Dayton Agreement

The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as the Dayton Agreement, Dayton Accords, Paris Protocol or Dayton–Paris Agreement, (Bosnian: Dejtonski mirovni sporazum, Serbian: Dejtonski mirovni sporazum, Croatian: Daytonski sporazum) is the peace agreement reached at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio, United States, on 1 November 1995, and formally signed in Paris, France, on 14 December 1995. These accords put an end to the ​3 12-year-long Bosnian War, one of the Yugoslav Wars.

Dayton Peace agreement
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina
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Seated from left to right: Slobodan Milošević, Alija Izetbegović, Franjo Tuđman initialling the Dayton Peace Accords at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base on 21 November 1995.
Drafted1 November 1995
Signed14 December 1995
Signatories
Parties

Negotiation and signature

Though basic elements of the Dayton Agreement were proposed in international talks as early as 1992,[2] these negotiations were initiated following the unsuccessful previous peace efforts and arrangements, the August 1995 Croatian military Operation Storm and its aftermath, the government military offensive against the Republika Srpska, conducted in parallel with NATO's Operation Deliberate Force. During September and October 1995, world powers (especially the United States and Russia), gathered in the Contact Group, applied intense pressure to the leaders of the three sides to attend the negotiations in Dayton, Ohio.

The conference took place from 1–21 November 1995. The main participants from the region were the President of the Republic of Serbia Slobodan Milošević (representing the Bosnian Serb interests due to the absence of Karadžić), President of Croatia Franjo Tuđman, and President of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović with his Foreign Minister Muhamed Šaćirbeg.

The peace conference was led by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and negotiator Richard Holbrooke with two Co-Chairmen in the form of EU Special Representative Carl Bildt and the First Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia Igor Ivanov. A key participant in the US delegation was General Wesley Clark (later to become NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in 1997). The head of the UK's team was Pauline Neville-Jones, political director of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The UK military representative was Col Arundell David Leakey (later to become Commander of EUFOR in 2005). Paul Williams, through the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG) served as legal counsel to the Bosnian Government delegation during the negotiations.

The secure site was chosen in order to remove all the parties from their comfort zone, without which they would have little incentive to negotiate; to reduce their ability to negotiate through the media; and to securely house over 800 staff and attendants. Curbing the participants' ability to negotiate via the media was a particularly important consideration. Richard Holbrooke wanted to prevent posturing through early leaks to the press.

Signing the Dayton Agreement Milosevic Tudjman Izetbegovic
The signing of the full and formal agreement in Paris.

After having been initiated in Dayton, Ohio, on 21 November 1995, the full and formal agreement was signed in Paris on 14 December 1995[3] and witnessed by Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, French President Jacques Chirac, U.S. President Bill Clinton, UK Prime Minister John Major, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.

Content

The agreement's main purpose is to promote peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to endorse regional balance in and around the former Yugoslavia (Article V, annex 1-B), thus in a regional perspective.[4]

The present political divisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its structure of government were agreed upon, as part the constitution that makes up Annex 4 of the General Framework Agreement concluded at Dayton. A key component of this was the delineation of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line to which many of the tasks listed in the Annexes referred.

The State of Bosnia Herzegovina was set as of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the Republika Srpska. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a complete state, as opposed to a confederation; no entity or entities could ever be separated from Bosnia and Herzegovina unless by due legal process. Although highly decentralised in its entities, it would still retain a central government, with a rotating State Presidency, a central bank and a constitutional court.[4]

The agreement mandated a wide range of international organizations to monitor, oversee and implement components of the agreement. The NATO-led IFOR (Implementation Force) was responsible for implementing military aspects of the agreement and deployed on 20 December 1995, taking over the forces of the UNPROFOR. The Office of the High Representative was charged with the task of civil implementation. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe was charged with organising the first free elections in 1996.[4]

Constitutional Court decision

On 13 October 1997, the Croatian 1861 Law Party and the Bosnia-Herzegovina 1861 Law Party requested the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina to annul several decisions and to confirm one decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, more importantly, to review the constitutionality of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina since it was alleged that the agreement violated the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina in a way that it undermined the integrity of the state and could cause the dissolution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Court reached the conclusion that it is not competent to decide the dispute in regards to the mentioned decisions since the applicants were not subjects that were identified in Article VI.3 (a) of the Constitution on those who can refer disputes to the Court. The Court also rejected the other request:

(...) the Constitutional Court is not competent to evaluate the constitutionality of the General Framework Agreement as the Constitutional Court has in fact been established under the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to uphold this Constitution (...) The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina was adopted as Annex IV to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and consequently there cannot be a conflict or a possibility for controversy between this Agreement and the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[5]

It was one of the early cases in which the Court had to deal with the question of the legal nature of the Constitution. By making the remark in the manner of obiter dictum concerning the Annex IV (the Constitution) and the rest of the peace agreement, the Court actually "established the ground for legal unity"[6] of the entire peace agreement, which further implied that all of the annexes are in the hierarchical equality. In later decisions the Court confirmed that by using other annexes of the peace agreement as a direct base for the analysis, not only in the context of systematic interpretation of the Annex IV. However, since the Court rejected the presented request of the appellants, it did not go into details concerning the controversial questions of the legality of the process in which the new Constitution (Annex IV) came to power and replaced the former Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Court used the same reasoning to dismiss the similar claim in a later case.[7]

Territorial changes

Dayton
Territorial changes.
Bih dayton en
Political division of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Dayton Agreement.

Before the agreement, Bosnian Serbs controlled about 46% of Bosnia and Herzegovina (23,687 km2), Bosniaks 28% (14,505 km2) and Bosnian Croats 25% (12,937 km2).

Bosnian Serbs got large tracts of mountainous territories back (4% from Bosnian Croats and some small amounts from Bosniaks), but they had to surrender Sarajevo and some vital Eastern Bosnian/Herzegovian positions. Their percentage grew to 49% (48% by excluding the Brčko District, 24,526 km2) from a little bit more than 46% prior to Dayton.

Bosniaks got most of Sarajevo and some important positions in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina while they lost only a few locations on Mount Ozren and in western Bosnia. Their percentage grew from 28%, prior to Dayton to 30%, and they greatly improved the quality of the land. Large tracts of prewar Bosniak (and Bosnian Croat) inhabited lands remained under Bosnian Serb control.

Bosnian Croats gave most (4% of BiH territories) back to the Bosnian Serbs (9% of today's RS) and also retreated from Una-Sana Donji Vakuf (in Central Bosnia) afterward. A small enlargement of Posavina (Odžak and parts of Domaljevac) have not changed the fact that after Dayton Bosnian Croats controlled just 21% of Bosnia and Herzegovina (10,640 km2), especially when compared to more than 25% prior to Dayton. One of the most important Bosnian Croat territories (Posavina with Bosanski Brod, Bosanski Šamac, Derventa) was left out of Bosnian Croat control.[4]

Control of Republika Srpska

Control of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

  • About 53% (13,955 km2) of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was under Bosniak control.
  • About 41% (10,720 km2) of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was under the control of Bosnian Croats.
  • About 6% (1,435 km2) was under control of Bosnian Serbs.

Cantons

Canton 10:

  • was almost completely under control of Bosnian Croats (4,924 km2)
  • Bosniaks controlled some points east of Kupres (10 km2)

Una-Sana Canton:

  • was almost completely under control of Bosniaks (3,925 km2)
  • Bosnian Croats controlled some mountain passes on the southern parts of Bosanski Petrovac and Bihać municipalities (200 km2)

West Herzegovina Canton:

  • was completely under Bosnian Croat control (1,362 km2)

Herzegovina-Neretva Canton:

  • was divided, more than half was under Bosnian Croat control (2,525 km2)
  • northern and central parts were under Bosniak control (1,666 km2)
  • eastern mountains were under Bosnian Serb control (210 km2)

Central Bosnia Canton:

  • was divided, a bit more than a third was under Bosnian Croat control (1,099 km2)
  • rest was under control of Bosniaks (2,090 km2)

Zenica-Doboj Canton:

  • was largely under Bosniak control (2,843 km2)
  • there were some small enclaves like Žepče, Usora under Bosnian Croat control (400 km2)
  • eastern mountains were under Bosnian Serb control (100 km2)

Tuzla Canton:

  • was largely under Bosniak control (2,544 km2)
  • there were some villages in Gradačac municipality under Bosnian Croat control (5 km2)
  • and some villages in Doboj and Gračanica municipalities under Bosnian Serb control (100 km2)

Posavina Canton:

  • was mostly under Bosnian Croat control (205 km2)
  • Bosnian Serbs controlled Odžak and parts of Domaljevac municipalities (120 km2)

Bosnian Podrinje Canton:

  • was mostly under Bosniak control (405 km2)
  • Bosnian Serbs controlled areas which linked it with Sarajevo (100 km2)

Sarajevo Canton:

  • was mostly under Bosnian Serbs control (800 km2)
  • while Bosniaks controlled some southern suburbs and most of the city itself (477 km2)

Brčko District was divided;

  • Bosniaks controlled most of its southern parts (200 km2)
  • Bosnian Serbs its northern parts (193 km2)
  • While Bosnian Croats controlled the rest, part near Orašje municipality and two enclaves on southern parts of municipality (100 km2)

Analysis

The immediate purpose of the agreement was to freeze the military confrontation and prevent it from resuming. It was thefore defined as a "construction of necessity".[8]

The Dayton Agreement proved to be a highly flexible instrument, allowing Bosnia and Herzegovina to move from an early post-conflict phase through reconstruction and consolidation, passing from a consociationalist approach to a more integrationist one.[4] Many scholars refer to it as "the most impressive example of conflict resolution".[9]

Wolfgang Petritsch, OHR, has argued that the Dayton framework has allowed the international community to move "from statebuilding via institutions and capacity-building to identity building", putting Bosnia and Herzegovina "on the road to Brussels".[10]

Criticism

The Dayton Agreement has come across much criticism since its inception, including:

  • A complicated government system - As part of the Dayton agreement, Bosnia was divided into 2 entities and a government structure was created to appease all sides. However, by creating such a dissolved government, Bosnia has stalled in moving forward as every important issue is deadlocked within the central government as each party is championing opposing priorities that are based on ethnic policies and not shared ideals.[11]
  • Dependency and control of international actors - Dayton was very much an international vision, led by the United States who supported an end to the war, but that didn't allow Bosnian leaders to negotiate an ending to the war, therefore leaving no incentive in the afterward peacebuilding process and no area for leaders to discuss the underlying root causes of the conflict. International actors also played an extensive role in shaping the postwar agenda in Bosnia, including enacting punishment over local political actors.[12] The influx of NGOs and international actors to kick start investment in the country post war also failed to kick start the economy, with Bosnia suffering from poor economic growth (2% in 2015). The lack of economic development has been attributed to poor coordination between international actors and lack of consideration for local capacity [13]
  • Ending the war but not promoting peace - The primary aims of Dayton was to stop the war, but the agreement was only meant to be a temporary measure while a long term plan was developed. While Dayton has halted the conflict and there has not been an resurgence of violence, the stability in the conflict does not give an accurate assessment of peace. There is still currently a large military presence to mitigate any chance of violence and to enforce peace in the country.[14] Enforcing such peace can be seen as highlighting the still deep rooted tensions in the country, with Dayton covering the cracks of a fractured society that could be plunged back into conflict as soon as military forces left.

Disappearance of the original document

On 13 February 2008, the head of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina Željko Komšić said that the original Dayton Agreement was lost from the Presidency's archive. High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina Miroslav Lajčak said: "I don't know whether the news is sad or funny".[15] On 16 November 2009 the French Foreign Ministry delivered the certified copy of the Dayton agreement to the French embassy in Sarajevo. The copy was later transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina.[16] The original was found in 2017 in a private residence in Pale, resulting in arrest of one person.[17]

See also

References

  1. ^ "Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina". www1.umn.edu. 30 November 1995. Retrieved 16 January 2016.
  2. ^ Munich All Over Again?, Time Magazine, 31 August 1992
  3. ^ "Dayton Accords". US Department of State. 30 March 1996. Retrieved 5 May 2014.
  4. ^ a b c d e Cannon, P., The Third Balkan War and Political Disunity: Creating A Cantonal Constitutional System for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jrnl. Trans. L. & Pol., Vol. 5-2
  5. ^ Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, U-7/97, p. 2 and 3, Sarajevo, 22 December 1997
  6. ^ Vehabović, Faris (2006). Odnos Ustava Bosne i Hercegovine i Evropske konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i osnovnih sloboda. Sarajevo: ACIPS, 24. ISBN 9958-9187-0-6
  7. ^ Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, U-1/03, Sarajevo, 25 July 2003.
  8. ^ Rory Keane, Reconstructing sovereignty. Post-Dayton Bosnia uncovered, London: Ashgate 2001, p. 61
  9. ^ Charles-Philippe David, "Alice in Wonderland meets Frankenstein: Constructivism, Realism and Peacebuilding in Bosnia", Contemporary Security Policy 22, No.1, 2001
  10. ^ Wolfgang Petritsch, "My lessons learnt in Bosnia and Herzegovina", Sarajevo, 2006
  11. ^ Yourdin, C (2003). "Society Building in Bosnia: A Critique of Post-Dayton Peacebuilding Efforts'". Journal of Diplomacy and international Relations. 4 (2): 59–74.
  12. ^ Chandler, David (2005). "From Dayton to Europe". International Peacekeeping. 12 (3): 336–349. Retrieved 28 January 2018.
  13. ^ Kell, Kudlenko, S, A (2015). "Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after Dayton, complexity born of paradoxes". International peacekeeping. 22 (5): 471–489.
  14. ^ Berdal, M; Collantes-Celador, G. "Post-War Violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina". Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding: 75–94.
  15. ^ "Izgubljen original Dejtonskog sporazuma". Blic (in Serbian). 13 February 2008. Retrieved 21 November 2012.
  16. ^ "Francuska dostavila BiH kopiju Dejtonskog sporazuma". Politika (in Serbian). 16 November 2009. Retrieved 21 November 2012.
  17. ^ "Man arrested in possession of original Dayton Agreement". b92.net. 1 November 2017. Retrieved 13 April 2018.

Further reading

  • Belloni, Roberto (2009). "Bosnia: Dayton is dead! long live dayton!". Nationalism and Ethnic Politics. 15 (3–4): 355–375.
  • Bieber, Florian (2001). "Croat Self-Government in Bosnia: A Challenge for Dayton?". European Centre for Minority Issues.
  • Caplan, R., 2000. Assessing the Dayton Accord: The structural weaknesses of the general framework agreement for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Diplomacy and Statecraft, 11(2), pp. 213–232.
  • Chandler, David (2000). Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton. Pluto Press. ISBN 978-0-7453-1689-5.
  • Chivvis, Christopher S. (2010). "The Dayton Dilemma". Survival. 52 (5): 47–74.
  • Daalder, I.H., 2014. Getting to Dayton: the making of America's Bosnia policy. Brookings Institution Press.
  • Donais, Timothy (2002). "The politics of privatization in post-Dayton Bosnia". Southeast European Politics. 3 (1): 3–19.
  • Goodby, J.E., 1996. When war won out: Bosnian peace plans before Dayton. International Negotiation, 1(3), pp. 501–523.
  • McMahon, Patrice C.; Western, Jon (2009). "The death of Dayton: How to stop Bosnia from falling apart". Foreign Affairs: 69–83.
  • Parish, M., 2007. The Demise of the Dayton protectorate. Inside the Bosnian Crisis: Documents and Analysis. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 1, pp. 11–23.
  • Tuathail, Gearóid Ó.; O'Loughlin, John; Djipa, Dino (2006). "Bosnia-Herzegovina ten years after Dayton: Constitutional change and public opinion". Eurasian Geography and Economics. 47 (1): 61–75.
  • Woodward, Susan L. (1996). "Implementing Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina: a post-Dayton primer and memorandum of warning". Foreign Policy Studies Program. Brookings Institution.
  • Adriana Camisar, Boris Diechtiareff, Bartol Letica, Christine Switzer (2005). "An Analysis of the Dayton Negotiations and Peace Accords" (PDF). The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.CS1 maint: Multiple names: authors list (link)

External links

Exodus of Sarajevo Serbs

The Exodus of Sarajevo Serbs (Serbo-Croatian: egzodus sarajevskih Srba; egzodus Srba iz Sarajeva) refers to the migration of ethnic Serbs from Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina, between January and March 1996 after the Dayton Agreement that concluded the Bosnian War (1991–95).

High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina

The High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, were created in 1995 immediately after the signing of the Dayton Agreement which ended the 1992–95 Bosnian War. The purpose of the High Representative and the OHR is to oversee the civilian implementation of the Dayton agreement. They also serve to represent the countries involved in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement through the Peace Implementation Council (PIC).

To the present, all of the High Representatives named have been from European Union countries, while their principal deputies have been from the United States. The Principal Deputy High Representative serves as International Supervisor for Brčko, representing the international community in the Brčko District.

Novo Goražde

Novo Goražde (Serbian Cyrillic: Ново Горажде), also known as Ustiprača, is a village and municipality located in Republika Srpska, an entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As of 2013, it has a population of 3,117 inhabitants. It was split from the pre-existing municipality of Goražde and given to Republika Srpska by the Dayton Agreement. The other part of the pre-war municipality is now in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Operation Althea

Operation Althea, formally European Union Force (EUFOR) Bosnia and Herzegovina, is a military deployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina to oversee the military implementation of the Dayton Agreement. It is the successor to NATO's SFOR and IFOR. The transition from SFOR to EUFOR was largely a change of name and commanders: 80% of the troops remained in place. It replaced SFOR on 2 December 2004.

Oštra Luka

Oštra Luka (Serbian Cyrillic: Оштра Лука) is a village and a municipality located in Republika Srpska, an entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As of 2013, it has a population of 2,786 inhabitants.

The municipality is situated in the northwestern part of the Republika Srpska and the central part of the Bosanska Krajina region. It was also known as Srpski Sanski Most (Српски Сански Мост, "Serb Sanski Most") and was formed after the Dayton Agreement from part of the pre-war municipality of Sanski Most (the other part of the pre-war municipality is now in the entity of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina).

Peace Implementation Council

The Peace Implementation Council (PIC) is an international body charged with implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Council was established at an implementation conference held in London, United Kingdom on December 8 and 9, 1995, subsequent to the completion of the negotiations of the accord the preceding month. The Council is, in effect, the realization, through the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the international community's governance of Bosnia and Herzegovina after signature of the Dayton Agreement. This international control over Bosnia and Herzegovina is to last until the country is deemed politically and democratically stable and self-sustainable.

The PIC comprises 55 countries and agencies that support the peace process in many different ways - by assisting it financially, providing troops for SFOR, or directly running operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is also a fluctuating number of observers.

Since the London conference, the PIC has come together at the ministerial level another six times to review progress and define the goals of peace implementation for the coming period: in June 1996 in Florence, Italy; in December 1996 for a second time in London; in December 1997 in Bonn, Germany; in December 1998 in Madrid, Spain, in May 2000 and February 2007 in Brussels, Belgium.

The PIC clarifies the responsibilities of the High Representative as the main implementing body of the civilian part of the Dayton Agreement, as set out in Annex 10 the Dayton Agreement. For example, the 1997 Bonn session provided the Office of the High Representative with the so-called "Bonn authority" to dismiss elected and non-elected officials who obstruct the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. The High Representative from 2006-2007, Christian Schwarz-Schilling, used this power sparingly, to promote confidence in elected domestic government. This strategy was reversed by the new appointee to that post, Miroslav Lajčák, who imposed several decisions on his first day at work.

Politics of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Politics of Bosnia and Herzegovina takes place in a framework of a parliamentary representative democracy, whereby executive power is exercised by the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Legislative power is vested in both the Council of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Members of the Parliamentary Assembly are chosen according to a proportional representation system.

The judiciary is independent of the executive and the legislature. The system of government established by the Dayton Accord is an example of consociationalism, as representation is by elites who represent the country's three major ethnic groups termed constituent peoples, with each having a guaranteed share of power.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is divided into two Entities – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, which are politically autonomous to an extent, as well as the district of Brčko, which is jointly administered by both. The Entities have their own constitutions. The Economist Intelligence Unit has rated Bosnia and Herzegovina as "hybrid regime" in 2016.

See Political divisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serbo-Croatian: Republika Bosna i Hercegovina / Република Босна и Херцеговина) was the direct legal predecessor to the modern-day state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina existed legally until co-signing the Annex 4 of the Dayton Agreement, containing the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 14 December 1995, but official documents reveal that the state existed until the end of 1997 when the implementation of the Dayton Agreement was finished and only then it fully came into effect. Most of this period is taken up by the Bosnian War, in which majority of population of two of three main ethnicities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, established entities of Republika Srpska and Herzeg-Bosnia respectively, which were unlawful and secessionist in nature hence unrecognized by international community. Informally these events were considered by nationalists as evidence that republic was left to be representative primarily of its Bosniak population, formally presidency and government of the republic was still composed of Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats along with Bosniaks. By the Washington Agreement of 1994, however, Bosniaks were joined by Bosnian Croats of Herzeg-Bosnia, which was abolished by this agreement, in support for the Republic by the formation of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a sub-state joint entity. In 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords joined the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the Serb entity, the Republika Srpska, from that point onward recognized formally as political sub-state entity without a right on secession, into the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Republika Srpska–Serbia relations

Republika Srpska–Serbia relations are foreign relations between Republika Srpska, one of two entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia. Republika Srpska has office of representation in Belgrade and Serbia has consulate-general in Banja Luka. Serbia and Republika Srpska have signed Agreement on Special Parallel Relations.

The beginnings of formal cooperation can be traced to the Bosnian War; Republika Srpska got support from Serbia. At the Dayton Agreement, the President of the Republic of Serbia Slobodan Milošević represented the Bosnian Serb interests due to absence of Radovan Karadžić. Dayton Agreement ensure the right for entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to establish special parallel relationships with neighboring countries consistent with sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Agreement on Special Parallel Relations is signed in February 28, 1997. The Agreement was implemented December 15, 2010. Until now was organized significant number of formal and informal meetings between representatives of two sides.

On July 26, 2010, the Serbian Minister of Finance Diana Dragutinović and her Republika Srpska counterpart Aleksandar Džombić signed an Agreement on Cooperation in the Financial Sector, which will further develop mutual relations in the financial system. It will bolster the already good cooperation between the two, and help to maintain special parallel relations and enable exchange of experience, also discussing other sections. The working groups will convene at least twice a year.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1026

United Nations Security Council resolution 1026, adopted unanimously on 30 November 1995, after recalling resolutions 982 (1995) and 998 (1995) on the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the Council authorised an extension of its mandate until 31 January 1996.The Council again welcomed the Dayton Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and stressed the need for all parties to abide by that agreement. The role of UNPROFOR was also praised.

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council extended UNPROFOR's mandate until 31 January 1996 pending further action on the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. The Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was invited to keep the Council informed on developments and submit reports on the implementation of the agreement and how it would affect the United Nations role.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1035

United Nations Security Council resolution 1035, adopted unanimously on 21 December 1995, after recalling Resolution 1031 (1995) and the Dayton Agreement, the Council authorised the establishment of a United Nations civilian police force, known as the International Police Task Force (IPTF) to carry out tasks in accordance with the agreement. It was part of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The IPTF would be established for a period of one year from the transfer of authority from the United Nations Protection Force to the multinational Implementation Force (IFOR). The Police Task Force and civilian office would be under the authority of the Secretary-General with guidance from the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Secretary-General was requested to submit reports about the work of the IPTF and civilian office every three months.

The IPTF would have an initial strength of 1,721 in accordance with the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's report.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1088

United Nations Security Council resolution 1088, adopted unanimously on 12 December 1996, after recalling all resolutions on the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and in particular resolutions 1031 (1995) and 1035 (1995), the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, authorised the creation of the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina to replace the Implementation Force (IFOR).At a conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina there was an action plan to consolidate the peace process. Elections were held in the country in accordance with the Dayton Agreement, and institutions were established as set out in the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) had played a positive role in the peace process, and the efforts of all were welcomed, including the High Representative, IFOR and other international organisations.

The Security Council welcomed the mutual recognition between the successor states of former Yugoslavia and stressed the importance of the full normalisation of their diplomatic relations. They were reminded of their obligations under previous Security Council resolutions and for full implementation of the Dayton Agreement and co-operation with the United Nations.

Member States were authorised to establish the SFOR as a legal successor to IFOR for a period of 18 months. They were to take all necessary measures to ensure compliance with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement and its right to defend itself against attacks or threats. Bosnia and Herzegovina also asked for an extension of the United Nations police force (the International Police Task Force) that was part of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). The mandate of UNMIBH was extended until 21 December 1997 and the Security Council demanded that all United Nations missions worked together.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1107

United Nations Security Council resolution 1107, adopted unanimously on 16 May 1997, after recalling Resolution 1103 (1997) on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and United Nations International Police Task Force (UN-IPTF) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council authorised a further increase in the number of police personnel of UNMIBH.The Security Council recalled the Dayton Agreement and increased the size of the police component of UNMIBH by 120 personnel, following a recommendation by the Secretary-General Kofi Annan concerning the tasks of the UN-IPTF. Member States were urged to provide qualified police monitors and other forms of assistance to the UN-IPTF and in support of the Dayton Agreement.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1112

United Nations Security Council resolution 1112, adopted unanimously on 12 June 1997, after recalling 1031 (1995) and 1088 (1996), the Council approved the appointment of Carlos Westendorp as High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina.Recalling the Dayton Agreement, the Council expressed appreciation for the work of Carl Bildt as High Representative and agreed for Carlos Westendorp to succeed him. It reaffirmed the role of the High Representative in monitoring the implementation of the Dayton Agreement and co-ordinating the activities of civilian organisations and agencies that were working to implement the Agreement. Finally, it also reaffirmed the role of the High Representative as the final authority regarding the interpretation of Annex 10 on the civilian implementation of the Peace Agreement.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1184

United Nations Security Council resolution 1184, adopted unanimously on 16 July 1998, after recalling previous resolutions concerning the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, particularly resolutions 1168 (1998) and 1174 (1998), the Council established a programme to monitor the court system in Bosnia and Herzegovina.The Security Council approved the establishment of the court monitoring programme by the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) as part of an overall programme of legal reform proposed by the Office of the High Representative, Dayton Agreement and others. The authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina were urged to co-operate with and support officials associated with the programme. The Secretary-General Kofi Annan was requested to keep the Council informed on the progress of the monitoring programme as part of his reports on UNMIBH.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1256

United Nations Security Council resolution 1256, adopted unanimously on 3 August 1999, after recalling 1031 (1995), 1088 (1996) and 1112 (1997), the Council approved the appointment of Wolfgang Petritsch as High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina.Recalling the Dayton Agreement, the Council expressed appreciation for the work of Carlos Westendorp as High Representative and agreed for Wolfgang Petritsch to succeed him. It reaffirmed the role of the High Representative in monitoring the implementation of the Dayton Agreement and co-ordinating the activities of civilian organisations and agencies that were working to implement the Agreement. Finally, it also reaffirmed the role of the High Representative as the final authority regarding the interpretation of Annex 10 on the civilian implementation of the Peace Agreement.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1305

United Nations Security Council resolution 1305, adopted on 21 June 2000, after recalling resolutions 1031 (1995), 1035 (1995), 1088 (1996), 1103 (1997), 1107 (1997), 1144 (1997), 1168 (1998), 1174 (1998), 1184 (1998) and 1247 (1999), the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) for a period terminating on 19 June 2001 and authorised states participating in the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) to continue to do so for a further twelve months.The Security Council underlined the importance of the Dayton Agreement (General Framework Agreement) and the importance that Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and other states had to play in the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The situation continued to constitute a threat to peace and security and the Council was determined to promote a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Council reminded the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and others of their responsibility to implement the Dayton Agreement. It emphasised the role of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina to monitor its implementation. It also attached importance to co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.The Security Council commended the countries participating in SFOR to continue their operations for an additional twelve months; it would be extended beyond this date if warranted by the situation in the country. It also authorised the use of necessary measures, including that of the use of force and self-defense, to ensure compliance with the agreements and the safety and freedom of movement of SFOR personnel. At the same time, the mandate of UNMIBH, which included that of the International Police Task Force (IPTF), was extended until 21 June 2001. Countries were urged to provide training, equipment and support to local police forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Russia abstained from the voting on Resolution 1305, which was approved by the other 14 members of the Council. The Russian representative had felt that amendments were not included in the resolution, and opposed participation in the Peace Implementation Conference in Brussels as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, one of the signatories to the Dayton Agreement, had not been invited.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1396

In United Nations Security Council resolution 1396, adopted unanimously on 5 March 2002, after recalling resolutions 1031 (1995), 1088 (1996), 1112 (1997), 1256 (1999) and 1357 (2001) on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council welcomed the acceptance by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council on 28 February 2002 of the offer of the European Union to provide a European Union Police Mission (EUPM) to succeed the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) from 1 January 2003.The Security Council recalled the Dayton Agreement and preparations for the transition from UNMIBH at the end of its mandate. It agreed to the designation of Paddy Ashdown to succeed Wolfgang Petritsch as High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and appreciated the work of the latter for his achievements.The resolution welcomed the establishment of the EUPM from 1 January 2003 to follow on from the end of UNMIBH's mandate as part of a co-ordinated rule of law programme. It encouraged co-ordination among the EUPM, UNMIBH and High Representative to ensure a transition of responsibilities from the International Police Task Force to the EUPM and welcomed the streamlining of the international civilian implementation effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EUPM was to monitor and train the Bosnian Police and to create or reform sustainable institutions to EU standards.Finally, Resolution 1396 reaffirmed the importance and final authority the Council attached to the role of the High Representative in co-ordinating activities of organisations and agencies in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement.

Warren Christopher

Warren Minor Christopher (October 27, 1925 – March 18, 2011) was an American lawyer, diplomat, and politician. During Bill Clinton's first term as president, Christopher served as the 63rd Secretary of State.

Born in Scranton, North Dakota, Christopher clerked for Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas after graduating from Stanford Law School. During World War II, he served in the Pacific Theater as a member of the United States Naval Reserve. He became a partner in the firm of O'Melveny & Myers and served as Deputy Attorney General from 1967 to 1969 under President Lyndon B. Johnson. He served as Deputy Secretary of State under President Jimmy Carter, holding that position from 1977 to 1981. In 1991, he chaired the Christopher Commission, which investigated the Los Angeles Police Department in the wake of the Rodney King incident.

During the 1992 presidential election, Christopher headed Bill Clinton's search for a running mate, and Clinton chose Senator Al Gore. After Clinton won the 1992 election, Christopher led the Clinton administration's transition process, and he took office as Secretary of State in 1993. As Secretary of State, Christopher sought to expand NATO, broker peace in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and pressure China regarding its human rights practices. He also helped negotiate the Dayton Agreement, which ended the Bosnian War. He left office in 1997, and was succeeded by Madeleine Albright.

Christopher oversaw the Gore campaign's Florida recount effort in the aftermath of the disputed 2000 presidential election. At the time of his death in 2011, he was a Senior Partner at O'Melveny & Myers in the firm's Century City, California, office. He also served as a professor at the University of California at Los Angeles.

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