ISO 9564

ISO 9564 is an international standard for personal identification number (PIN) management and security in financial services.

The PIN is used to verify the identity of a customer (the user of a bank card) within an electronic funds transfer system, and (typically) to authorize the transfer or withdrawal of funds. Therefore, it is important to protect PINs against unauthorized disclosure or misuse. Modern banking systems require interoperability between a variety of PIN entry devices, smart cards, card readers, card issuers, acquiring banks and retailers – including transmission of PINs between those entities – so a common set of rules for handling and securing PINs is required, both to ensure technical compatibility and a mutually agreed level of security. ISO 9564 provides principles and techniques to meet these requirements.

ISO 9564 comprises three parts,[Note 1] under the general title of Financial services — Personal Identification Number (PIN) management and security.

Part 1: Basic principles and requirements for PINs in card-based systems

ISO 9564-1:2011[1] specifies the basic principles and techniques of secure PIN management. It includes both general principles and specific requirements.

Basic principles

The basic principles of PIN management include:

  • PIN management functions shall be implemented in software and hardware in such a way that the functionality cannot be modified without detection, and that the data cannot be obtained or misused.
  • Encrypting the same PIN with the same key but for a different bank account shall not predictably give the same cipher text.
  • Security of the PIN encryption shall depend on secrecy of the key, not secrecy of the algorithm.
  • The PIN must always be stored encrypted or physically secured.
  • Only the customer (i.e. the user of a card) and/or authorized card issuer staff shall be involved with PIN selection or issuing. Where card issuer staff are involved, appropriate strictly enforced procedures shall be used.
  • A stored encrypted PIN shall be protected from substitution.
  • A PIN shall be revoked if it is compromised, or suspected to be.
  • The card issuer shall be responsible for PIN verification.
  • The customer shall be advised of the importance of keeping the PIN secret.

PIN entry devices

The standard specifies some characteristics required or recommended of PIN entry devices (also known as PIN pads), i.e. the device into which the customer enters the PIN, including:

  • All PIN entry devices shall allow entry of the digits zero to nine. Numeric keys may also have letters printed on them, e.g. as per E.161. These letters are only for the customers' convenience; internally, the PIN entry device only handles digits. (E.g. the standard does not support multi-tap or similar.) The standard also recommends that customers should be warned that not all devices may have letters.
  • The PIN entry device shall be physically secured so that it is not feasible to modify its operation or extract PINs or encryption keys from it.
  • The PIN entry device should be designed or installed so as to prevent other people from observing the PIN as it is entered.
  • The keyboard layout should be standardized, with consistent and unambiguous labels for function keys, such as "enter", "clear" (this entry) and "cancel" (the transaction). The standard also recommends specific colours for function keys: green for "enter", yellow for "clear", red for "cancel".

Smart card readers

A PIN may be stored in a secure smart card, and verified offline by that card. The PIN entry device and the reader used for the card that will verify the PIN may be integrated into a single physically secure unit, but they do not need to be.

Additional requirements that apply to smart card readers include:

  • The card reader should be constructed in such a way as to prevent someone monitoring the communications to the card by inserting a monitoring device into the card slot.
  • If the PIN entry device and the card reader are not both part of an integrated secure unit, then the PIN shall be encrypted while it is transmitted from the PIN entry device to the card reader.

Other specific PIN control requirements

Other specific requirements include:

  • All hardware and software used for PIN processing shall be implemented such that:
    • Their correct functioning can be assured.
    • They cannot be modified or accessed without detection.
    • The data cannot be inappropriately accessed, modified or misused.
    • The PIN cannot be determined by a brute-force search.
  • The PIN shall not be communicated verbally. In particular bank personnel shall never ask the customer to disclose the PIN, nor recommend a PIN value.
  • PIN encryption keys should not be used for any other purpose.

PIN length

The standard specifies that PINs shall be from four to twelve digits long, noting that longer PINs are more secure but harder to use. It also suggests that the issuer should not assign PINs longer than six digits.

PIN selection

There are three accepted methods of selecting or generating a PIN:

assigned derived PIN
The card issuer generates the PIN by applying some cryptographic function to the account number or other value associated with the customer.
assigned random PIN
The card issuer generates a PIN value using a random number generator.
customer selected PIN
The customer selects the PIN value.

PIN issuance and delivery

The standard includes requirements for keeping the PIN secret while transmitting it, after generation, from the issuer to the customer. These include:

  • The PIN is never available to the card issuing staff.
  • The PIN can only be displayed or printed for the customer in an appropriately secure manner. One method is a PIN mailer, an envelope designed so that it can be printed without the PIN being visible (even at printing time) until the envelope is opened. A PIN mailer must also be constructed so that any prior opening will be obvious to the customer, who will then be aware that the PIN may have been disclosed.
  • The PIN shall never appear where it can be associated with a customer's account. For example, a PIN mailer must not include the account number, but only sufficient information for its physical delivery (e.g. name and address). The PIN and the associated card shall not be mailed together, nor at the same time.

PIN encryption

To protect the PIN during transmission from the PIN entry device to the verifier, the standard requires that the PIN be encrypted, and specifies several formats that may be used. In each case, the PIN is encoded into a PIN block, which is then encrypted by an "approved algorithm", according to part 2 of the standard).

The PIN block formats are:

The PIN block is constructed by XOR-ing two 64-bit fields: the plain text PIN field and the account number field, both of which comprise 16 four-bit nibbles.

The plain text PIN field is:

  • one nibble with the value of 0, which identifies this as a format 0 block
  • one nibble encoding the length N of the PIN
  • N nibbles, each encoding one PIN digit
  • 14−N nibbles, each holding the "fill" value 15 (i.e. 11112)

The account number field is:

This format should be used where no PAN is available. The PIN block is constructed by concatenating the PIN with a transaction number thus:

  • one nibble with the value of 1, which identifies this as a format 1 block
  • one nibble encoding the length N of the PIN
  • N nibbles, each encoding one PIN digit
  • 14−N nibbles encoding a unique value, which may be a transaction sequence number, time stamp or random number

Format 2 is for local use with off-line systems only, e.g. smart cards. The PIN block is constructed by concatenating the PIN with a filler value thus:

  • one nibble with the value of 2, which identifies this as a format 2 block
  • one nibble encoding the length N of the PIN
  • N nibbles, each encoding one PIN digit
  • 14−N nibbles, each holding the "fill" value 15 (i.e. 11112)

(Except for the format value in the first nibble, this is identical to the plain text PIN field of format 0.)

Format 3 is the same as format 0, except that the "fill" digits are random values from 10 to 15, and the first nibble (which identifies the block format) has the value 3.

Formats 0 to 3 are all suitable for use with the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm, as they correspond to its 64-bit block size. However the standard allows for other encryption algorithms with larger block sizes, e.g. the Advanced Encryption Standard has a block size of 128 bits. In such cases the PIN must be encoding into an extended PIN block, the format of which is defined in a 2015 amendment to ISO 9564-1.[2]

Part 2: Approved algorithms for PIN encipherment

ISO 9564-2:2014[3] specifies which encryption algorithms may be used for encrypting PINs. The approved algorithms are:

Part 3 (withdrawn)

ISO 9564-3 Part 3: Requirements for offline PIN handling in ATM and POS systems,[4] most recently published in 2003, was withdrawn in 2011 and its contents merged into part 1.

Part 4: Requirements for PIN handling in eCommerce for Payment Transactions

ISO 9564-4:2016[5] defines minimum security requirements and practices for the use of PINs and PIN entry devices in electronic commerce.

Notes

  1. ^ Parts 1, 2 and 4. Part 3 was withdrawn in 2011.

References

  1. ^ ISO 9564-1:2011 Financial services — Personal Identification Number (PIN) management and security — Part 1: Basic principles and requirements for PINs in card-based systems
  2. ^ ISO 9564-1:2011/Amd 1:2015 Financial services — Personal Identification Number (PIN) management and security — Part 1: Basic principles and requirements for PINs in card-based systems AMENDMENT 1
  3. ^ ISO 9564-2:2014 Financial services — Personal Identification Number (PIN) management and security — Part 2: Approved algorithms for PIN encipherment
  4. ^ ISO 9564-3:2003 Banking — Personal Identification Number management and security — Part 3: Requirements for offline PIN handling in ATM and POS systems
  5. ^ ISO 9564-4:2016 Financial services — Personal Identification Number (PIN) management and security — Part 4: Requirements for PIN handling in eCommerce for Payment Transactions
E.161

E.161 is an ITU-T recommendation that defines the assignment of the basic 26 Latin letters (A to Z) to the 12-key telephone keypad. Uses for this mapping include:

Multi-tap and predictive text systems

Forming phonewords from telephone numbers

Using alphabetic characters (e.g. as a mnemonic) in a personal identification numberETSI ETS 300 640 and ISO 9995-8 also address this. Language-specific letters (e.g. ü, é, å, ä, ö) as well as other characters (e.g. ‘€’ or ‘@’) are not addressed, which has led to a variety of inconsistent solutions for European languages.The E.161 layout is primarily based on the layout used on American telephones since the 1930s for telephone exchange names. Until the 1990s, Q and Z were not included in the standard layout, and since the letters served mainly as mnemonic devices, they were not necessary (Q and Z were not used in phonewords); telephones either omitted them, placed Q and Z onto the 1 key, or included Q and Z on the current locations, with PRS on 7 and with WXY on 9, respectively. The development of text messaging on mobile phones, which required the full range of the alphabet, led to the need to standardize locations for Q and Z on mobile devices. E.161 adopted the current layout in response to this.

IBM 4765

The IBM 4765. PCIe Cryptographic Coprocessor is a hardware security module (HSM) that includes a secure cryptoprocessor implemented on a high-security, tamper resistant, programmable PCIe board. Specialized cryptographic electronics, microprocessor, memory, and random number generator housed within a tamper-responding environment provide a highly secure subsystem in which data processing and cryptography can be performed.

The IBM 4765 is validated to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 4, the highest level of certification achievable for commercial cryptographic devices. The IBM 4765 data sheet describes the coprocessor in detail.

IBM supplies two cryptographic-system implementations:

The PKCS#11 implementation creates a high-security solution for application programs developed for this industry-standard API.

The IBM Common Cryptographic Architecture (CCA) implementation provides many functions of special interest in the finance industry, extensive support for distributed key management, and a base on which custom processing and cryptographic functions can be added.Toolkits for custom application development are also available.

Applications may include financial PIN transactions, bank-to-clearing-house transactions, EMV transactions for integrated circuit (chip) based credit cards, and general-purpose cryptographic applications using symmetric key algorithms, hashing algorithms, and public key algorithms.

The operational keys (symmetric or RSA private) are generated in the coprocessor and are then saved either in a keystore file or in application memory, encrypted under the master key of that coprocessor. Any coprocessor with an identical master key can use those keys.

IBM 4767

The IBM 4767 PCIe Cryptographic Coprocessor is a hardware security module (HSM) that includes a secure cryptoprocessor implemented on a high-security, tamper resistant, programmable PCIe board. Specialized cryptographic electronics, microprocessor, memory, and random number generator housed within a tamper-responding environment provide a highly secure subsystem in which data processing and cryptography can be performed. Sensitive key material is never exposed outside the physical secure boundary in a clear format.

The IBM 4767 is validated to FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 4, the highest level of certification achievable for commercial cryptographic devices. The IBM 4767 data sheet describes the coprocessor in detail.

IBM supplies two cryptographic-system implementations:

The PKCS#11 implementation creates a high-security solution for application programs developed for this industry-standard API.

The IBM Common Cryptographic Architecture (CCA) implementation provides many functions of special interest in the finance industry, extensive support for distributed key management, and a base on which custom processing and cryptographic functions can be added.Toolkits for custom application development are also available.

Applications may include financial PIN transactions, bank-to-clearing-house transactions, EMV transactions for integrated circuit (chip) based credit cards, and general-purpose cryptographic applications using symmetric key algorithms, hashing algorithms, and public key algorithms.

The operational keys (symmetric or RSA private) are generated in the coprocessor and are then saved either in a keystore file or in application memory, encrypted under the master key of that coprocessor. Any coprocessor with an identical master key can use those keys. Performance benefits include the incorporation of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and format preserving encryption (FPE) in the hardware.

IBM 4768

The IBM 4768 PCIe Cryptographic Coprocessor is a hardware security module (HSM) that includes a secure cryptoprocessor implemented on a high-security, tamper resistant, programmable PCIe board. Specialized cryptographic electronics, microprocessor, memory, and random number generator housed within a tamper-responding environment provide a highly secure subsystem in which data processing and cryptography can be performed. Sensitive key material is never exposed outside the physical secure boundary in a clear format.

The IBM 4768 is designed to meet FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 4, the highest level of certification achievable for commercial cryptographic devices. It has achieved PCI-HSM certification. The IBM 4768 data sheet describes the coprocessor in detail.

IBM supplies two cryptographic-system implementations:

The PKCS#11 implementation creates a high-security solution for application programs developed for this industry-standard API.

The IBM Common Cryptographic Architecture (CCA) implementation provides many functions of special interest in the finance industry, extensive support for distributed key management, and a base on which custom processing and cryptographic functions can be added.Applications may include financial PIN transactions, bank-to-clearing-house transactions, EMV transactions for integrated circuit (chip) based credit cards, and general-purpose cryptographic applications using symmetric key algorithms, hashing algorithms, and public key algorithms.

The operational keys (symmetric or RSA private) are generated in the coprocessor and are then saved either in a keystore file or in application memory, encrypted under the master key of that coprocessor. Any coprocessor with an identical master key can use those keys. Performance benefits include the incorporation of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and format preserving encryption (FPE) in the hardware.

IBM supports the 4768 on certain IBM Z mainframes as Crypto Express6S (CEX6S) - feature code 0893. The 4768 / CEX6S is part of IBM's support for pervasive encryption and drive to encrypt all data.

List of International Organization for Standardization standards, 9000-9999

This is a list of published International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards and other deliverables. For a complete and up-to-date list of all the ISO standards, see the ISO catalogue.The standards are protected by copyright and most of them must be purchased. However, about 300 of the standards produced by ISO and IEC's Joint Technical Committee 1 (JTC1) have been made freely and publicly available.

PIN pad

A PIN pad or PIN entry device is an electronic device used in a debit, credit or smart card-based transaction to accept and encrypt the cardholder's personal identification number (PIN).

PIN pads are normally used with payment terminals, automated teller machines or integrated point of sale devices in which an electronic cash register is responsible for taking the sale amount and initiating/handling the transaction. The PIN pad is required to read the card and allow the PIN to be securely entered and encrypted before it is sent to the bank. In some cases, with chip cards, the PIN is only transferred from the PIN pad to card and it is verified by the chip card. In this case the PIN does not need to be sent to the bank or card scheme for verification. (This is known as "offline PIN verification".)

Like some stand-alone point of sale devices, PIN pads are equipped with hardware and software security features to ensure that the encryption keys and the PIN are erased if someone tries to tamper with the device. The PIN is encrypted immediately on entry and an encrypted PIN block is created. This encrypted PIN block is erased as soon as it has been sent from the PIN pad to the attached point of sale device and/or the chip card. PINs are encrypted using a variety of encryption schemes, the most common in 2010 being triple DES.

PIN pads must be approved to the standards required by the payment card industry to ensure that they provide adequate security at the point of PIN entry and for the PIN encryption process. ISO 9564 is the international standard for PIN management and security, and specifies some required and recommended characteristics of PIN entry devices.Although PIN pads nominally allow entry of numeric values, some PIN pads also have letters assigned to most of the digits, to allow use of alphabetic characters or a words as a mnemonic for the numeric PIN. Not all PIN pads necessarily have the same letters for the same numbers. ISO 9564 does not mandate any particular assignment of letters, and includes two examples that differ in the digits to which Q and Z are assigned.

Personal identification number

A Personal Identification Number, pronounced "pin"; (often spoken out loud "PIN number", introducing redundancy) is a numeric or alpha-numeric password used in the process of authenticating a user accessing a system.

The personal identification number has been the key to flourishing the exchange of private data between different data-processing centers in computer networks for financial institutions, governments, and enterprises. PINs may be used to authenticate banking systems with cardholders, governments with citizens, enterprises with employees, and computers with users, among other uses.

In common usage, PINs are used in ATM or POS transactions, secure access control (e.g. computer access, door access, car access), internet transactions or to log into a restricted website.

Shoulder surfing (computer security)

In computer security, shoulder surfing is a type of social engineering technique used to obtain information such as personal identification numbers (PINs), passwords and other confidential data by looking over the victim's shoulder. This attack can be performed either at close range (by directly looking over the victim's shoulder) or from a longer range, for example by using a pair of binoculars or similar hardware. To implement this technique attackers do not require any technical skills; keen observation of victims' surroundings and the typing pattern is sufficient. Crowded places are the more likely areas for an attacker to shoulder surf the victim. In the early 1980s, shoulder surfing was practiced near public pay phones to steal calling card digits and make long distance calls or sell them in the market for the cheaper prices. However, the advent of modern-day technologies like hidden cameras and secret microphones makes shoulder surfing easier and gives more scope for the attacker to perform long range shoulder surfing. A hidden camera allows the attacker to capture whole login process and other confidential data of the victim, which ultimately could lead to financial loss or identity theft. Shoulder surfing is more likely to occur in crowded places because it is easier to observe the information without getting the victim's attention.Apart from threats to password or PIN entry, shoulder surfing also occurs in daily situations to uncover private content on handheld mobile devices; shoulder surfing visual content was found to leak sensitive information and even private information about third-parties.

ISO standards by standard number
1–9999
10000–19999
20000+

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