Hallstein Doctrine

The Hallstein Doctrine, named after Walter Hallstein, was a key principle in the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) from 1955 to 1970. As usually presented, it prescribed that the Federal Republic would not establish or maintain diplomatic relations with any state that recognized the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). In fact it was more nuanced. There was no public official text of the "doctrine", but its main architect, Wilhelm Grewe, explained it publicly in a radio interview.[1] Konrad Adenauer, who served as Chancellor of Germany from 1949 to 1963, explained the outlines of the policy in a statement to the German parliament on 22 September 1955.[1] It meant that the Federal German government would regard it as an unfriendly act (acte peu amical) if third countries were to recognize the "German Democratic Republic" (East Germany) or to maintain diplomatic relations with it – with the exception of the Soviet Union (as one of the Four Powers responsible for Germany).[2][3]:58–61 The West German response to such could mean breaking off diplomatic relations, though this was not stated as an automatic response under the policy and in fact remained the ultima ratio (last resort).[1]

The Federal Republic abandoned important aspects of the doctrine after 1970 when it became difficult to maintain, and the Federal government changed its politics towards the German Democratic Republic.[4]:19 The Four Power Agreement on Berlin in 1971 and the signing of the Basic Treaty in 1972 brought an end to the doctrine, in accordance with the new strategy of Ostpolitik.

Historical background

Partition of Germany

Following Germany's defeat in World War II, the territory east of the Oder–Neisse line was under Soviet or Polish administration and had de facto been annexed. The rest of the territory west of that was divided into four occupation zones controlled by the Allies, with the former capital, Berlin, being similarly divided into four sectors.[5]

The western zones controlled by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States were merged, in May 1949, to form the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesrepublik Deutschland); in October 1949, the Soviet Zone became the German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik, or DDR).[5] They were informally known as "West Germany" and "East Germany". However, prior to 1954, the Allies still officially retained responsibility for the whole of Germany and neither East Germany nor West Germany had regained their sovereignty.

The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, which came into effect in 1949, was written as a constitution for the whole of Germany, including West Germany and East Germany.[6] It laid down German reunification as a goal and a requirement and was proclaimed in the name of the whole of the German people.[7]

Soviet recognition of East Germany

On 23 March 1954, the Soviet Union declared that it would establish diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic. This was seen as giving the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) a degree of legitimacy as a separate state.[4]:19 The West German government in Bonn rejected this, claiming that the Federal Republic of Germany was the legitimate heir of the German Reich.[4]: 19

German sovereignty

After the ratification of the Paris Accords on 5 May 1955, the General Treaty (Deutschlandvertrag), which largely restored (West) German sovereignty, took effect.[8]:41

Exclusive mandate

The government of the Federal Republic of Germany claimed to speak for the whole German people; this was re-iterated in a number of declarations.[4]:18 In the New York Declaration of 18 September 1951, the western occupying powers had declared that they "regard[ed] the government of the Federal Republic of Germany as the only German government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for the German nation in international affairs".[4]:20

The Federal Republic of Germany did not recognize the German Democratic Republic and maintained diplomatic relations with neither the German Democratic Republic nor the other Communist states of Eastern Europe.

Origin of the "doctrine"

In 1955 Konrad Adenauer visited Moscow, where agreement was reached that the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union would establish diplomatic relations. This was obviously in the interest of the Federal Republic of Germany but—because the Soviet Union also maintained diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic—it was apparently inconsistent with the exclusive mandate policy, which insisted that other states should not maintain diplomatic relations with both German "states". There was therefore a need to publicly define the policy and reinforce the message that the Federal Republic would not accept any other states maintaining diplomatic relations with both the Federal Republic of Germany and the ("so-called") German Democratic Republic.[4]:22

Walter Hallstein and Wilhelm Grewe were members of the delegation that accompanied Adenauer to Moscow.[4]:13 It was on the flight back from Moscow that the major elements of the policy were laid down,[9]:372f[10] though elements of the policy had already been devised and practised by the Foreign Office before.[4]:19–21 Hallstein referred to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in spite of the latter's recognition of East Germany as a "singular act" because of the Soviet Union's privileged status as an occupying power.[4]:22

Adenauer talked of the policy in a press conference on 16 September 1955 and again in a government statement to the Parliament on 22 September 1955, warning other states that establishing diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic would be regarded as an unfriendly act.[4]:22 On 8 December 1955, there was a meeting of the heads of all major German embassies and the leadership of the Foreign Office. The policy of non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic was one of the main points on the agenda. The text of the speeches by Foreign Minister Brentano, Hallstein and Grewe were later distributed to embassies worldwide.[4]:22

Authorship and name

Bundesarchiv B 145 Bild-F028459-0019, Robert-Schuman-Preis, Verleihung an Walter Hallstein
Walter Hallstein in 1969, accepting the Robert Schuman Prize.

The Hallstein Doctrine was named after Walter Hallstein, then "state secretary" (the top civil servant) at the German Foreign Office, though largely devised and implemented by the head of the political department of the German Foreign Office, Wilhelm Grewe.[11]

At the time the Hallstein Doctrine was born (or at least named), Heinrich von Brentano was the foreign minister, a post that had been recently created, after West Germany largely regained its sovereignty in 1955—before this, political responsibility for foreign policy had been retained by the chancellor, Konrad Adenauer. Brentano is also known to have referred to the policy, or a variation of it as the Brentano Doctrine.[4]:25

Some time later, in 1958, journalists named the policy the Hallstein–Grewe Doctrine, and this later became shortened to the Hallstein Doctrine.[12]:84 Grewe himself writes that he devised the broad outlines of the policy, but mainly as one of a number of options, the decisions being made by the foreign minister, Brentano, and the chancellor, Adenauer; in any case, the name Hallstein doctrine may be something of a misnomer.[3]:59

Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1989-101-01A, Moskau, Besuch Konrad Adenauer
Konrad Adenauer in Moscow, 1955

Content and rationale

The Hallstein Doctrine followed from the Federal Republic's claimed exclusive mandate to represent the whole of Germany (the Alleinvertretungsanspruch). It specified that the Federal German government would regard it as an unfriendly act (acte peu amical) if third countries were to recognize the "German Democratic Republic" (East Germany) or maintain diplomatic relations with it—with the exception of the Soviet Union, as one of the Four Powers responsible for Germany.[2][3]:58–61 The response to such an unfriendly act was often understood to mean breaking off diplomatic relations, but this was not stated as an automatic response under the policy, though it remained the ultima ratio.[1]

Which actions short of official recognition and full diplomatic relations would trigger sanctions, and what these sanctions would be, was deliberately kept unclear—at least publicly—in order to prevent foreign governments testing the limits.[4]:23 Grewe warned privately that flexibility was essential and that it was not possible to pretend that the state-like entity of East Germany did not exist[4]:23 and gave the diplomatic service guidance on what sort of activities would be tolerated under the policy.[4]:24

Neither full diplomatic relations nor consular relations with similar recognition (exequatur) would be tolerated. The same applied to treaties that did not contain special provisos specifying that the treaty did not imply recognition. However, normal commercial activities, including non-state trade representations, etc. would be tolerated. There was also a considerable grey area open to interpretation.[4]:24 While Grewe was somewhat circumspect, the foreign minister, Brentano, made it clear that – regardless of the economic consequences – the Federal Republic would immediately break off diplomatic relations with any state that recognized the German Democratic Republic de jure or recognized the "reality of two German states".[4]:24

Legal basis

A legal expert produced a legal opinion setting out that the Soviet declaration (initiating diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic) had finally separated the Soviet Zone from the three western zones, but that, since it was under the control of the Soviet Union, it had no separate state government and therefore did not meet the minimum requirements of statehood.[4]:20 The legal opinion went on to claim that any state that had established diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany or had declared an end of the state of war had implicitly recognized the Federal Republic as having an exclusive mandate to represent Germany.[13]

The western allies, in various agreements, including the General Treaty of 1955, had agreed to recognize only the Federal Republic of Germany. The western occupying powers (France, Britain, and the USA) accepted the continued existence of the pre-existing German State; and the New York Declaration of 18 September 1950 stated that they "regard[ed] the government of the Federal Republic of Germany as the only German government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for the German nation in international affairs".[13] An unpublished "interpretative minute" produced at the same time clarifies that the formula did not constitute recognition of the Government of the Federal Republic as the de jure government of all Germany".[13]

The legal justification for the policy was that there was an obligation (based on the constitution and the General Treaty, to strive for German re-unification and therefore to avoid or prevent recognition of East Germany and thus the division of Germany. The political arguments were: that recognition implied acceptance of the division of Germany; that non-recognition meant rejection of the status quo; that non-recognition gave moral support to the population of East Germany in rejecting the Communist regime; that non-recognition weakened the international standing of the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union and increased the standing of the Federal Republic of Germany; and that recognition of the German Democratic Republic would not lead to reunification because the other side would not be expected to commit political suicide.

Reaction of the German Democratic Republic ("East Germany")

In the beginning, the German Democratic Republic had pressed for re-unification, though they were not willing to accept free elections with UN participation. From about 1955, they favoured a "two state" solution and strongly objected to the Federal Republic's claim to represent the whole of Germany; but they made no such claims themselves.[4]:32–33 In the 1960s, after the building of the Berlin Wall, Walter Ulbricht, the East German leader increasingly claimed to represent the whole of Germany.[4]:34

Whenever the German Democratic Republic opened some form of representation in another country, they attempted to persuade that country to open a similar representation in the German Democratic Republic. Although they were willing to provide financial inducements for this purpose, their success was limited.[4]:39 For the first stage in developing diplomatic relations, the German Democratic Republic often used the assistance of the local communist party in the country, and East German journalists were also pressed into service.[4]:32–33 The next stage was to establish a trade agreement . This was not especially problematic, because the Federal Republic of Germany did not object to trade relations, providing it did not involve explicit diplomatic recognition.[4]:35 So the minister of foreign trade minister Heinrich Rau was one of the first to be involved. Having established trade relations, the next stage was to establish permanent offices of the chamber of commerce. This, too, usually met with little resistance from the Federal Republic of Germany, provided the entities involved were not formally organs of the state.[4]:36 The next stage was to establish trade representations. These were usually tolerated by the Federal Republic of Germany, as long as there were no visible indications of diplomatic privileges, such as flying the official flag or pennant or invitation to official events normally reserved to the diplomatic corps. The German Democratic Republic increasingly used these for consular purposes and tried to "upgrade" them diplomatically by calling them "trade missions" and using diplomatic titles for their officers. This met with resistance on the part of the Federal Republic of Germany.[4]:36–37 The final stage that the German Democratic Republic aimed for was to establish a consulate general. This usually involved issuing an exequatur, a document that guarantees the consul's rights and privileges. This was regarded by the Federal Republic of Germany as equivalent to official diplomatic recognition and could be expected to be met with sanctions of some form. Countries such as Egypt attempted to avoid upsetting either side by issuing an exequatur but adding a note that it did not imply recognition of the German Democratic Republic.

Right up to 1969, however, the German Democratic Republic was not able to achieve full diplomatic representation – with two possible exceptions:

  • In March 1960, an ambassador from Guinea formally presented his papers to the East German head of state, President Wilhelm Pieck. After protests from the Federal Republic of Germany, however, the Guineans claimed there had been a mistake and an ambassador of the German Democratic Republic was never accredited by Guinea.
  • In 1963, the island of Zanzibar had gained independence from Britain, and in early 1964 there was a revolution, leading to the establishment of the People's Republic of Zanzibar and Pemba, which agreed to diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic. In April 1964, however, the new republic merged with Tanganyika, the resulting state being soon renamed the United Republic of Tanzania, and the German Democratic Republic had to close its embassy.

History of the Hallstein Doctrine

The doctrine was applied twice, to Yugoslavia in 1957, and to Cuba in 1963. Both had first recognized the GDR.

In 1958 the newly founded republic of Guinea accepted a Federal German ambassador and a GDR trade mission. When the country in 1960 sent an ambassador to GDR, the Federal Republic withdrew its own. Guinea then declared that it had never sent an ambassador to the GDR.

Problems of the doctrine

Bundesarchiv Bild 183-D0227-0053-004, Ägypten, Besuch Walter Ulbricht
GDR leader Walter Ulbricht in 1965 visiting Egypt.

The doctrine seemed to succeed for a long time in isolating the GDR, at least from important Western or Third World states. But it also limited the federal government's politics, and in the 1960s it became more and more difficult to maintain.

In several cases, the doctrine was in fact not applied. When, in 1957, the GDR opened an office in Cairo to establish contact with the entire Arab world, the Federal Republic did not withdraw its ambassador from Egypt. Moreover, when in 1965 the Federal Republic established diplomatic relations with Israel, many Arab states ceased theirs with the Federal Republic but did not recognise the GDR. This eventually happened after 1967, because the GDR had supported the Arab states in the Six-Day War. The doctrine was also not applied to Cambodia in 1969, although it had recognised the GDR.

The Federal Republic established diplomatic relations with Romania in 1967 and reestablished those with Yugoslavia in 1968. The government's argument was that the communist states had been in fact forced to recognise the GDR and should not be punished for that.

Abolition

In 1969 Willy Brandt became German Chancellor as head of a social democrat / liberal government. The new government maintained the main political goals such as the German reunification in peace and freedom, but it altered the way to achieve these goals. Brandt's new Ostpolitik was a policy of negotiating with the German Democratic Republic government in order to improve the situation of Germans in German Democratic Republic and involved supporting visits from one part of Germany to the other. As part of this, the Federal Republic de jure recognized the German Democratic Republic as a state organisation of parts of Germany not within the Federal Republic, emphasizing that both German states could not be "foreign" to each other, that their relationships can be only of a special kind.

The Four Power Agreement on Berlin in 1971 and the signing of the Basic Treaty in 1972 brought an end to the doctrine, in accordance with the new strategy of Ostpolitik.

Similar situations

In diplomacy the non-recognition of another state, and the discouraging of third states to do the same, is an old instrument. In the first years after the establishing of the communist Soviet Union and People's Republic of China, the United States refused to have diplomatic contact with them. Similar exclusive mandate policies (One-China policy) were (and still are) pursued by the People's Republic of China and Republic of China (Taiwan), and the situation in Vietnam during the Vietnam War was somewhat similar.

Novel Approach

In 2016, Torben Gülstorff gave a new interpretation of the Hallstein doctrine.[14] According to him, the doctrine’s impact on the West and the East German foreign policy was only marginal, more myth than reality.[15] During the entire Cold War, national economic and international geostrategic interests dominated German foreign affairs – on both sides of the wall.[16][17][18]

Notes and references

  1. ^ a b c d Explanation of the Hallstein Doctrine, Interview of Wilhelm Grewe, Head of the Political Dept. of the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany (11 December 1955). "Erläuterung der sog. "Hallstein-Doktrin" durch den Leiter der Politischen Abteilung des Auswärtigen Amts, Ministerialdirektor Wilhelm Grewe, in einem Interview mit dem Chefredakteur des Nordwestdeutschen Rundfunks, Hans Wendt, am 11. Dezember 1955; Auszug". Norddeutscher Rundfunk (Interview: transcript (extract)) (in German). Interviewed by Hans Wendt, Editor of the Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk. Bavarian State Library. Retrieved 2009-09-13.CS1 maint: Multiple names: authors list (link) cited as Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes, 1955, Nr. 233, S. 1993f. and quoted in full at http://www.1000dokumente.de/index.html?c=dokument_de&dokument=0019_hal&object=translation
  2. ^ a b Hans Wendt, Editor of the Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk. "Interview des Ministerialdirektors, Professor Dr. Wilhelm G. Grewe mit dem Chefredakteur des Nordwestdeutschen Rundfunk, Hans Wendt ["Hallstein-Doktrin"], 11. Dezember 1955: Einführung" [Interview with Professor Wilhelm Grewe [Head of the Political Dept. of the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany ]on 11 December 1955: Introduction]. 100(0) Schlüsseldokumente zur deutschen Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert [100(0) key documents on German history of the 2oth century (in German). Bavarian State Library. Retrieved 2011-09-13.
  3. ^ a b c Grewe, Wilhelm G (1995). "Hallsteins deutschlandpolitische Konzeption" [Hallsteins deutschlandpolitische Konzeption]. In Loth, Wolfgang; Wallace, William; Wessels, Wolfgang (eds.). Walter Hallstein: Der vergessene Europäer? [Walter Hallstein: The forgotten European?]. Europäische Schriften (in German). 73. Forewords by Helmut Kohl and Jacques Delors. Bonn: Europa Union Verlag. pp. 57–79. ISBN 3-7713-0499-7.
    also available in translation in Loth, Wilfried; Wallace, William; Wessels, Wolfgang (1998). Walter Hallstein: The Forgotten European?. New York: St. Martin's Press. ISBN 978-0-312-21293-3.
  4. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y Kilian, Werner. Die Hallstein-Doktrin. Der diplomatische Krieg zwischen der BRD und der DDR 1955–1973. Aus den Akten der beiden deutschen Außenministerien [The Hallstein Doctrine. The diplomatic war between the FRG and the German Democratic Republic 1955–1973. From the files of the two German foreign ministries]. Zeitgeschichtliche Forschngen (in German). 7. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. ISBN 3-428-10371-8. ISSN 1438-2326.
  5. ^ a b Spencer, Robert (1995). "The Origins of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1944–1949". In Schweitzer, Carl Christoph (ed.). Politics and Government in Germany, 1944-1994: Basic Documents (2nd ed.). 9781571818553. pp. 1–28. ISBN 9781571818553.
  6. ^ Partly for this reason, this article often uses the official names "Federal Republic of Germany" (for what was commonly called West Germany) and "German Democratic Republic" (for what was commonly known as East Germany)
  7. ^ "Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 23. Mai 1949". Retrieved 2011-10-30.
  8. ^ Lahn, Lothar (1995). "Walter Hallstein als Staatssekretär" [Walter Hallstein as state secretary]. In Loth, Wolfgang; Wallace, William; Wessels, Wolfgang (eds.). Walter Hallstein: Der vergessene Europäer? [Walter Hallstein: The forgotten European?]. Europäische Schriften (in German). 73. Forewords by Helmut Kohl and Jacques Delors. Bonn: Europa Union Verlag. pp. 31–48. ISBN 3-7713-0499-7.
    also available in translation in Loth, Wilfried; Wallace, William; Wessels, Wolfgang (1998). Walter Hallstein: The Forgotten European?. New York: St. Martin's Press. ISBN 978-0-312-21293-3.
  9. ^ Kilian, Michael. "Walter Hallstein: Jurist und Europäer" [Walter Hallstein: Jurist und European]. Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart. New series (in German). Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 53, 2005: 369–389. ISSN 0075-2517.
  10. ^ Wilhelm Grewe (interviewee), Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Sankt Augustin (prod.) (1987). The resumption of diplomatic relations between the FRG and the USSR and the Hallstein Doctrine (1955) (Flash) (video) (in German). Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l'Europe (published 2011-08-15). Event occurs at 04:09. Retrieved 2013-03-09.
  11. ^ Jaenicke, Joachim (1995). "Erinnerungen an Walter Hallstein" [Memories of Walter Hallstein]. In Loth, Wolfgang; Wallace, William; Wessels, Wolfgang (eds.). Walter Hallstein: Der vergessene Europäer? [Walter Hallstein: The forgotten European?]. Europäische Schriften (in German). 73. Forewords by Helmut Kohl and Jacques Delors. Bonn: Europa Union Verlag. pp. 49–55. ISBN 3-7713-0499-7.
    also available in translation in Loth, Wilfried; Wallace, William; Wessels, Wolfgang (1998). Walter Hallstein: The Forgotten European?. New York: St. Martin's Press. ISBN 978-0-312-21293-3.
  12. ^ William Glenn Gray (2003). Germany's Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany. University of North Carolina Press. ISBN 0-8078-2758-4.
  13. ^ a b c Quoted in a German Constitutional Court decision, translation available at "Case: BVerfGE 77, 137 2 BvR 373/83 Teso-Beschluß German Democratic Republic-Citizenship". Institute for Transnational Law, University of Texas at Austin. Retrieved 11 November 2007..
  14. ^ Gülstorff, Torben (2016). Trade follows Hallstein? Deutsche Aktivitäten im zentralafrikanischen Raum des 'Second Scramble' (PDF). Berlin: Humboldt Universität.
  15. ^ Gülstorff, Torben (2018). "Die Hallstein-Doktrin – Abschied von einem Mythos". Deutschland Archiv. 2017: 177–190.
  16. ^ Gülstorff, Torben (2017). "Between Economic Interests and Cold War Motives: German Activities in the Central African Region During the Second Scramble for Africa" in Békés, Csaba, Melinda Kamár (eds.). Students on the Cold War. New Findings and Interpretations. Budapest: Cold War History Research Center, 212–234.
  17. ^ Gülstorff, Torben (1 August 2018). "On Both Sides of the Berlin Wall: Africa and the Two Germanies". Review of African Political Economy Online Blog.
  18. ^ Gülstorff, Torben (2017). "Klassenkampf um neue Märkte: Das verkannte ökonomische Primat ostdeutscher Außenpolitik am Beispiel Zentralafrikas". Zeitschrift des Forschungsverbundes SED-Staat. 41: 103–114.
ASEAN Declaration

The ASEAN Declaration or Bangkok Declaration is the founding document of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It was signed in Bangkok on 8 August 1967 by the five ASEAN founding members, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand as a display of solidarity against communist expansion in Vietnam and communist insurgency within their own borders. It states the basic principles of ASEAN: co-operation, amity, and non-interference. The date is now celebrated as ASEAN Day.

Asian Relations Conference

The Asian Relations Conference took place in New Delhi in March-April 1947. It was hosted by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who then headed a provisional government that was preparing for India's Independence, which came on 15 August 1947. The Asian Relations Conference brought together many leaders of the independence movements in Asia, and represented a first attempt to assert Asian unity. The objectives of the conference were "to bring together the leading men and women of Asia on a common platform to study the problems of common concern to the people of the continent, to focus attention on social, economic and cultural problems of the different countries of Asia, and to foster mutual contact and understanding."

In his writings and speeches, Nehru had laid great emphasis on the manner in which post-colonial India would rebuild its Asia connections. At this conference Nehru declared: "... Asia is again finding herself ... one of the notable consequences of the European domination of Asia has been the isolation of the countries of Asia from one another. ... Today this isolation is breaking down because of many reasons, political and otherwise ... This Conference is significant as an expression of that deeper urge of the mind and spirit of Asia which has persisted ... In this Conference and in this work there are no leaders and no followers. All countries of Asia have to meet together in a common task ..."

Basic Treaty, 1972

The Basic Treaty (German: Grundlagenvertrag) is the shorthand name for the Treaty concerning the basis of relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic (German: Vertrag über die Grundlagen der Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik). The Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic (GDR) recognized each other as sovereign states for the first time, an abandonment of West Germany's Hallstein Doctrine in favor of Ostpolitik.

After the entry into force of the Four-Power Agreement from 1971, the two German states began negotiations over a Basic Treaty. As for the Transit Agreement of 1972, the discussions were led by the Under-Secretaries of State Egon Bahr (for the Federal Republic of Germany) and Michael Kohl (for the German Democratic Republic). As part of the Ostpolitik of Chancellor Willy Brandt, the treaty was signed on 21 December 1972 in East Berlin. It was ratified the following year by West Germany, despite opposition from hardline right-wingers. It came into effect in June 1973.The signing of the treaty paved the way for the two German states to be recognised by the international community. Diplomatic relations were opened between the German Democratic Republic and:

Australia (December 1972),

the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands (February 1973),

the United States (December 1974).Both German nations were also admitted to the United Nations on 18 September 1973.

Under the terms of the 1973 Treaty, the two states established de facto embassies known as "permanent missions", headed by "permanent representatives", who served as de facto ambassadors. West Germany sent its first permanent representative in February 1974, but formal diplomatic relations were never established until German reunification (in October 1990).

Doctrine

Doctrine (from Latin: doctrina, meaning "teaching", "instruction" or "doctrine") is a codification of beliefs or a body of teachings or instructions, taught principles or positions, as the essence of teachings in a given branch of knowledge or in a belief system. The etymological Greek analogue is "catechism".Often the word doctrine specifically suggests a body of religious principles as promulgated by a church. Doctrine may also refer to a principle of law, in the common-law traditions, established through a history of past decisions, such as the doctrine of self-defense, or the principle of fair use, or the more narrowly applicable first-sale doctrine. Some organizations simply define doctrine as "that which is taught", or the basis for institutional teaching to its personnel of internal ways of operating.

Exclusive mandate

An exclusive mandate is a government's assertion of its legitimate authority over a certain territory, part of which another government controls with stable, de facto sovereignty. It is also known as a claim to sole representation or an exclusive authority claim. The concept was particularly important during the Cold War period when a number of states were divided on ideological grounds.

Foreign policy doctrine

A foreign policy doctrine is a general statement of foreign policy and belief system through a doctrine. In some cases, the statement is made by a political leader, typically a nation’s chief executive or chief diplomat, and comes to be named after that leader. Richard Nixon’s justification for the phased withdrawal of the United States from the Vietnam War, for example, came to be called the Nixon Doctrine. This pattern of naming is not universal, however; Chinese doctrines, for example, are often referred to by number.

The purpose of a foreign policy doctrine is to provide general rules for the conduct of foreign policy through decisions on international relations. These rules allow the political leadership of a nation to deal with a situation and to explain the actions of a nation to other nations. “Doctrine” is usually not meant to have any negative connotations; it is especially not to be confused with “dogma.”

Glasnost

In the Russian language the word Glasnost (; Russian: гла́сность, IPA: [ˈɡɫasnəsʲtʲ] (listen)) has several general and specific meanings. It has been used in Russian to mean "openness and transparency" since at least the end of the eighteenth century.In the Russian Empire of the late-19th century, the term was particularly associated with reforms of the judicial system, ensuring that the press and the public could attend court hearings and that the sentence was read out in public. In the mid-1980s, it was popularised by Mikhail Gorbachev as a political slogan for increased government transparency in the Soviet Union.

Guerrilla war in the Baltic states

The Guerrilla war in the Baltic states or the Forest Brothers resistance movement was the armed struggle against Soviet rule that spanned from 1940 to the mid-1950s. After the occupation of the Baltic territories by the Soviets in 1944, an insurgency started. According to some estimates, 10,000 partisans in Estonia, 10,000 partisans in Latvia and 30,000 partisans in Lithuania and many more supporters were involved. This war continued as an organised struggle until 1956 when the superiority of the Soviet military caused the native population to adopt other forms of resistance. While estimates related to the extent of partisan movement vary, but there seems to be a consensus among researchers that by international standards, the Baltic guerrilla movements were extensive. Proportionally, the partisan movement in the post-war Baltic states was of a similar size as the Viet Cong movement in South Vietnam.

Jamaican political conflict

The Jamaican political conflict is a long standing feud between right-wing and left-wing elements in the country, often exploding into violence. The Jamaican Labor Party and the People's National Party have fought for control of the island for years and the rivalry has encouraged urban warfare in Kingston. Each side believes the other to be controlled by foreign elements, the JLP is said to be backed by the American Central Intelligence Agency and the PNP is said to been backed by the Soviet Union and Fidel Castro.

Johnson Doctrine

The Johnson Doctrine, enunciated by U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson after the United States' intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, declared that domestic revolution in the Western Hemisphere would no longer be a local matter when "the object is the establishment of a Communist dictatorship". It is an extension of the Eisenhower and Kennedy Doctrines.

NDF Rebellion

The NDF Rebellion was an uprising in the Yemen Arab Republic by the National Democratic Front, under Yahya Shami, between 1978 and 1982.

Ortrun Enderlein

Ortrun Zöphel-Enderlein (born 1 December 1943) is a former East German (GDR) luger, and one of the most successful lugers in the 1960s. Enderlein started her working career at the SC Traktor Oberwiesenthal, and was first introduced to luge in her home village of Raschau in the Ore Mountains. In the 1964 Winter Olympic Games in Innsbruck, she became the first female luger to win gold at the Olympics. and won the World Cup in 1965 in Davos and 1967 in Hammarstrand. The athletic achievements of the lugers Thomas Köhler and Enderlein were celebrated and politicised in the GDR during the Cold War when the GDR was not recognised by West Germany, and athletic events in either part of Germany with athletes from both countries were not permitted because of the Hallstein Doctrine.

The controversial disqualification of Enderlein and two other GDR sportswomen at the 1968 Winter Olympic Games in Grenoble, involving the alleged heating of runners before the race start, was believed by GDR officials to be a staged incident against the first official GDR luge team. After her sports career, Enderlein worked as a sales engineer and later presidium member of the Luge and Bobsleigh Association of the GDR and member of the National Olympic Committee of the GDR.

Ostpolitik

Neue Ostpolitik (German for "new eastern policy"), or Ostpolitik for short, was the normalization of relations between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, or West Germany) and Eastern Europe, particularly the German Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany) beginning in 1969. Influenced by Egon Bahr, who proposed "change through rapprochement" in a 1963 speech at the Evangelische Akademie Tutzing, the policies were implemented beginning with Willy Brandt, fourth Chancellor of the FRG from 1969 to 1974.

Ostpolitik was an effort to break with the policies of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which was the elected government of West Germany from 1949 until 1969. The Christian Democrats under Konrad Adenauer and his successors tried to combat the Communist regime of East Germany, while Brandt's Social Democrats tried to achieve a certain degree of cooperation with East Germany.

The term Ostpolitik has since been applied to Pope Paul VI's efforts to engage Eastern European countries during the same period. The term Nordpolitik was also coined to describe similar rapprochement policies between North and South Korea beginning in the 1980s.

Rapacki Plan

Rapacki Plan (pronounced Rapatz-ki) is from the Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki on 2 October 1957 the UN General Assembly presented a limited plan called demilitarization in Central Europe. The proposal provided for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone, which should include the People's Republic of Poland, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. This area was later extended to Czechoslovakia.

While the plan was a consensus among the states of the Warsaw Pact, NATO countries rejected it for various reasons. The United States, fearing for implementation of the plan Rapacki a loss of the balance of power in Europe and the United Kingdom also saw a threat to the security of NATO countries because of the dominance of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. West Germany also looked prevented due to the Hallstein Doctrine in the signing of a treaty with the GDR.

Rapacki presented in the following years several modified versions of the original plan before, but ultimately failed, so the project was not implemented in reality.

Ulbricht Doctrine

The Ulbricht Doctrine, named after East German leader Walter Ulbricht, was the assertion that normal diplomatic relations between East Germany and West Germany could occur only if both states fully recognised each other's sovereignty. That contrasted with the Hallstein Doctrine, a West German policy which insisted that West Germany was the only legitimate German state.

East Germany gained acceptance of its view from fellow Communist states, such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria, which all agreed not to normalise relations with West Germany until it recognised East German sovereignty.

West Germany eventually abandoned its Hallstein Doctrine, instead adopting the policies of Ostpolitik. In December 1972, a Basic Treaty between East and West Germany was signed that reaffirmed two German states as separate entities. The treaty also allowed the exchange of diplomatic missions and the entry of both German states to the United Nations as full members.

Walter Hallstein

Walter Hallstein (17 November 1901 – 29 March 1982) was a German academic, diplomat, and politician. He was the first president of the Commission of the European Economic Community and one of the founding fathers of the European Union.

Hallstein began his academic career before World War II, becoming Germany's youngest law professor at the age of 29. During the war he served as an officer in the German army in France. Captured by American troops in 1944, he spent the rest of the war in a prisoner-of-war camp in the United States. After the war he returned to Germany and continued his academic career until, in 1950, he was recruited to a diplomatic career, becoming the leading civil servant at the German Foreign Office, where he gave his name to the Hallstein Doctrine, West Germany's policy of isolating East Germany diplomatically.

A keen advocate of a federal Europe, Hallstein played a key role in European integration and in West Germany's post-war rehabilitation, clashing with the Economics Minister, Ludwig Erhard, on the path of European integration. He was one of the architects of the European Coal and Steel Community and the first President of the Commission of the European Economic Community, which would later become the European Union. He held the office from 1958 to 1967 and has remained the only German to serve as president of the European Commission or its predecessors.Hallstein left office following a clash with the French President, Charles de Gaulle, and turned to German politics as a member of parliament, also serving as President of the European Movement from 1968 to 1974. He is also the author of books and numerous articles and speeches on European integration and on the European Communities.

Western Bloc

The Western Bloc during the Cold War refers to capitalist countries under the hegemony of the United States and NATO against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The latter were referred to as the Eastern Bloc. The governments and press of the Western Bloc were more inclined to refer to themselves as the "Free World" or the "Western world", whereas the Eastern Bloc was often called the "Communist world or Second world".

Wilhelm Grewe

Wilhelm Georg Grewe (16 October 1911 – 11 January 2000) was a German diplomat and professor of international law. He played a major role in formulating the Hallstein Doctrine. He was an expert in International Law and was the author of Epochen der Völkerrechtsgeschichte (1984), a standard work on the subject.

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