychological understanding.[33] The former, referred to as imperative pointing, was originally described by Vygotsky (1978)[31] as pointing which begins in an attempt to reach for a desired object. When another retrieves the desired object, the individual learns to associate the gesture (typically hand and all fingers extended outward) with a communicated intention to acquire the desired object. However, research suggests not all points develop in this way. A study by Bates, Camaioni and Volterra (1975)[34] distinguished between imperative and declarative gestures. Imperative gestures were described as those directed at an adult in order to obtain an object, while declarative gestures were those simply intended to obtain adult attention. Both types of gestures are social in nature; however, declarative pointing is thought to be linked to more advanced social understanding.[35][36] Declarative gestures may involve more complex social and cooperative skills, linked to the development of communication skills (e.g. Liszkowski et al., 2005[37]). For instance, Camaioni and colleagues found that declarative pointing was related to an understanding of adult's intentions, while imperative gestures were not related.[38]

According to a social-cultural perspective, it is not the actions of pointing themselves, but the tendency to engage in cooperative actions (as indicated by elements such as shared intentionality and declarative pointing) that determines the advanced social-cognitive status of normally developing humans. These cooperative actions reveal an understanding of intention and may be for the sole purpose of interacting or cooperating rather than achieving an end. It may be that declarative pointing (typically exhibited by normally developing children but not children with autism), rather than imperative pointing, is indicative of the tendency to engage in the cooperative interactions believed to be important for developing advanced social-cognitive understanding. This fits in with Tomasello and colleagues’ conception that triadic social interactions in which child and adult engage in cooperative actions with shared intention are not only indicative of advanced social-cognitive ability but critical to the development of it.[19][30] During these interactions, children gradually begin to conceptualize both first- and third-person perspectives, gaining a “bird’s eye view” of social interactions.[19] Both the embodiment and social cultural perspectives share the principle that gestures are not just indicators of development, but play an important role in how children come to understand object-directed relations and human intention.

Gaze and attentional acts

Research suggests that faces are pivotal in offering social cues necessary for children's cognitive, language, and social development. These cues may offer information on another's emotional state,[39][40] focus of attention,[41] and potential intentions[42][43] (For a discussion see Mosconi, Mack, McCarthy, & Pelphrey, 2005[44]).

Intention may be ascribed to an individual based on where in space that individual is attending. Intention is understood not only through actions and the manipulation of objects, but by tracking eye movements.[13] Research in this area is focused on how humans develop the understanding that eye gaze indicates that the observer may be psychologically connected to the referent.[13]

Even as infants, humans are able to follow the gaze of others. Further research has aimed to test whether infants are simply inclined to look in the direction of head movements, without any real understanding of another individual's psychological state.[13] Brooks (1999) found that children do not direct attention simply toward the visual hemisphere of novel head movements; rather, children as young as 15 months attend to object-directed eye gaze, suggesting that children are attending to referents to which others attend, and are not simply gazing in a similar direction.[45] These results support the idea that infants understand eye gaze as an indicator of another individual's psychological state, which is a basic component of understanding that others may have intentions separate from one's own.

Biological motion and inferring intention

Neuroimaging research suggests that biological motion is processed differently from other types of motion. Biological motion is processed as a category in which individuals are able to infer intention.[46] An evolutionary perspective of this phenomenon is that humans survived on the basis of being able to predict the internal mental states and potential future actions of others. Research on biological motion has found cells in the primate superior temporal polysensory area (STP) that respond specifically to biological motion.[47] In addition, there are brain regions, including the superior temporal sulcus, that respond to biological but not non-biological motion.[48][49] These findings suggest that humans may have a biologically-based affinity for spotting and interpreting purposeful, biological motions.

In one experiment, 18-month-olds observed either a human or a mechanical arm attempting to perform actions, but failing to achieve a goal. The children imitated the action to complete the intended goal when the arm was human, but not when it was mechanical. This suggests that from a young age, humans are able to infer intention specifically as a biological mechanism between motions and goals.[50]

Humans have a tendency to infer intention from motion, even in the absence of other distinguishing features (e.g. body shape, emotional expression). This was demonstrated in a study by Heider and Simmel;[51] they had observers view videos of moving triangles, and found that participants tended to attribute intentions and even personality traits to the shapes based on their movements. The movement had to be animate, meaning self-propelled and non-linear.[51]

Johansson[52] devised a way to study biological motion without interference from other characteristics of humans such as body shape, or emotional expression. He attached dots of light to actors' joints and recorded the movements in a dark environment, so that only the dots of light were visible. The Johansson figures, as they came to be known, have been used to demonstrate that individuals attribute mental states, such as desires and intentions to movements, that are otherwise disconnected from context.[46]

Simulation theory

The simulation hypothesis holds that in order to understand intention in others, individuals must observe an action, and then infer the actor's intentions by estimating what their own actions and intentions might be in the situation.[46] Individuals connect their own actions to internal mental states through the experience of sensory information when movements are carried out; this sensory information is stored and connected to one's own intentions. Since internal mental states, such as intention, cannot be understood directly through observing movements, it is hypothesized that these internal states are inferred based on one's own stored representations of those movements.[46]

This theory is supported by research on mirror neurons, or neural regions, including the premotor cortex, and parietal cortex, that activate both when individuals are engaging in an action, and when they are observing the actions of others. This suggests individuals may be simulating the motor movements via internal representations of their own motor movements.[53][54] Thus, research indicates that humans are hard-wired to notice biological motion, infer intention, and use previous mental representations to predict future actions of others.

Intentions and behaviors

Although human behavior is extremely complex and still remains unpredictable, psychologists are trying to understand the influential factors in the process of forming intentions and performing actions. The theories of Reasoned Action and Planned Behavior are comprehensive theories that specify a limited number of psychological variables that can influence behavior, namely (a) intention; (b) attitude toward the behavior; (c) subjective norm; (d) perceived behavioral control; and (e) behavioral, normative and control beliefs.[55] In the theory of reasoned action, intention is influenced by people's attitude toward performing the behavior and the subjective norm. However, the level of perceived control is believed to be influential on people's behavioral intention along with their attitude and subjective norms, according to the theory of planned behavior. Not surprisingly, in most studies, intention is driven by attitudes to a greater extent than by subjective norms.[56]

The predictive validity of the theory of Reasoned Action has been examined in numerous studies that have previously served as literature for at least three quantitative reviews. Ajzen and Fishbein (1973) reviewed 10 studies and reported a .63 average correlation for the prediction of behavior from intentions and a mean multiple correlation of .76 for the equation predicting intentions from both attitudes and norms.[57] With similar objectives but larger samples, Sheppard et al.'s and van den Putte's meta-analyses estimated correlations of .53 and .62 for the prediction of behavior and multiple correlations of .66 and .68, respectively, for the prediction of intentions.[58][59] All these studies have reflected the strong correlation that exists between people's attitudes, social norms and their intentions, as well as between their intention and the prediction of their behaviors. However, these correlations do not remain unchanged across all the conditions in people's life. Although people are likely to develop intentions to perform the action in question if they have a favorable attitude and perceive the behavior as controllable, then people's perception of control would be irrelevant to intentions when people have negative attitudes and perceive normative pressure not to perform certain actions.[56] Research has also shown that people are more likely to perform an action if they have previously formed the corresponding intentions. Their intentions to perform the action appear to derive from attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control.[60] For instance, the reason you are motivated to have a few drinks after work is mostly determined by several factors. The very first one is your intention. Whether you have a positive attitude towards drinking as it can help you relieve stress and enjoy your time can greatly influence your attitude towards drinking after work. The next factor is the subjective norms around you. The level of intention to drink after work you are most likely to develop is influenced by whether significant people around you also hold favorable attitudes towards drinking and whether society tends to reward people who can drink. The last factor is the level of perceived behavioral control you have towards your intended behavior, more specifically how much confidence you have in controlling how much you will drink. If all of these factors tend to enhance your intention to have some drinks after work, you are more likely to do so. The longer you maintain the behavior of drinking after work, the stronger and more consistent your original intention will become. As a result, the greater the likelihood you will have some drinks in the future.

How people think about and verbally communicate their own intentions also impacts these intentions. For example, asking a question about prior behaviors using the imperfective aspect of language seems to be able to bring out stronger intentions to perform such a behavior in the future.[61] According to the World Atlas of Language Structures, "Imperfective Aspects" refers to a specific form of language structure used for reference to the present and the future but also for ongoing and habitual events in the past. For example, ‘He writes/is writing/wrote/was writing/will write letters.’[62] People are more likely to interpret the event as ongoing, and likely to resume the action in the future when it has been described with the imperfective verb aspect.[63] Similarly, using present tense to describe an action as ongoing may strengthen intentions to perform the same action in the future.[64] Previous research has showed that both information on past behavior and their attitude towards such behavior play crucial roles in predicting people's future behavioral tendency.[65][66] Recent research done by Carrera and others concluded that verb tense may not have direct influence on intentions, however it could still affect the type of information used as a basis of behavioral intentions. When participants described a past episode using the present tense, they consistently used the more concrete past behavior as a basis for their intentions. In contrast, when participants described a past episode using the past tense, they consistently used the more abstract attitude as a basis for their intentions.[67]

See also

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External links

Attempted murder

Attempted murder is a crime of attempt in various jurisdictions.

Authorial intent

In literary theory and aesthetics, authorial intent refers to an author's intent as it is encoded in their work. Authorial intentionalism is the view, according to which an author's intentions should constrain the ways in which it is properly interpreted.

Deed poll

A deed poll (plural: deeds poll) is a legal document binding only to a single person or several persons acting jointly to express an active intention. It is, strictly speaking, not a contract because it binds only one party and expresses an intention instead of a promise.

Diary

A diary is a record (originally in handwritten format) with discrete entries arranged by date reporting on what has happened over the course of a day or other period. A personal diary may include a person's experiences, thoughts, and/or feelings, excluding comments on current events outside the writer's direct experience. Someone who keeps a diary is known as a diarist. Diaries undertaken for institutional purposes play a role in many aspects of human civilization, including government records (e.g. Hansard), business ledgers, and military records. In British English, the word may also denote a preprinted journal format. A diary is a collection of notes.

Today the term is generally employed for personal diaries, normally intended to remain private or to have a limited circulation amongst friends or relatives. The word "journal" may be sometimes used for "diary," but generally a diary has (or intends to have) daily entries, whereas journal-writing can be less frequent.

Although a diary may provide information for a memoir, autobiography or biography, it is generally written not with the intention of being published as it stands, but for the author's own use. In recent years, however, there is internal evidence in some diaries (e.g. those of Ned Rorem, Alan Clark, Tony Benn or Simon Gray) that they are written with eventual publication in mind, with the intention of self-vindication (pre- or posthumous), or simply for profit.

By extension the term diary is also used to mean a printed publication of a written diary; and may also refer to other terms of journal including electronic formats (e.g. blogs).

Entrepreneurship

Entrepreneurship is the process of designing, launching and running a new business, which is often initially a small business. The people who create these businesses are called entrepreneurs.Entrepreneurship has been described as the "capacity and willingness to develop, organize and manage a business venture along with any of its risks in order to make a profit." While definitions of entrepreneurship typically focus on the launching and running of businesses, due to the high risks involved in launching a start-up, a significant proportion of start-up businesses have to close due to "lack of funding, bad business decisions, an economic crisis, lack of market demand, or a combination of all of these."A broader definition of the term is sometimes used, especially in the field of economics. In this usage, an Entrepreneur is an entity which has the ability to find and act upon opportunities to translate inventions or technology into new products: "The entrepreneur is able to recognize the commercial potential of the invention and organize the capital, talent, and other resources that turn an invention into a commercially viable innovation." In this sense, the term "Entrepreneurship" also captures innovative activities on the part of established firms, in addition to similar activities on the part of new businesses.

G. E. M. Anscombe

Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe (; 18 March 1919 – 5 January 2001), usually cited as G. E. M. Anscombe or Elizabeth Anscombe, was a British analytic philosopher. She wrote on the philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, philosophical logic, philosophy of language, and ethics. She was a prominent figure of analytical Thomism.

Anscombe was a student of Ludwig Wittgenstein and became an authority on his work and edited and translated many books drawn from his writings, above all his Philosophical Investigations. Anscombe's 1958 article "Modern Moral Philosophy" introduced the term consequentialism into the language of analytic philosophy, and had a seminal influence on contemporary virtue ethics. Her monograph Intention is generally recognised as her greatest and most influential work, and the continuing philosophical interest in the concepts of intention, action, and practical reasoning can be said to have taken its main impetus from this work.

Good faith

Good faith (Latin: bona fides), in human interactions, is a sincere intention to be fair, open, and honest, regardless of the outcome of the interaction. While some Latin phrases lose their literal meaning over centuries, this is not the case with bona fides; it is still widely used and interchangeable with its generally accepted modern-day English translation of good faith. It is an important concept within law and business. The opposed concepts are bad faith, mala fides (duplicity) and perfidy (pretense). In contemporary English, the usage of bona fides is synonymous with credentials and identity. The phrase is sometimes used in job advertisements, and should not be confused with the bona fide occupational qualifications or the employer's good faith effort, as described below.

Intention-to-treat analysis

An intention-to-treat (ITT) analysis of the results of an experiment is based on the initial treatment assignment and not on the treatment eventually received. ITT analysis is intended to avoid various misleading artifacts that can arise in intervention research such as non-random attrition of participants from the study or crossover. ITT is also simpler than other forms of study design and analysis because it does not require observation of compliance status for units assigned to different treatments or incorporation of compliance into the analysis. Although ITT analysis is widely employed in published clinical trials, it can be incorrectly described and there are some issues with its application. Furthermore, there is no consensus on how to carry out an ITT analysis in the presence of missing outcome data.

Intention (criminal law)

In criminal law, intent is a subjective state of mind that must accompany the acts of certain crimes to constitute a violation. A more formal, generally synonymous legal term is scienter: intent or knowledge of wrongdoing.

Intention tremor

Intention tremor, also known as cerebellar tremor, is a dyskinetic disorder characterized by a broad, coarse, and low frequency (below 5 Hz) tremor. The amplitude of an intention tremor increases as an extremity approaches the endpoint of deliberate and visually guided movement (hence the name intention tremor). An intention tremor is usually perpendicular to the direction of movement. When experiencing an intention tremor, one often overshoots or undershoots their target, a condition known as dysmetria. Intention tremor is the result of dysfunction of the cerebellum, particularly on the same side as the tremor in the lateral zone, which controls visually guided movements. Depending on the location of cerebellar damage, these tremors can be either unilateral or bilateral.A variety of causes have been discovered to date, including damage or degradation of the cerebellum due to neurodegenerative diseases, trauma, tumor, stroke, or toxicity. There is currently no established pharmacological treatment; however, some success has been seen using treatments designed for essential tremors.

Mens rea

Mens rea (; Law Latin for "guilty mind") is the mental element of a person's intention to commit a crime; or knowledge that one's action or lack of action would cause a crime to be committed. It is a necessary element of many crimes.

The standard common law test of criminal liability is expressed in the Latin phrase actus reus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, i.e. "the act is not culpable unless the mind is guilty". In jurisdictions with due process, there must be both actus reus ("guilty act") and mens rea for a defendant to be guilty of a crime (see concurrence). As a general rule, someone who acted without mental fault is not liable in criminal law. Exceptions are known as strict liability crimes.

In civil law, it is usually not necessary to prove a subjective mental element to establish liability for breach of contract or tort, for example. But if a tort is intentionally committed or a contract is intentionally breached, such intent may increase the scope of liability and the damages payable to the plaintiff.

In some jurisdictions, the terms mens rea and actus reus have been replaced by alternative terminology.

Murder–suicide

A murder–suicide is an act in which an individual kills one or more people before (or while) killing themself. The combination of murder and suicide can take various forms, often linked to the first form:

Murder linked with suicide of a mentally unstable person with a homicidal ideation;

Murder which entails suicide, such as suicide bombing or driving a car with one or more passenger(s) over a precipice;

Suicide after murder to escape state punishment(s);

Suicide after murder as a form of self-punishment due to guilt;

Suicide after (or before) murder by proxy;

Suicide after or during murder inflicted by others;

Murder to receive a death sentence willfully;

Joint suicide in the form of killing the other with consent, and then killing oneself;

Murder before suicide with the intent of preventing future pain and suffering of others including family members and oneself, such as a parent killing their children before ending their own life;Suicide-lawful killing has three conceivable forms:

To kill one's assailant through proportionate self-defense killing oneself in the process;

Lawful killing to prevent an individual from causing harm to others, in so doing killing oneself;

Lawful killing indirectly resulting in or contributing to suicide.Many spree killings have ended in suicide, such as in many school shootings. Some cases of religiously-motivated suicides may also involve murder. All categorization amounts to forming somewhat arbitrary distinctions where relating to intention in the case of psychosis, where the intention(s) is/are more likely than not to be irrational. Ascertaining the legal intention (mens rea) is inapplicable to cases properly categorized as insanity.

Nekkhamma

Nekkhamma (Sanskrit: नैष्काम्य) is a Pali word generally translated as "renunciation" or "the pleasure of renunciation" while also conveying more specifically "giving up the world and leading a holy life" or "freedom from lust, craving and desires." In Buddhism's Noble Eightfold Path, nekkhamma is the first practice associated with "Right Intention." In the Theravada list of ten perfections, nekkhamma is the third practice of "perfection." It involves non-attachment (detachment).

Normalization (statistics)

In statistics and applications of statistics, normalization can have a range of meanings. In the simplest cases, normalization of ratings means adjusting values measured on different scales to a notionally common scale, often prior to averaging. In more complicated cases, normalization may refer to more sophisticated adjustments where the intention is to bring the entire probability distributions of adjusted values into alignment. In the case of normalization of scores in educational assessment, there may be an intention to align distributions to a normal distribution. A different approach to normalization of probability distributions is quantile normalization, where the quantiles of the different measures are brought into alignment.

In another usage in statistics, normalization refers to the creation of shifted and scaled versions of statistics, where the intention is that these normalized values allow the comparison of corresponding normalized values for different datasets in a way that eliminates the effects of certain gross influences, as in an anomaly time series. Some types of normalization involve only a rescaling, to arrive at values relative to some size variable. In terms of levels of measurement, such ratios only make sense for ratio measurements (where ratios of measurements are meaningful), not interval measurements (where only distances are meaningful, but not ratios).

In theoretical statistics, parametric normalization can often lead to pivotal quantities – functions whose sampling distribution does not depend on the parameters – and to ancillary statistics – pivotal quantities that can be computed from observations, without knowing parameters.

Opinion poll

An opinion poll, often simply referred to as a poll or a survey, is a human research survey of public opinion from a particular sample. Opinion polls are usually designed to represent the opinions of a population by conducting a series of questions and then extrapolating generalities in ratio or within confidence intervals.

Richard Nixon's resignation speech

Richard Nixon's resignation speech was an address made on August 8, 1974, by President of the United States Richard Nixon to the American public. It was delivered in the White House Oval Office. The purpose of the speech was for Nixon, who had been intimately involved in the events surrounding the Watergate scandal that occurred during his controversial re-election campaign in 1972, to announce to the nation that he was resigning from office. Watergate had cost Nixon much of his political support, and at the time of his resignation, he faced almost certain impeachment and removal from office.

Nixon was the ninth incumbent president not to complete the four-year term to which they had been elected since the presidency was established in 1789. He was however, the first to do so for a reason other than dying in office. His presidential resignation remains the only one in U.S. history.

Supergroup (music)

A supergroup is a musical performing group whose members have successful solo careers, are members of other groups, or are well known in other musical professions. The term is usually used in the context of rock and pop music, but it has occasionally been applied to other musical genres. For example, The Three Tenors—composed of opera superstars José Carreras, Plácido Domingo, and Luciano Pavarotti—or Rainbow have been called a supergroup.A supergroup sometimes forms as a side project, with no intention that the group will remain together. In other instances, the group may become the primary project of the members' careers. It became popular in late 1960s rock music for members of already successful groups to record albums together, after which they normally split up. Charity supergroups, in which prominent musicians perform or record together in support of a particular cause, have been common since the 1980s.

Theory of planned behavior

In psychology, the theory of planned behavior (abbreviated TPB) is a theory that links one's beliefs and behavior.

The theory states that attitude toward behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control, together shape an individual's behavioral intentions and behaviors.

The concept was proposed by Icek Ajzen to improve on the predictive power of the theory of reasoned action by including perceived behavioral control. It has been applied to studies of the relations among beliefs, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behaviors in various fields such as advertising, public relations, advertising campaigns, healthcare, sport management and sustainability.

Wound healing

Wound healing is a complex process in which the skin, and the tissues under it, repair themselves after injury. In this article, wound healing is depicted in a discrete timeline of physical attributes (phases) constituting the post-trauma repairing process. In undamaged skin, the epidermis (surface layer) and dermis (deeper layer) form a protective barrier against the external environment. When the barrier is broken, a regulated sequence of biochemical events is set into motion to repair the damage. This process is divided into predictable phases: blood clotting (hemostasis), inflammation, tissue growth (proliferation), and tissue remodeling (maturation). Blood clotting may be considered to be part of the inflammation stage instead of a separate stage.

The wound healing process is not only complex but also fragile, and it is susceptible to interruption or failure leading to the formation of non-healing chronic wounds. Factors that contribute to non-healing chronic wounds are diabetes, venous or arterial disease, infection, and metabolic deficiencies of old age.Wound care encourages and speeds wound healing via cleaning and protection from reinjury or infection. Depending on each patient's needs, it can range from the simplest first aid to entire nursing specialties such as wound, ostomy, and continence nursing and burn center care.

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