Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that held that all occupants of a car are "seized" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment during a traffic stop, not just the driver.
|Brendlin v. California|
|Argued April 23, 2007|
Decided June 18, 2007
|Full case name||Bruce Edward Brendlin v. People of the State of California|
|Citations||551 U.S. 249 (more)|
|Prior||Motion to suppress denied; rev'd, California Court of Appeal; rev'd, 136 P.3d 845 (Cal. 2006); cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 1145 (2007).|
|Automobile passengers are "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the car in which they are riding is held at a law enforcement traffic stop. California Supreme Court vacated and remanded.|
|Majority||Souter, joined by unanimous|
|U.S. Const. amend. IV|
In the early morning hours of November 27, 2001, a Sutter County deputy sheriff and his partner, who was a cadet at the time, stopped a car in which Bruce Brendlin was riding. The car's registration had expired, but the owner had applied for a renewal, and a valid temporary registration permit was properly affixed to the car. Nevertheless, the deputy decided to investigate further. He asked the driver of the car, Karen Simeroth, for her license, and noticed that Bruce Brendlin, "one of the Brendlin brothers," was sitting in the passenger seat. The deputy determined that there was a warrant out for Brendlin's arrest, and so he called for backup. Once backup arrived, Brendlin and Simeroth were arrested. The police found an orange syringe cap on Brendlin's person, more syringes and a "green leafy substance" on Simeroth's person, and equipment used to manufacture methamphetamine in the car.
Brendlin was charged with possession and manufacture of methamphetamine. Before trial, he moved to suppress the evidence found on his person and in the car as fruits of an unlawful seizure—unlawful because, he argued, the police had neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that Brendlin was first "seized" at the point he was removed from the car and arrested. Brendlin pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the suppression issue, and was sentenced to four years in prison.
The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. However, the California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal, reinstating the trial court's decision. Although the State conceded that the police had no lawful basis to effect the traffic stop, the California Supreme Court still held that the trial court was correct in denying the motion to suppress because, it reasoned, "a passenger is not seized as a constitutional matter in the absence of additional circumstances that would indicate to a reasonable person that he or she was the subject of the peace officer's investigation or show of authority." Simeroth was the exclusive target of the traffic stop, and so Brendlin was not seized until the police did something else to cast their eyes upon him. The decision was at odds with several federal circuit courts of appeal.
The issue before the Court was whether a passenger in a vehicle subject to a traffic stop is thereby "detained" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, thus allowing the passenger to contest the legality of the traffic stop.
A person is "seized" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when physical force or a show of authority terminates or restrains his freedom of movement. If the police's intent to restrain an individual is unclear, or if an individual's submission to a show of authority takes the form of passive acquiescence, a seizure does not occur unless a reasonable person would not feel free to leave in light of all the circumstances. If, however, the person has no desire to leave for reasons unrelated to the traffic stop, there is no seizure.
Before the Court's decision in this case, the law was clear that a traffic stop seized the driver of the car. The Court had also repeatedly suggested—but never formally held—that a traffic stop in fact seizes everyone in the vehicle. With its decision in this case, the Court expressly so held. "We think that in these circumstances any reasonable passenger would have understood the police officers to be exercising control to the point that no one in the car was free to depart without police permission."
A traffic stop necessarily curtails the freedom of movement of all within the vehicle, and a reasonable person riding in a stopped vehicle would know that some wrongdoing led the police to stop the vehicle. At the same time, any occupant of the vehicle cannot be sure of the reason for the stop. "If the likely wrongdoing is not the driving, the passenger will reasonably feel subject to suspicion owing to close association; but even when the wrongdoing is only bad driving, the passenger will expect to be subject to some scrutiny, and his attempt to leave the scene would be so obviously likely to prompt an objection from the officer that no reasonable passenger would feel free to leave in the first place." Moreover, no passenger could expect an officer to allow him to move around in ways that might jeopardize the officer's safety.
The California Supreme Court went astray by making three assumptions with which the Court disagreed. First, it reasoned that Brendlin was not the initial focus of the police's investigation, being concerned as they were with verifying the registration of the car, which Brendlin did not own. But the Court pointed out that this reasoning ignores the focus of the Fourth Amendment on what a reasonable person would believe, not the subjective intentions of the officers. Second, the California court reasoned that Brendlin was not in a position to submit to the officers' show of authority because only the driver of the car could do so. But the acts that constitute submission to a show of authority depend on what the person was doing beforehand. As a passenger in a vehicle, Brendlin could not affirmatively submit until the vehicle was stopped on the side of the road. Third, the California Supreme Court resisted the conclusion the Court drew because it feared that occupants of cars merely stuck in traffic would also be "seized" under a contrary holding. But the Court noted that "incidental restrictions on freedom of movement would not tend to affect an individual's sense of security and privacy in traveling in an automobile." Indeed, the California court's holding was a kind of incentive for the police to conduct "roving patrols" that would violate the Fourth Amendment rights of drivers.
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which held that “[a]lthough an affidavit supporting a search warrant may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances relied on by the person providing the information and some of the underlying circumstances from which the affiant concluded that the informant, whose identity was not disclosed, was credible or his information reliable.” Along with Spinelli v. United States (1969), Aguilar established the Aguilar–Spinelli test, a judicial guideline for evaluating the validity of a search warrant based on information provided by a confidential informant or an anonymous tip. The test developed in this case was subsequently rejected and replaced in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).Arizona v. Johnson
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held, by unanimous decision, that police may conduct a pat down search of a passenger in an automobile that has been lawfully stopped for a minor traffic violation, provided the police reasonably suspect the passenger is armed and dangerous.Brinegar v. United States
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), was a United States Supreme Court case employing the "reasonableness test" in warrantless searches. The Court held that while the police need not always be factually correct in conducting a warrantless search, such a search must always be reasonable.Coolidge v. New Hampshire
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), was a United States Supreme Court case dealing with the Fourth Amendment and the automobile exception.
The state sought to justify the search of a car owned by Edward Coolidge, suspected of killing 14-year-old Pamela Mason in January 1964, on three theories: automobile exception, search incident to arrest, and plain view.Counselman v. Hitchcock
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled that not incriminating an individual for testimony was not the same as not requiring them to testify at all. The court reasoned that as long as evidence arising from the compelled testimony could incriminate the individual in any way, the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination was not satisfied. The court then passed the broader "transactional immunity" statute.Davis v. United States (2011)
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States "[held] that searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule".Illinois v. Lidster
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the Fourth Amendment permits the police to use a roadblock to investigate a traffic incident.Illinois v. Wardlow
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), is a case decided before the United States Supreme Court involving U.S. criminal procedure regarding searches and seizures.List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 551
This is a list of all the United States Supreme Court cases from volume 551 of the United States Reports:
Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1 (2007)
Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007)
Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74 (2007)
Claiborne v. United States 551 U.S. 87 (2007) (vacated as moot)
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007)
Beck v. PACE Int'l Union, 551 U.S. 96 (2007)
Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112 (2007)
United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007)
Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142 (2007)
Long Island Care at Home Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007)
Davenport v. Washington Ed. Assn., 551 U.S. 177 (2007)
Permanent Mission of India v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193 (2007)
Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007)
Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services Inc., 551 U.S. 224 (2007)
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007)
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007)
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn. v. Brentwood Academy, 551 U.S. 291 (2007)
Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007)
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007)
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007)
Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007)
Federal Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007)
Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007)
National Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007)
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007)
Leegin Creative Leather Products Inc. v. PSKS Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007)
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007)
Dada v. Mukasey, 551 U.S. 1188 (2007) (cert. granted)Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz
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Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), is a United States Supreme Court decision relating to the open fields doctrine limiting the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), was a U.S. Supreme Court case that ruled that in a case involving a consent search, knowledge of a right to refuse consent is a factor in determining whether a grant of consent to a search was voluntary, the state does not need to prove that the person who granted consent to search knew of the right to refuse consent under the Fourth Amendment .United States v. Matlock
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974), was a Supreme Court of the United States case in which the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures was not violated when the police obtained voluntary consent from a third party who possessed common authority over the premises sought to be searched. The ruling of the court established the "co-occupant consent rule," which was later explained by Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) and distinguished later by Georgia v. Randolph (2006), in which the court held that a third party could not consent over the objections of a present co-occupant, and Fernandez v. California (2014), where the court held when the objecting co-resident is removed for objectively reasonable purposes (such as lawful arrest), the remaining resident may validly consent to search.United States v. Ramsey (1977)
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held the search of letters or envelopes from foreign countries falls under the border exception to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.United States v. Robinson
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that "in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a reasonable search under that Amendment."Virginia v. Moore
Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008), is a Supreme Court of the United States case that addresses use of evidence obtained by police in a search incident to an arrest if that arrest is later found to be unlawful.Warden v. Hayden
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), was a United States Supreme Court case that held that 'mere evidence' may be seized and held as evidence in a trial. This finding reversed previous Supreme Court decisions such as Boyd v. United States which had held that search warrants may not be used as a means of gaining access to a man's house or office and papers solely for the purpose of making search to secure evidence to be used against him in a criminal or penal proceeding...Weeks v. United States
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court unanimously held that the warrantless seizure of items from a private residence constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment. It also prevented local officers from securing evidence by means prohibited under the federal exclusionary rule and giving it to their federal colleagues. It was not until the case of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), that the exclusionary rule was deemed to apply to state courts as well.
United States 4th Amendment case law