Ethnic issues in China

Ethnic issues in China arise from Chinese history, nationalism, and other factors. They have driven historical movements such as the Red Turban Rebellion (which targeted the Mongol leadership of the Yuan Dynasty) and the Xinhai Revolution, which overthrew the Manchu Qing Dynasty. Ethnic tensions have led to incidents in the country such as the July 2009 Ürümqi riots.

Background

China is a largely-homogenous society; over 90 percent of its population has historically been Han Chinese.[1] Some of the country's ethnic groups are distinguishable by physical appearance and relatively-low intermarriage rates. Others have married Han Chinese and resemble them. A growing number of ethnic minorities are fluent at a native level in Mandarin Chinese. Children sometimes receive ethnic-minority status at birth if one of their parents belongs to an ethnic minority, even if their ancestry is predominantly Han Chinese. Pockets of immigrants and foreign residents exist in some cities.

A 100-day crackdown on illegal foreigners in Beijing began in May 2012, with Beijing residents wary of foreign nationals due to recent crimes.[2][3] China Central Television host Yang Rui said, controversially, that "foreign trash" should be cleaned out of the capital. [2]

History

Racism in Imperial China

1900 killing of foreigners
1861 woodblock print of Westerners (depicted as a pig and a goat) being executed by Chinese officials

Racial discrimination by the ruling Han Chinese in imperial China has been documented in historical texts such as Yan Shigu's commentary on the Book of Han, in which the Wusun people were called "barbarians who have green eyes and red hair" and compared to macaques.[4]

Some ethnic conflicts resulted in genocides. During the 350 AD Wei–Jie war, the Han Chinese leader Ran Min massacred non-Chinese Wu Hu in retaliation for abuses of the Chinese population; the Jie people were particularly affected.[5] Rebels slaughtered Arab and Persian merchants in the Yangzhou massacre (760). According to Arab historian Abu Zayd Hasan of Siraf, the rebel Huang Chao's army killed Arab, Jewish, Christian, and Parsi merchants in the Guangzhou massacre when he captured Guang Prefecture.[6] Arabs and Persians living in Quanzhou were massacred in the Ispah rebellion.

Widespread violence against the Manchu people by Han Chinese rebels occurred during the Xinhai Revolution, most notably in Xi'an (where the Manchu quarter's population—20,000—was killed) and Wuhan (where 10,000 Manchus were killed).[7] Manchus were seen as uncivilized and lacking culture, adopting Han Chinese and Tibetan culture instead. According to 20th-century social and cultural critic Lu Xun, "Throughout the ages, Chinese have had only two ways of looking at foreigners, up to them as superior beings or down on them as wild animals."[8]

Racism by minorities

The Mongols divided groups into a four-class caste system during the Yuan dynasty. Merchants and non-Mongol overseers were usually immigrants or local ethnic groups: Turkestani and Persian Muslims and Christians. Foreigners from outside the Mongol Empire, such as the Polo family, were welcomed.

Despite the Muslims' high position, the Yuan Mongols discriminated against them: restricting halal slaughter and other Islamic practices, such as circumcision (and kosher butchering for Jews). Genghis Khan called Muslims "slaves".[9][10] Muslim generals eventually joined the Han Chinese in rebelling against the Mongols. Ming dynasty founder Zhu Yuanzhang had Muslim generals (including Lan Yu) who rebelled against the Mongols and defeated them in battle. Semu-caste Muslims revolted against the Yuan dynasty in the Ispah rebellion, although the rebellion was crushed and the Muslims massacred by Yuan commander Chen Youding. Uyghur leader Sabit Damulla Abdulbaki said about the Han Chinese and Tungans (Hui Muslims):

The Tungans, more than the Han, are the enemy of our people. Today our people are already free from the oppression of the Han, but still continue under Tungan subjugation. We must still fear the Han, but cannot fear the Tungans also. The reason we must be careful to guard against the Tungans, we must intensely oppose, cannot afford to be polite. Since the Tungans have compelled us, we must be this way. Yellow Han people have not the slightest thing to do with Eastern Turkestan. Black Tungans also do not have this connection. Eastern Turkestan belongs to the people of Eastern Turkestan. There is no need for foreigners to come be our fathers and mothers ... From now on we do not need to use foreigners language, or their names, their customs, habits, attitudes, written language, etc. We must also overthrow and drive foreigners from our boundaries forever. The colors yellow and black are foul. They have dirtied our land for too long. So now it is absolutely necessary to clean out this filth. Take down the yellow and black barbarians! Long live Eastern Turkestan!"[11][12]

An American telegram reported that Uyghur groups in parts of Xinjiang demanded the expulsion of White Russians and Han Chinese from Xinjiang during the Ili Rebellion. The Uyghurs reportedly said, "We freed ourselves from the yellow men, now we must destroy the white". According to the telegram, "Serious native attacks on people of other races frequent. White Russians in terror of uprising."[13]

Tensions erupted between Muslim sects, ethnic groups, the Tibetans and Han Chinese during the late 19th century near Qinghai.[14] According to volume eight of the Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics, the Muslim Dungan and Panthay revolts were ignited by racial antagonism and class warfare.[15]

Modern China

Anti-Japanese sentiment

Anti-Japanese sentiment primarily stems from Japanese war crimes committed during the Second Sino-Japanese War. History-textbook revisionism in Japan and the denial (or whitewashing) of events such as the Nanking Massacre by the whole Japanese people has continued to inflame anti-Japanese feeling in China. It has been alleged that anti-Japanese sentiment is also partially the result of political manipulation by the Communist Party.[16] According to a BBC report, anti-Japanese demonstrations received tacit approval from Chinese authorities (although Chinese ambassador to Japan Wang Yi said that the Chinese government does not condone such protests).[17]

Tensions with Uyghurs

We have to conquer our own country and purify it of all infidels. Then, we should conquer the infidels’ countries and spread Islam. The infidels who are usurping our countries have announced war against Islam and Muslims, forcing Muslims to abandon Islam and change their beliefs.

— Abdullah Mansour, leader of the Turkistan Islamic Party (East Turkestan Islamic Movement), "The Duty of Faith and Support", Voice of Islam/al-Fajr Media Center, August 26, 2009.[18]

A Uyghur proverb says, "Protect religion, Kill the Han and destroy the Hui" (baohu zongjiao, sha Han mie Hui 保護宗教，殺漢滅回),[19][20] and anti-Hui poetry was written by Uyghurs:[21]

In Bayanday there is a brick factory,
it had been built by the Chinese.
If the Chinese are killed by soldiers,
the Tungans take over the plundering.

A Uyghur would reportedly not enter a Hui mosque, and Hui and Han households were built together in a town; Uyghurs would live farther away.[21] Uyghurs have been known to view Hui Muslims from other provinces of China as hostile and threatening.[22][23][24] Mixed Han and Uyghur children are known as erzhuanzi (二转子); Uyghurs call them piryotki,[23][25] and shun them.[26]

The Chinese government and individual Han Chinese citizens have been accused of discrimination against the Uyghur minority.[27][28][29] This was a reported cause of the July 2009 Ürümqi riots, which occurred largely along racial lines. A People's Daily essay referred to the events as "so-called racial conflict",[30] and several Western media sources called them "race riots".[31][32][33] Unofficial Chinese policy reportedly denies passports to Uyghurs until they reach retirement age, especially if they intend to leave the country for the pilgrimage to Mecca.[27]

Tensions between Hui and Uyghurs arose because Qing and Republican Chinese authorities used Hui troops and officials to dominate the Uyghurs and suppress Uyghur revolts.[34] The Uyghur population grew by 1.7 percent in Xinjiang between 1940 and 1982, and the Hui population increased by 4.4 percent. Tensions have increased between Uyghur and Hui Muslims due to the population-growth disparity. The massacre of Uyghurs by Ma Zhongying's Hui troops in the Battle of Kashgar (1934) caused unease as more Hui moved into the region from other parts of China.[35]

Some Hui criticize Uyghur separatism. According to Dru C. Gladney, the Hui "don't tend to get too involved in international Islamic conflict. They don't want to be branded as radical Muslims."[36][37] Hui and Uyghurs live and worship separately.[38]

Han and Hui intermarry more than Uyghurs and Hui do, despite the latter's shared religion. Some Uyghurs believe that a marriage to a Hui is more likely to end in divorce.[39]

The Sibe tend to believe negative stereotypes of Uyghurs and identify with the Han.[40] According to David Eimer, one Han person had a negative view of Uyghurs but had a positive opinion of Tajiks in Tashkurgan.[41]

Yengisar (يېڭىسار, Йеңисар) is known for the manufacture of Uyghur handcrafted knives[42][43]—yingjisha (英吉沙刀 or 英吉沙小刀) in Chinese.[44][45][46][47][48] Although the wearing of knives by Uyghur men (indicating the wearer's masculinity) is a significant part of Uyghur culture,[49] it is seen as an aggressive gesture by others.[50] The Uyghur word for knife is pichaq (پىچاق, пичақ), and the plural is pichaqchiliq (پىچاقچىلىقى, пичақчилиқ).[51] Limitations were placed on knife vending due to terrorism and violent assaults where they were utilized.[52] Robberies and assaults committed by groups of Uighurs, including children sold to (or kidnapped by) gangs, have increased tensions.[53][54][55] China has been working on multilateral anti-terrorism since the September 11 attacks and, according to the United Nations and the U.S. Department of State, some Uyghur separatist movements have been identified as terrorist groups.[56].

Tibet

Many residents of the frontier districts of Sichuan and other Tibetan areas in China are of Han-Tibetan ethnicity, and are looked down on by Tibetans.[57] Tibetan Muslims, known as Kache in Tibetan, have lived peacefully with Tibetan Buddhists for over a thousand years because Buddhists are prohibited by their religion from killing animals but require meat to survive in their mountainous climate. However, Tibetans clash with the Hui (known as Kyangsha in Tibetan). Tibetans and Mongols refused to allow other ethnic groups (such as the Kazakhs) to participate in a ritual ceremony in Qinghai until Muslim general Ma Bufang reformed the practice.[58]

Tibetan-Muslim violence

Most Muslims in Tibet are Hui. Although hostility between Tibetans and Muslims stems from the Muslim warlord Ma Bufang's rule in Qinghai (the Ngolok rebellions (1917–49) and the Sino-Tibetan War), in 1949 the Communists ended violence between Tibetans and Muslims. However, recent Tibetan-Muslim violence occurred. Riots broke out between Muslims and Tibetans over a bone in soups and the price of balloons; Tibetans accused Muslims of being cannibals who cooked humans, attacking Muslim restaurants. Fires set by Tibetans burned the apartments and shops of Muslims, and Muslims stopped wearing their traditional headwear and began to pray in secret.[59] Chinese-speaking Hui also have problems with the Tibetan Hui (the Tibetan-speaking Kache Muslim minority).[60]

The main mosque in Lhasa was burned down by Tibetans, and Hui Muslims were assaulted by rioters in the 2008 Tibetan unrest.[61] Tibetan exiles and foreign scholars overlook sectarian violence between Tibetan Buddhists and Muslims.[62] Most Tibetans viewed the wars against Iraq and Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks positively, and anti-Muslim attitudes resulted in boycotts of Muslim-owned businesses.[63] Some Tibetan Buddhists believe that Muslims cremate their imams and use the ashes to convert Tibetans to Islam by making Tibetans inhale the ashes, although they frequently oppose proposed Muslim cemeteries.[64] Since the Chinese government supports the Hui Muslims, Tibetans attack the Hui to indicate anti-government sentiment and due to the background of hostility since Ma Bufang's rule; they resent perceived Hui economic domination.[65]

In 1936, after Sheng Shicai expelled 20,000 Kazakhs from Xinjiang to Qinghai, Hui troops led by Ma Bufang]] reduced the number of Kazakhs to 135.[66] Over 7,000 Kazakhs fled northern Xinjiang to the Tibetan Qinghai plateau region (via Gansu), causing unrest. Ma Bufang relegated the Kazakhs to pastureland in Qinghai, but the Hui, Tibetans and Kazakhs in the region continued to clash.[67]

In northern Tibet, Kazakhs clashed with Tibetan soldiers before being sent to Ladakh.[68] Tibetan troops robbed and killed Kazakhs at Chamdo, 400 miles (640 km) east of Lhasa, when the Kazakhs entered Tibet.[69][70] In 1934, 1935 and 1936-1938, an estimated 18,000 Kazakhs entered Gansu and Qinghai.[71] In 2017, the Dalai Lama compared the peacefulness of China's Muslims unfavorably to that of their Indian counterparts.[72]

Other ethnic groups

Hostility to foreigners by high-ranking Chinese Muslim officers was sparked by foreign arrogance about Chinese affairs; status and wealth were contributing factors.[15] A Hui soldier from the 36th Division called Swedish explorer Sven Hedin a "foreign devil",[73][74] and Tungans were reportedly "strongly anti-Japanese".[75] During the 1930s, a White Russian driver for Nazi agent Georg Vasel in Xinjiang was afraid to meet Hui general Ma Zhongying, saying: "You know how the Tungans hate the Russians." Vasel passed the Russian driver off as a German.[76]

A Chinese Muslim general encountered by writer Peter Fleming thought that his visitor was a foreign "barbarian" until he learned that Fleming's outlook was Chinese.[77] Fleming saw a Uyghur grovel at the general's feet, and other Uighurs were treated contemptuously by his soldiers.[77][78] Racial slurs were allegedly used by the Chinese Muslim troops against Uyghurs.[79] Ma Qi's Muslim forces ravaged the Labrang Monastery over an eight-year period.[80][81]

Ethnic slurs

  • 毛子 (máo zi, literally "body hair" – a derogatory term for Caucasians. However, because most white people in contact with China were Russians before the 19th century, 毛子 became a derogatory term for Russians.[82][83]

According to historian Frank Dikötter,

A common historical response to serious threats directed towards a symbolic universe is "nihilation", or the conceptual liquidation of everything inconsistent with official doctrine. Foreigners were labelled "barbarians" or "devils", to be conceptually eliminated. The official rhetoric reduced the Westerner to a devil, a ghost, an evil and unreal goblin hovering on the border of humanity. Many texts of the first half of the nineteenth century referred to the English as "foreign devils" (yangguizi), "devil slaves" (guinu), "barbarian devils" (fangui), "island barbarians" (daoyi), "blue-eyed barbarian slaves" (biyan yinu), or "red-haired barbarians" (hongmaofan).[84]

2012 Anti-Japan demonstrations7
Demonstrators in Taiwan tell "Japanese devils" to "get out" of the Senkaku Islands in 2012.
  • 黑鬼 (hei guǐ) - "Black devil" (directed at Africans)[85][86]
  • 妖精 - "Demons", used against Manchu people by the Taipings[87]
  • 阿三 (A Sae) or 红头阿三 (Ghondeu Asae) - Originally a Shanghainese term used against Indians, it is also used in Mandarin.[88]
  • Ch'an-t'ou (纏頭; turban heads) – used during the Republican period against Uyghurs[79][89]
  • Nao-tzu-chien-tan (脑子简单; simple-minded) – also used during the Republican period against Uyghurs[79]
  • Erzhuanzi (二转子) – children who are mixed Uyghur and Han[23][25] The term was said by European explorers in the 19th century to refer to a people descended from Chinese, Taghliks, and Mongols living in the area from Ku-ch'eng-tze to Barköl in Xinjiang.[90]
  • 绿绿 (Green Green) - used to disparage Muslims as green is considered a holy colour in the Muslim faith.
  • 棒子/高丽棒子 (Stick/Korean Stick) - Used to call Koreans, does not matter North Korean or South Korean.

Racism in written Chinese

Chinese orthography provides opportunities to write ethnic insults logographically. Some Chinese characters used to transcribe the names of non-Chinese peoples were graphically-pejorative ethnic slurs, where the insult was not the Chinese word but the character used to write it. For example, the name of the Yao people was transcribed as 猺, a character which also means "jackal" and is written with the dog radical 犭. This name for the Yao, developed by 11th-century Song dynasty authors, has been replaced twice in 20th-century language reforms: with the invented character yao 傜 (with the human radical 亻) and with yao 瑤 (with the jade radical 玉), which can also mean "precious jade". Although the characters have the same pronunciation, they have different radicals (which convey different meanings).

See also

Notes

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  85. ^ Hooi, Alexis (2009-07-31). "The disunited colors of prejudice". China Daily. Retrieved 2009-11-24. Even now, some Guangzhou residents might admit using the generic and derogatory term "hei gui" or "ghost" to refer to Africans in the community.
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References

  • Fischer, Andrew Martin (2005). "Close encounters of an Inner-Asian kind: Tibetan–Muslim coexistence and conflict in Tibet, past and present" (PDF). CSRC Working Paper series. Crisis States Research Centre (Working Paper no.68). Archived from the original (PDF) on January 3, 2006. Retrieved 26 September 2015.
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  • Starr, S. Frederick (2004). Xinjiang: China's Muslim borderland. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 0-7656-1318-2.
Anti-Japanese sentiment in China

Anti-Japanese sentiment in China is among the strongest in the world. It is an issue with modern roots (post-1868). Modern anti-Japanese sentiment in China is often rooted in nationalist or historical conflict, particularly in Japan's history textbook controversies.

Japan seized concessions in areas of China towards the end of the Qing Dynasty. Dissatisfaction with the settlement and the Twenty-One Demands by the Imperial Japanese government led to a severe boycott of Japanese products in China in 1915. Bitterness in China persists over the Second Sino-Japanese War and Japan's post-war actions. This sentiment may also be at least to some extent influenced by issues related to Chinese people in Japan. According to a 2017 BBC World Service Poll, mainland Chinese people hold the largest anti-Japanese sentiment in the world, with 75% of Chinese people viewing Japan's influence negatively, and 22% expressing a positive view. Anti-Japanese sentiment in China was at its highest in 2014 since the poll was first conducted in 2006 and was up 16 percent over the previous year.

Anti-Korean sentiment in China

Anti-Korean sentiment in China refers to opposition, hostility, hatred, distrust, fear, and general dislike of Korean people or culture in both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (commonly known as Taiwan). This is sometimes referred to in China as the xianhan (dislike of Korea) sentiment, which some have argued has been evoked by perceived Korean arrogance that has challenged the sense of superiority that the Chinese have traditionally associated with their 5,000-year-old civilization.South Korea established official relations with the People's Republic of China in 1992, and relations between the two states have gradually improved. Within the Chinese population, Korean art and culture became popular in the 21st century. Amid improvements in relations however, there was also looming anti-South Korean sentiment involved in various disputes between the two countries.

Anti-Western sentiment in China

Anti-Western sentiment in China has been increasing since the early 1990s, particularly amongst the Chinese youth. Notable incidents which have resulted in a significant anti-Western backlash have included the 1999 NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the 2008 demonstrations during the Olympic torch relay and alleged Western media bias, especially in relation to the March 2008 Tibet riots.While available public opinion polls show that the Chinese hold generally favorable views towards the United States, there remains suspicion over the West's motives towards China stemming largely from historical experiences and specifically the 'century of humiliation'. Some allege that these suspicions have been increased by the Communist Party's "Patriotic Education Campaign".

Ethnic minorities in China

Ethnic minorities in China are the non-Han Chinese population in the People's Republic of China (PRC). China officially recognises 55 ethnic minority groups within China in addition to the Han majority. As of 2010, the combined population of officially recognised minority groups comprised 8.49% of the population of mainland China. In addition to these officially recognised ethnic minority groups, there are Chinese nationals who privately classify themselves as members of unrecognised ethnic groups (such as Jewish, Tuvan, Oirat, Ili Turki, and Japanese).

The ethnic minority groups officially recognized by the PRC reside within mainland China and Taiwan, whose minorities are called the Taiwanese aborigines. The Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan officially recognises 14 Taiwanese aborigine groups, while the PRC classifies them all under a single ethnic minority group, the Gaoshan. Hong Kong and Macau do not use this ethnic classification system, and figures by the PRC government do not include the two territories.

By definition, these ethnic minority groups, together with the Han majority, make up the greater Chinese nationality known as Zhonghua Minzu. Chinese minorities alone are referred to as "Shaoshu Minzu".

History of Central Asia

The history of Central Asia concerns the history of the various peoples that have inhabited Central Asia. The lifestyle of such people has been determined primarily by the area's climate and geography. The aridity of the region makes agriculture difficult and distance from the sea cut it off from much trade. Thus, few major cities developed in the region. Nomadic horse peoples of the steppe dominated the area for millennia.

Relations between the steppe nomads and the settled people in and around Central Asia were marked by conflict. The nomadic lifestyle was well suited to warfare, and the steppe horse riders became some of the most militarily potent people in the world, due to the devastating techniques and ability of their horse archers. Periodically, tribal leaders or changing conditions would organise several tribes into a single military force, which would then often launch campaigns of conquest, especially into more 'civilised' areas. A few of these types of tribal coalitions included the Huns' invasion of Europe, various Turkic migrations into Transoxiana, the Wu Hu attacks on China and most notably the Mongol conquest of much of Eurasia.

The dominance of the nomads ended in the 16th century as firearms allowed settled people to gain control of the region. The Russian Empire, the Qing dynasty of China, and other powers expanded into the area and seized the bulk of Central Asia by the end of the 19th century. After the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Soviet Union incorporated most of Central Asia; only Mongolia and Afghanistan remained nominally independent, although Mongolia existed as a Soviet satellite state and Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in the late 20th century. The Soviet areas of Central Asia saw much industrialisation and construction of infrastructure, but also the suppression of local cultures and a lasting legacy of ethnic tensions and environmental problems.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, five Central Asian countries gained independence — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. In all of the new states, former Communist Party officials retained power as local strongmen.

Human rights in China

Human rights in China is a highly contested topic, especially for the fundamental human rights periodically reviewed by the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), on which the government of the People's Republic of China and various foreign governments and human rights organizations have often disagreed. PRC authorities, their supporters, and other proponents claim that existing policies and enforcement measures are sufficient to guard against human rights abuses. However other countries and their authorities (such as the United States Department of State, Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, among others), international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as Human Rights in China and Amnesty International, and citizens, lawyers, and dissidents inside the country, state that the authorities in mainland China regularly sanction or organize such abuses. Jiang Tianyong, 46, is the latest lawyer known for defending government critics to be jailed. According to the news over the past two years more than 200 have been detained in the ongoing crackdown on criticism in China.NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, as well as foreign governmental institutions such as the U.S. State Department, regularly present evidence of the PRC violating the freedoms of speech, movement, and religion of its citizens and of others within its jurisdiction. Authorities in the PRC claim to define human rights differently, so as to include economic and social as well as political rights, all in relation to "national culture" and the level of development of the country. Authorities in the PRC, referring to this definition, claim that human rights are being improved. They do not, however, use the definition used by most countries and organisations. PRC politicians have repeatedly maintained that, according to the PRC Constitution, the "Four Cardinal Principles" supersede citizenship rights. PRC officials interpret the primacy of the Four Cardinal Principles as a legal basis for the arrest of people who the government says seek to overthrow the principles. Chinese nationals whom authorities perceive to be in compliance with these principles, on the other hand, are permitted by the PRC authorities to enjoy and exercise all the rights that come with citizenship of the PRC, provided they do not violate PRC laws in any other manner.

Numerous human rights groups have publicized human rights issues in China that they consider the government to be mishandling, including: the death penalty (capital punishment), the one-child policy (which China had made exceptions for ethnic minorities prior to abolishing it in 2015), the political and legal status of Tibet, and neglect of freedom of the press in mainland China. Other areas of concern include the lack of legal recognition of human rights and the lack of an independent judiciary, rule of law, and due process. Further issues raised in regard to human rights include the severe lack of worker's rights (in particular the hukou system which restricts migrant labourers' freedom of movement), the absence of independent labour unions (which have since been changing), and allegations of discrimination against rural workers and ethnic minorities, as well as the lack of religious freedom – rights groups have highlighted repression of the Christian, Tibetan Buddhist, Uyghur Muslim, and Falun Gong religious groups. Some Chinese activist groups are trying to expand these freedoms, including Human Rights in China, Chinese Human Rights Defenders, and the China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group. Chinese human rights attorneys who take on cases related to these issues, however, often face harassment, disbarment, and arrest.According to the Amnesty International report from 2016/2017 the government continued to draft and enact a series of new national security laws that presented serious threats to the protection of human rights. The nationwide crackdown on human rights lawyers and activists continued throughout the year. Activists and human rights defenders continued to be systematically subjected to monitoring, harassment, intimidation, arrest and detention. The report continues that police detained increasing numbers of human rights defenders outside of formal detention facilities, sometimes without access to a lawyer for long periods, exposing the detainees to the risk of torture and other ill-treatment. Booksellers, publishers, activists and a journalist who went missing in neighboring countries in 2015 and 2016 turned up at detention in China, causing concerns about China’s law enforcement agencies acting outside their jurisdiction.

Secession in China

The People's Republic of China and the Republic of China both claim to have sole sovereignty over China, the former administering Mainland China and the two special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau, and the latter administering the Taiwan area.

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