Battle of Tannenberg

The Battle of Tannenberg was fought between Russia and Germany between the 26th and 30th of August 1914, the first month of World War I. The battle resulted in the almost complete destruction of the Russian Second Army and the suicide of its commanding general, Alexander Samsonov. A series of follow-up battles (First Masurian Lakes) destroyed most of the First Army as well and kept the Russians off balance until the spring of 1915. The battle is particularly notable for fast rail movements by the Germans, enabling them to concentrate against each of the two Russian armies in turn, and also for the failure of the Russians to encode their radio messages. It brought considerable prestige to Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and his rising staff-officer Erich Ludendorff.

Although the battle actually took place near Allenstein (Olsztyn), Hindenburg named it after Tannenberg, 30 km to the west, in order to avenge the defeat of the Teutonic Knights 500 years earlier at the Battle of Grunwald by Poland-Lithuania (which was also known as the Battle of Tannenberg in German).

Battle of Tannenberg
Part of the East Prussian campaign of the
Eastern Front in World War I
Russian prisoners tannenberg

Russian prisoners of war after the Battle of Tannenberg.
Date26–30 August 1914
Location
53°29′45″N 20°08′4″E / 53.49583°N 20.13444°ECoordinates: 53°29′45″N 20°08′4″E / 53.49583°N 20.13444°E
Result Decisive German victory
Russian Second Army annihilated
Belligerents
 German Empire  Russian Empire
Commanders and leaders
German Empire Paul von Hindenburg
German Empire Erich Ludendorff
German Empire Max Hoffmann
Russian Empire Alexander Samsonov  
Russian Empire Paul von Rennenkampf
Units involved
German Empire VIII Army Russian Empire I Army
Russian Empire II Army
Strength
150,000[1] 230,000[2]
Casualties and losses
Official German data 21–30/08/14:
13,873+:[3]
1,726+ KIA
7,461 WIA
4,686 MIA
170,000:
78,000 killed or wounded
92,000 POW
350 guns captured[4][5]
Vivat-bander - 1914 - Hindenburg Tanenburg by E.D.d.j
Vivat ribbon commemorating Battle of Tannenberg. Shows Wilhelm II and "Hindenburg the victor of Tannenberg".

Background

Germany entered World War I largely following the Schlieffen Plan. Devised a decade earlier in response to concerns about fighting a two-front war with Russia and France, the Plan depended on differences in the speed with which the different nations could mobilize their armies for war. The basic idea was for Germany to use its speed advantage to mobilize before the French could, invade and defeat France before it mobilized, and then turn the German army around, send it east, and defeat Russia, which was seen as being slower to mobilize than France. In short, Germany could deliver a devastating one-two punch before either of its adversaries was ready. Put another way, the Plan depended on Russia's slow entry into the war.

The French army's Plan XVII at the outbreak of the war involved swift mobilization followed by an immediate attack to drive the Germans from Alsace and Lorraine. If the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) joined in accordance with their Allied treaty, they would fill the left flank. Their Russian allies in the East would have a massive army, more than 95 divisions, but their mobilization would inevitably be slower. Getting their men to the front would itself take time because of their relatively sparse and unreliable railway network (for example, three-quarters of the Russian railways were still single-tracked.[6] Russia intended to have 27 divisions at the front by day 15 and 52 by day 23, but it would take 60 days before 90 divisions were in action.[7] Despite their difficulties, the Russians promised the French that they would promptly engage the armies of Austria-Hungary in the south and on day 15 would invade German East Prussia.[8]

East Prussia was a vulnerable salient thrust into Russian territory, extending from the Vistula River in the west to the border with (at the time, Russian) Lithuania in the east, a distance of roughly 190 km (120 mi). On the north was the Baltic and on the south was the border with (at the time, Russian) Poland; it was about 130 km (81 mi) wide. Somewhat east of the center of the province was the heavily fortified peninsula on which its capital Königsberg (nowadays: Kaliningrad, Russia) was located.

The Russians would rely on two of their three railways that ran up to the border; each would provision an army. The railways ended at the border, as Russian trains operated on a different rail gauge than Western Europe. Consequently, its armies could be transported by rail only as far as the German border and could use Prussian railways only with captured locomotives and rolling stock. The First Army would use the line that ran from Vilnius, Lithuania, to the border 136 km (85 mi) southeast of Königsberg. The Second Army railway ran from Warsaw, Poland, to the border 165 km (103 mi) southwest of Königsberg. The two armies would take the Germans in a pincers. The Russian supply chains would be ungainly because—for defense—on their side of the border there were only a few sandy tracks rather than proper macadamized roads. Adding to their supply problems, the Russians deployed large numbers of cavalry and Cossacks; every day each horse needed ten times the resources that a man required.[9]

The First Army commander was Gen. Paul von Rennenkampf, who in the Russo-Japanese War had earned a reputation for "exceptional energy, determination, courage, and military capability."[10] The Second Army, coming north from Warsaw, was under Gen. Alexander Samsonov, who was “… possessed of a brilliant mind, reinforced by an excellent military education”. Since commanding a division in the war with Japan he had been governor of Turkestan. The two armies were directed by the military governor of Warsaw, who in wartime commanded the Northwest Military District, Gen. Yakov Zhilinsky. His duties in Manchuria had been more diplomatic than military. Before moving to Warsaw he had been Chief of the Russian General Staff for two years. He set up his headquarters in Volkovysk. (Vawkavysk, Belarus), about 410 km (250 mi) from Königsberg.

Communications would be a daunting challenge. The Russian supply of cable was insufficient to run telephone or telegraph connections from the rear; all they had was needed for field communications. Therefore, they relied on mobile wireless stations, which would link Zhilinskiy to his two army commanders and with all corps commanders. The Russians were aware that the Germans had broken their ciphers, but they continued to use them until war broke out. A new code was ready but they were still very short of the code books. Zhilinskiy and Rennenkampf each had one; Samsonov did not.[11] Hence, many messages were sent in the clear, hoping that they would not be intercepted.

The German Schlieffen Plan proposed to defeat France swiftly while the Russians were mobilizing. Then Germany's armies would shift by train to the Eastern Front. Therefore, East Prussia was garrisoned by a single army, the Eighth, commanded by Gen. Maximilian von Prittwitz und Gaffron, which was to hold back the Russians while the outcome in the West was decided. A tangle of lakes, marshes and dense woods characterized the province, which would help defenders. When the war began the bulk of the German Eighth Army was southwest of Königsberg, ready to defend either the Western or the Southern frontier: 485,000 Russians were facing 173,000 Germans. More than half of the men in both armies had just been mobilized, so many were not yet fighting fit.

Prelude: 17–22 August

Rennenkampf's First Army crossed the frontier on 17 August 1914, moving westward slowly. This was sooner than the Germans anticipated, because the Russian mobilization, including the Baltic and Warsaw districts, had begun secretly on 25 July, not with the Tsar's proclamation on 30 July.[12] They were attacked at Stallupönen by a division of the German I Corps under Lt. Gen. Hermann von François. The Russians were driven back and lost 3,000 men as prisoners, but I Corps was ordered by Prittwitz, who had not authorized the attack, to pull back to Gumbinnen to concentrate his forces. The Russian advance continued on the afternoon of 18 August and on the following day.

Prittwitz attacked near Gumbinnen on 20 August, when he knew from intercepted wireless messages that Rennenkampf's infantry was resting. German I Corps was on their left, XVII Corps commanded by Lt. Gen. August von Mackensen in the center and I Reserve Corps led by Gen. Otto von Below on the right. A night march enabled one of François’ divisions to hit the Russian XX Corps' right flank at 04:00. Rennenkampf's men rallied to stoutly resist the attack. Their artillery was devastating until they ran out of ammunition, then the Russians retired. I Corps attacks were halted at 16:00 to rest men sapped by the torrid summer heat. François was sure they could win the next day. On his left Mackensen's XVII Corps launched a vigorous frontal attack but the Russian infantry held firm. That afternoon the Russian heavy artillery struck back—the German infantry fled in panic, their artillery limbered up and joined the stampede. Prittwitz ordered I Corps and I Reserve Corps to break off the action and retreat also. At noon he had telephoned Field Marshal von Moltke at OHL (Oberste Heeresleitung, Supreme Headquarters) to report that all was going well; that evening he telephoned again to report disaster. His problems were compounded because an intercepted wireless message disclosed that the Russian II Army included five Corps and a cavalry division, and aerial scouts saw their columns marching across the frontier.[13] They were opposed by a single reinforced German Corps, the XX, commanded by Lt. Gen. Friedrich von Scholtz. Prittwitz excitedly but inconclusively and repeatedly discussed the dreadful news with Moltke that evening on the telephone, shouting back and forth. At 20:23 Eighth Army telegraphed OHL that they would withdraw to West Prussia.[14]

However, by the next morning, 21 August, Eighth Army staff realized that because Samsonov's II Army was closer to the Vistula crossings they must relocate most of their forces to join with XX Corps to block Samsonov before they could withdraw further. Now Moltke was told that they would only retreat a short way; François protested directly to the Kaiser about his panicking superiors.[15] That evening Prittwitz reported that the German 1st Cavalry Division had disappeared. His next call disclosed that they had ridden in with 500 prisoners. Probably Moltke had already decided to replace both Prittwitz and his highly regarded chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Alfred von Waldersee. On the morning of 22 August their replacements, Col. Gen. Paul von Hindenburg and Maj. Gen. Erich Ludendorff, were notified of their new assignments.

The Eighth Army issued orders to move toward Samsonov's Second Army. I Corps was closest to the railway, so it would move by train to support the right of XX Corps, while the other two German corps would march the shorter distance to XX Corps' left. The First Cavalry Division with some older garrison troops would remain to screen Rennenkampf. On the afternoon of 22 August the head of the Eighth Army field railways was informed by telegraph that new commanders were coming by special train. The telegram relieving their former commanders came later. I Corps was moving over more than 150 km (93 miles) of rail, day and night, one train every 30 minutes, with 25 minutes to unload instead of the customary hour or two.[16]

After the battle at Gumbinnen Rennenkampf decided to keep his First Army in position to resupply and to be in good positions if the Germans attacked again. Both Russian armies were having serious supply problems; everything had to be carted up from the railheads because they could not use the East Prussian railway track, and many units were hampered by lack of field bakeries, ammunition carts and the like. The Second Army also was hampered by incompetent staff work and poor communications. Poor staff work not only exacerbated supply problems but, more importantly, caused Samsonov during the fighting to lose operational control over all but the two corps in his immediate vicinity (XIII & XV Corps).[17]

Battle

Consolidation of the German Eighth Army

The new commanders arrived at Marienburg at 14:00 on 23 August; they had met for the first time on their special train the previous night and now they rendezvoused with the Eighth Army staff. Hindenburg knew none of them. Ludendorff knew the senior officer, deputy Chief of Operations Col. Max Hoffmann, because they had served together and had been neighbors in Berlin and he had met several of the junior men. First they sorted out the orders that had been issued for concentrating most of Eighth Army against Samsonov—each corps had received orders from the Eighth Army and also from Ludendorff—which rankled the staff. However, the orders were almost identical because they were dictated by the situation. I Corps was moving by the rail line. The Eighth Army had ordered it further west to shield the Vistula crossings, but now it would detrain at Deutsch-Eylau, where it could support the right of XX Corps. XVII Corps and I Reserve Corps would march towards the left of XX Corps. Ludendorff had delayed their marches for a day to rest while remaining in place should Rennenkampf attack. The German 1st Cavalry Division and some garrison troops of older men would remain as a screen just south of the eastern edge of the Königsberg defenses, facing Rennenkampf's First Army. The eastern portion of the Königsberg defenses was the only part that was fully manned, while the approaches from the south were entirely open.

Then the new commanders raised the stakes dramatically.[18] They must do more than stop Samsonov in his tracks, as they had tried to block and push back Rennenkampf. Samsonov must be annihilated before they turned back to deal with Rennenkampf.[19] For the moment Samsonov would be opposed only by the forces he was already facing, XX Corps, mostly East Prussians who were defending their homes. The bulk of the Second Russian Army was still coming towards the front; if necessary, they would be allowed to push further into the province while the German reinforcements assembled on the flanks, poised to encircle the invaders—just the tactics instilled by Schlieffen.[20] The danger was that if Rennenkampf's First Army marched southwest they would appear on the Eighth Army's extreme left flank. Thanks to their consolidation, the coming battle would be fought with 1.8 Russians facing each German. OHL was informed that they were moving to envelop the invaders.

Early phases of battle: 23–26 August

BattleOfTannenberg2
Movements of 23–26 August 1914. Red: Germans, blue: Russians

Zhilinskiy had agreed to Samsonov's proposal to start the Second Army's advance further westward than originally planned, separating them even further from Rennenkampf's First Army. On 22 August Samsonov's forces encountered Germans all along their front and pushed them back in several places. Zhilinskiy ordered him to pursue vigorously. They already had been advancing for six days in torrid heat without sufficient rest along primitive roads, averaging 24 km (15 mi) a day and had outrun their supplies[21] On 23 August they attacked the German XX Corps, which retreated to the Orlau-Frankenau line that night. The Russians followed, and on the 24th they attacked again; the now partially entrenched XX Corps temporarily stopped their advance before retreating to avoid possible encirclement. At one stage the chief of staff of the corps directed artillery fire onto his own dwelling.[22]

Samsonov saw a wonderful opportunity because, as far as he was aware, both of his flanks were unopposed. He ordered most of his units to the northwest, toward the Vistula, leaving only his VI Corps to continue north towards their original objective of Seeburg. He did not have enough aircraft or skilled cavalry to detect the German buildup on his left. Rennenkampf mistakenly reported that two of the German Corps had sheltered in the Königsberg fortifications.[23]

Bundesarchiv Bild 183-R36715, Ostpreußen, deutsche Infanterie auf dem Marsch
German infantry during the battle of Tannenberg

On 24 August Hindenburg, Ludendorff and Hoffmann motored along the German lines to meet Scholtz and his principal subordinates, sharing the roads with panic-stricken refugees; in the background were columns of smoke from burning villages ignited by artillery shells. They could keep control of their army because most of the local telephone operators remained at their switchboards, carefully tracking the motorcade. Along the way they drove through the village of Tannenberg, which reminded the two younger men of the defeat of the Teutonic Knights there by the Poles and Lithuanians in 1410; Hindenburg had been thinking about that battle since the evening before when he strolled near the ruins of the castle of the Teutonic Order. (In 1910 Slavs had commemorated their triumph on the old battlefield.)[24] By telephone with headquarters they were reassured that Rennenkampf's army was moving forward, but slowly—his heavy wagons were sinking into the East Prussian sands. They knew about Samsonov's proposed movements from a wireless intercept that agreed perfectly with papers found on the body of a Russian officer killed at Gumbinnen. When they met François he was told that Samsonov was moving northwest, to turn what he believed to be the German right flank. I Corps was ordered to attack the Russian left wing at Usdau on the next day, 25 August. François objected vigorously: only part of his corps had arrived and his artillery would not be detrained and ready before 26 August. Ludendorff screeched at him until François finally agreed to attack, but with the proviso that because his ammunition column was still on the road, his men must charge with bayonets. By setting Usdau as the objective, the commanders realized that part of the Russian Second Army would escape the trap.

On the way back to headquarters Hoffmann received new radio intercepts. Rennenkampf's most recent orders from Zhilinskiy were to continue due west, not turn southward towards Samsonov, who was instructed to continue his own drive northwest. Based on this information Scholtz formed a new defensive flank along the Drewenz River, while his main line strengthened their defenses. Back at headquarters Hindenburg told the staff, “Gentlemen. Our preparations are so well in hand that we can sleep soundly tonight."[25]

As the battle was beginning OHL telegraphed the Eighth Army that three army corps and a cavalry division would be sent to East Prussia. Ludendorff replied that they would arrive too late for the present battle, but would be welcome if they could be spared. Moltke was optimistic about their progress in France and Belgium and two army corps and the cavalry were sent.

Main battle: 26–30 August

Tannenberg3008
Movements of 27–30 August 1914

Samsonov's cavalry detected the German buildup on their left, so he ordered reinforcements to extend the Russian line, but it would take hours or even days for them to arrive. True to his word, on 26 August François advanced part of his 1st Division toward the Russian outposts at 08:00, where—despite telephone prodding from the Eighth Army—they only skirmished at a distance until noon. By then the railways had brought up the rest of I Corps including their artillery. Finally they drove the Russian outposts back, but at 15:45 François halted in order to organize a strong attack on the following day by men with full stomachs and ammunition pouches. Scholtz followed his orders, which were to make sure that Russians were not slipping past his flanks, which would make it difficult to spring the trap. On his right he attacked to push back the Russian 2nd Division and almost destroyed it. On his left the German 3rd Reserve Division repelled an attack by the Russian VI Corps. It was a different story in the thinly held center, where the Russian XIII Corps advanced toward the road center of Allenstein almost unopposed.

Zhilinskiy was visited by the commander of the Russian Army, the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich of Russia, who ordered him to support Samsonov.[26] Therefore, Rennenkampf ordered two of his corps to invest Königsberg, while the other two were to march to make contact with Samsonov. These orders were sent by wireless in the clear. The next day the Russian First Army's cavalry started riding towards their Second Army, but their infantry waited for resupply.

Tannenberg01
Burning house during the fight at Usdau on 27 August 1914
Usdau1
Dead Russian soldiers in a trench near Usdau

That evening the Eighth Army's staff was on edge. Little had been achieved during the day, when they had intended to spring the trap. XX Corps had done well on another torrid day, but now was exhausted. On their far left they knew that XVII Corps and I Reserve Corps were coming into action, but headquarters had learned little about their progress. In fact, XVII Corps had defeated the Russian VI Corps, which fled back along the roads. XVII Corps had endured long marches in sweltering weather, but some men still had the energy to pursue on bicycles requisitioned from civilians.[27] To add to their worries, German aerial scouts reported that still more of Samsonov's army was detraining at his railhead. Another aviator mistakenly reported that Rennenkampf's infantry was now heading towards them. The Eighth Army might be the one in the trap.

Hoffmann, who had been an observer with the Japanese in Manchuria, tried to ease their nerves by telling how Samsonov and Rennenkampf had quarreled during that war, so they would do nothing to help one another. It was a good story that Hoffmann treasured and retold frequently,[28] so it reappears in many histories, but not in either Hindenburg's or Ludendorff's memoirs.

In Hindenburg's words “… firm resolution began to yield to vacillation …”[29] At dinner Ludendorff was visibly distraught, toying with his bread, and finally abruptly asked to speak alone with Hindenburg. When Ludendorff emerged from their tête-a-tête he issued the orders to continue the attack on Samsonov. The rest of the German forces coming onto their left wing were swinging into place by forced marches. Samsonov's II Army was now facing Germans along a 100 km (62 mi) line.

François was ready to attack the Russian left decisively on 27 August, hitting I Russian Corps. His artillery barrage was overwhelming, and soon he had taken the key town of Usdau. In the center the Russians continued to strongly attack the German XX Corps and to move northwest from Allenstein. The German XVII Corps and I Reserve Corps pushed the Russian right wing they had bloodied the day before further back. Gen. Basil Gourko, commanding the Russian First Army Cavalry Division (and from 1916–17 chief of the general staff), was told later that Samsonov did not know what was happening on his flanks because he was observing the action from a rise in the ground a distance from his wireless set and reports were not relayed to him.[30] It was late in the day before he realized that his army was in frightful danger.

On the morning of 28 August the German commanders were motoring along the front when they were shown a report from an aerial observer that Rennenkampf was moving towards their rear. Ludendorff announced that the attack on the Second Army must be broken off. Hindenburg led him behind a nearby hedge, when they emerged Hindenburg calmly said that operations would continue as planned.[31] Before long they learned that the report of Rennenkampf's movement was mistaken. Samsonov's I Corps on the left and VI Corps on the right were both retreating. His center had received so little food and ammunition that they were unable to keep attacking. They were ordered to retreat southeast to obtain what they needed to fight. Samsonov asked that Rennenkampf be ordered to help. It was too late. François by this time had advanced due east, moving further than his orders specified, to form a line south of the Russians between Neidenburg and Willenberg, and XVII German Corps had swung southwest to meet him. The noose was in place. The Russians who had been attacking were surrounded.

On 29 August the troops from the Russian Second Army's center who were retreating south ran into a German defensive line. Those Russians who tried break through by dashing across open fields heavy with crops were mown down. They were in a cauldron centered at Frogenau, east of Tannenberg, and throughout the day were relentlessly pounded by artillery. Many surrendered—long columns of prisoners jammed the roads away from the battleground. Hindenburg and Ludendorff watched from a hilltop, with only a single field telephone line; thereafter they stayed closer to the telephone network. Hindenburg met one captured Russian corps commander that day, another on the day following. On 30 August the Russians remaining outside of the cauldron tried unsuccessfully to break open the snare. Rather than report the loss of his army to Tsar Nicholas II, Samsonov disappeared in the woods that night and committed suicide. His body was found in the following year and returned to Russia by the Red Cross.[32]

On 31 August Hindenburg formally reported to the Kaiser that three Russian army corps (XIII, XV and XXIII) had been destroyed. The two corps (I and VI) that had not been caught in the cauldron had been severely bloodied and were retreating back to Poland. He requested that the battle be named Tannenberg (an imaginative touch that both Ludendorff and Hoffmann claimed as their own).[33][34]

Tannenberg 001
Russian prisoners of war at Tilsit railway station

Samsonov's Second Army had been almost annihilated: 92,000 captured, 78,000 killed or wounded and only 10,000 (mostly from the retreating flanks) escaping. The Russians had lost 350 big guns. The Germans suffered just 12,000 casualties out of the 150,000 men committed to the battle.[35] Sixty trains were required to take captured Russian equipment to Germany. Other historians give smaller numbers for Russian killed and wounded, which were never properly recorded.[36] For instance, 30,000 Russian killed or wounded, with 13 generals and 500 guns captured.[37]

The Russian First Army had been so slowed by the combative German cavalry screen that by the time the battle was over their closest unit was still perhaps as much as 70 km (43 mi) from the trapped Second Army. Other Russian units were scattered back along the line to Königsberg, leaving the First Army itself in a dangerously spread-out position.

Aftermath

Ruinsoftannenbergdenkmalsmall
1998 photo of the foundations of the Tannenberg Memorial, which later served as the burial site of Paul von Hindenburg

To David Stevenson it was "a major victory but far from decisive",[38] because the Russian First Army was still in East Prussia. It set the stage for the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes a week later, when the reinforced German Eighth Army confronted the Russian First Army. Rennenkampf retreated hastily back over the pre-war border before they could be encircled.

Field Marshal Sir Edmund Ironside saw Tannenberg as the “… greatest defeat suffered by any of the combatants during the war”.[39] It was a tactical masterpiece that demonstrated the superior skills of the German army. Their pre-war organization and training had proven themselves, which bolstered German morale while severely shaking Russian confidence. Nonetheless, as long as the great battle in the West continued the outnumbered Germans had to remain on the defensive in the East, anticipating that the Russians would make another thrust from Poland against Germany, and because the Russians had bested the Austro-Hungarians in the Battle of Galicia; their allies would need help.

The Russian official inquiry into the disaster blamed Zhilinskiy for not controlling his two armies. He was replaced in the Northwest Command and sent to liaise with the French. Rennenkampf was exonerated, but was retired after a dubious performance in Poland in 1916.[40]

WWI German Silver Medal East Prussia 1914. Reverse
The reverse of a World War I German Silver medallion liberation of East Prussia 1914 by Paul von Beneckendorff und von Hindenburg. Referring to the Battle of Tannenberg. The naked Gen. Hindenburg fighting the Russian Bear with his sword.

Hindenburg was hailed as an epic hero, Ludendorff was praised, but Hoffmann was generally ignored by the press. Apparently not pleased by this, he later gave tours of the area, noting, "This is where the Field Marshal slept before the battle, this is where he slept after the battle, and this is where he slept during the battle." However, Hindenburg countered by saying, "If the battle had gone badly, the name 'Hindenburg' would have been reviled from one end of Germany to the other." Hoffmann is not mentioned in Hindenburg's memoirs. In his memoirs Ludendorff takes credit for the encirclement[41] and most historians give him full responsibility for conducting the battle. Hindenburg wrote and spoke of “we”, and when questioned about the crucial tête-á-tête with Ludendorff after dinner on 26 August resolutely maintained that they had calmly discussed their options and resolved to continue with the encirclement. Military historian Walter Elze wrote that a few months before his death Hindenburg finally acknowledged that Ludendorff had been in a funk that evening.[42] Hindenburg would also remark, “After all, I know something about the business, I was the instructor in tactics at the War Academy for six years”.[43]

Post-war legacy

A German monument commemorating the battle was completed in 1927 in Hohenstein. However, it was blown up in World War 2 by the Germans during their retreat from Prussia in January 1945.[44]

German film director Heinz Paul made a film, Tannenberg, about the battle, shot in East Prussia in 1932.

The battle is at the center of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's novel August 1914, published in 1971.

The video game Darkest of Days features the Battle of Tannenberg as one of the game's signature historical locations the player gets to explore.

Footnotes

  1. ^ Hastings, Max., 2013; p. 281.
  2. ^ Hastings, Max. Catastrophe: Europe goes to war 1914 London: William Collins, 2013; p. 281.
  3. ^ Sanitätsbericht über das deutsche Heer im Weltkriege 1914/1918, III. Band, Berlin 1934, S. 36
  4. ^ Sweetman 2004, p. 158
  5. ^ Ian F. W. Beckett, The Great War: 1914–1918, 2014, p. 76
  6. ^ Strachan, H. (2001) The First World War. Volume I. To Arms. Oxford University Press, p. 298.
  7. ^ Strachan (2001) p.312.
  8. ^ Herwig, H. L. (1997). The First World War, Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914–1918. Arnold, London, p. 53.
  9. ^ Van Creveld, M. (1977). Supplying War. Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. Cambridge University Press.
  10. ^ Gourko, G.B. (1918) Memories & Impressions of war and revolution in Russia, 1914–1917. John Murray, London, pp. 10–11.
  11. ^ Norman, B. (1973). Secret warfare : the battle of codes and ciphers. David & Charles, Newton Abbot, p. 62.
  12. ^ McMeekin, S. (2011) The Russian Origins of the First World War. Harvard University Press, p. 67.
  13. ^ Showalter, 1991, pp. 91–94.
  14. ^ Showalter, 1991, p. 195
  15. ^ Showalter, 1991, p. 196.
  16. ^ Lincoln, W. B., (1986) Passage through Armageddon. The Russians in war & revolution 1914-1918. Simon & Schuster, pp. 72–73.
  17. ^ Golovine, Nicholas N. (1931). The Russian army in the World War. Oxford University Press.
  18. ^ Hindenburg, P. von, (1921) Out of my life, Harper, vol. 1, p. 109.
  19. ^ Showalter, 1991 pp. 106–23
  20. ^ Schlieffen, Alfred, Graf von (1925). Cannae. Berlin: E. S. Mittler.
  21. ^ Lincoln, 1986, p. 73.
  22. ^ Showalter, 1991, p. 238
  23. ^ Asprey, R. B.(1991) The German High Command at War; Hindenburg and Ludendorff conduct World War I. London: William Morrow, p. 74.
  24. ^ Egremont, Max, (2011) Forgotten land : journeys among the ghosts of East Prussia. London: Picador.
  25. ^ Showalter, 1991, p. 233.
  26. ^ Asbury, 1991, p. 78.
  27. ^ Showalter, 1991, p. 263.
  28. ^ Hoffmann, General Max (1999) [1924]. The war of lost opportunities. Nashville, Tennessee: Battery Press. p. 34.
  29. ^ Hindenburg, 1921, p. 117
  30. ^ Gourko, General Basil, (1918) Memories & Impressions of war and revolution in Russia, 1914–1917. London: John Murray.
  31. ^ Showalter 1991, p. 291.
  32. ^ Stevenson 2004, p. 68
  33. ^ Hindenburg, 1921, vol. 1, p. 114.
  34. ^ "Battle of Tannenberg - Summary". britannica.com.
  35. ^ Hastings, Max, (2013) Catastrophe: Europe goes to war 1914. London: William Collins, 2013; p. 281.
  36. ^ Showalter, 1991, p. 323.
  37. ^ Gray, Randall; Argyle, Christopher (1990). Chronicle of the First World War. New York: Oxford. p. vol. I 282.
  38. ^ Stevenson 2004, p. 69
  39. ^ Ironside, Major General Sir E. (1925). Tannenberg: The First Thirty Days in East Prussia. W. Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh. 195.
  40. ^ Bohon, J.W.(1996) “Zhilinsky” in The European Powers in the First World War, ed, Tucker, S.C., Garland, New York, p. 768.
  41. ^ Ludendorff, 1919, p. 59.
  42. ^ Showalter, 1991, p. 241.
  43. ^ Papen, F. von. (1952). Memoirs. London: A. Deutsch, p. 177.
  44. ^ "A Monument to German Pride: A history of the Tannenberg Memorial". buffalo.edu. Archived from the original on 29 February 2012. Retrieved 29 February 2012.

Further reading

  • Clark, Christopher (2006), Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Fall of Prussia, 1600—1947, Cambridge, ISBN 978-0-674-02385-7
  • Durschmied, Erik (2000), "10", The hinge factor: how chance and stupidity have changed history, Arcade, ISBN 978-1-55970-515-8
  • Harrison, Richard W. (1991), "Samsonow and the Battle of Tannenberg, 1914", in Bond, Brian, Fallen Stars. Eleven Studies of Twentieth Century Military Disaster, London: Brassey's, pp. 13–31, ISBN 978-0-08-040717-3
  • Haufler, Hervie (2003), Codebreakers' Victory: How the Allied Cryptographers Won World War II, New York: New American Library, p. 10, ISBN 978-0-451-20979-5
  • Jaques, Tony (2007), Dictionary of Battles and Sieges: A–E, Greenwood, ISBN 978-0-313-33537-2
  • Showalter, Dennis E (1991), Tannenberg: Clash of Empires, 1914 (2004 ed.), Brassey's, ISBN 978-1-57488-781-5
  • Stevenson, David (2004), 1914—1918: The History of the First World War, Penguin Books Ltd, ISBN 978-0-14-026817-1
  • Stone, David (2015). The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914–1917. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 9780700620951.
  • Strachan, Hew (2001), The First World War, Oxford: Oxford, ISBN 978-0-19-926191-8
  • Sweetman, John (2004), Tannenberg 1914 (1st ed.), London: Cassell, ISBN 978-0-304-35635-5
  • Tuchman, Barbara Wertheim (1994), The Guns of August, New York: Ballantine Books, ISBN 978-0-345-47609-8
  • Hastings, Max(2013), Catastrophe 1914: Europe Goes to War. London, Knopf Press, Release Date 24 September 2013, ISBN 978-0307597052
  • Martin van Creveld(2004), Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton,Cambridge University Press,ISBN 978-0521837446
1st Army Corps (Russian Empire)

The 1st Army Corps (Russian: 1-й армейский корпус) was a formation in the Imperial Russian Army, formed in the 1870s. It took part in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877—78, and later, in August 1914, the 1st Army Corps fought as part of the Second Army in the Battle of Tannenberg. There, it was defeated by the Germans along with the rest of the Second Army. During the rest of World War I, it took part in other operations, up until around 1918.

2nd Army (Russian Empire)

The Russian 2nd Army (2-я армия, 2А) was an army-level command of the Imperial Russian Army in World War I. It was formed just prior to the outbreak of hostilities from the units of Warsaw Military District and was mobilized in August 1914. The army was effectively destroyed at Battle of Tannenberg in August 1914. However, it was rebuilt soon thereafter and fought until almost the end of the war.

2nd Army Corps (Russian Empire)

The 2nd Army Corps (Russian: 2-й армейский корпус) was a formation in the Imperial Russian Army that was active during World War I. It was headquartered in Grodno prior to the outbreak of the war, and took part in the Battle of Tannenberg in August 1914.

36th Reserve Division (German Empire)

The 36th Reserve Division (36. Reserve-Division) was a unit of the Imperial German Army, in World War I. The division was formed on the mobilization of the German Army in August 1914 and was disbanded during the demobilization of the German Army after World War I. The division was a reserve division of the I Reserve Corps and was raised primarily in Pomerania Province and West Prussia Province.

August 1914 (novel)

August 1914 is a Russian novel by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn about the defeat of the Imperial Russian Army at the Battle of Tannenberg in East Prussia. The novel was completed in 1970, first published in 1971, with an English translation the following year. The novel is an unusual blend of fiction narrative and historiography, and has given rise to extensive and often bitter controversy, both from the literary as well as from the historical point of view.

Some episodes of the book had caused in accusations of the author in anti-Semitism, mostly rebutted at the time, but these were renewed later, regarding Two Hundred Years Together (see the article about the latter for details).

Battle of Grunwald

The Battle of Grunwald, First Battle of Tannenberg or Battle of Žalgiris, was fought on 15 July 1410 during the Polish–Lithuanian–Teutonic War. The alliance of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, led respectively by King Władysław II Jagiełło (Jogaila) and Grand Duke Vytautas, decisively defeated the German–Prussian Teutonic Knights, led by Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen. Most of the Teutonic Knights' leadership were killed or taken prisoner. Although defeated, the Teutonic Knights withstood the siege of their fortress in Marienburg (Malbork) and suffered minimal territorial losses at the Peace of Thorn (1411) (Toruń), with other territorial disputes continuing until the Peace of Melno in 1422. The knights, however, would never recover their former power, and the financial burden of war reparations caused internal conflicts and an economic downturn in the lands under their control. The battle shifted the balance of power in Central and Eastern Europe and marked the rise of the Polish–Lithuanian union as the dominant political and military force in the region.The battle was one of the largest in medieval Europe and is regarded as one of the most important victories in the histories of Poland and Lithuania and is also widely celebrated in Belarus. It has been used as a source of romantic legends and national pride, becoming a larger symbol of struggle against foreign invaders. During the 20th century the battle was used in Nazi and Soviet propaganda campaigns. Only in recent decades have historians moved towards a dispassionate, scholarly assessment of the battle, reconciling the previous narratives, which differed widely by nation.

Battle of Narva (1944)

The Battle of Narva was a military campaign between the German Army Detachment "Narwa" and the Soviet Leningrad Front fought for possession of the strategically important Narva Isthmus on 2 February – 10 August 1944 during World War II.

The campaign took place in the northern section of the Eastern Front and consisted of two major phases: the Battle for Narva Bridgehead (February to July 1944) and the Battle of Tannenberg Line (July–August 1944). The Soviet Kingisepp–Gdov Offensive and Narva Offensives (15–28 February, 1–4 March and 18–24 March) were part of the Red Army Winter Spring Campaign of 1944. Following Joseph Stalin's "Broad Front" strategy, these battles coincided with the Dnieper–Carpathian Offensive (December 1943 – April 1944) and the Lvov–Sandomierz Offensive (July–August 1944). A number of foreign volunteers and local Estonian conscripts participated in the battle as part of the German forces. By giving its support to the illegal German conscription call, the underground National Committee of the Republic of Estonia had hoped to recreate a national army and restore the independence of the country.As a continuation of the Leningrad–Novgorod Offensive of January 1944, the Soviet Estonian operation pushed the front westward to the Narva River, aiming to destroy "Narwa" and to thrust deep into Estonia. The Soviet units established a number of bridgeheads on the western bank of the river in February while the Germans maintained a bridgehead on the eastern bank. Subsequent attempts failed to expand their toehold. German counterattacks annihilated the bridgeheads to the north of Narva and reduced the bridgehead south of the town, stabilizing the front until July 1944. The Soviet Narva Offensive (July 1944) led to the capture of the city after the German troops retreated to their prepared Tannenberg Defence Line in the Sinimäed Hills 16 kilometres from Narva. In the ensuing Battle of Tannenberg Line, the German army group held its ground. Stalin's main strategic goal—a quick recovery of Estonia as a base for air and seaborne attacks against Finland and an invasion of East Prussia—was not achieved. As a result of the tough defence of the German forces the Soviet war effort in the Baltic Sea region was hampered for seven and a half months.

Battle of Tannenberg Line

This is a sub-article to Battle of Narva (1944).

The Battle of Tannenberg Line (German: Die Schlacht um die Tannenbergstellung; Russian: Битва за линию «Танненберг») or the Battle of the Blue Hills (Estonian: Sinimägede lahing) was a military engagement between the German Army Detachment Narwa and the Soviet Leningrad Front. They fought for the strategically important Narva Isthmus from 25 July–10 August 1944. The battle was fought on the Eastern Front during World War II. The strategic aim of the Soviet Estonian Operation was to reoccupy Estonia as a favorable base for the invasions of Finland and East Prussia. 24 volunteer infantry battalions from Denmark, East Prussia, Flanders, the Netherlands, Norway, and Wallonia participated within the Waffen-SS. Roughly half of the infantry consisted of local Estonian conscripts motivated to regain Estonian independence rather than support Nazi power. The German force of 22,250 men held off 136,830 Soviet troops. As the Soviet forces were constantly reinforced, the casualties were 170,000 dead and wounded, and 157–164 tanks.

Flags of the regions of Ukraine

The flags of the subdivisions of Ukraine exhibit a wide variety of regional influences and local histories, as well as widely different styles and design principles. Most local flags were designed and adopted after 1991.

Frygnowo

Frygnowo [frɨɡˈnɔvɔ] (German: Frögenau) is a village in the administrative district of Gmina Grunwald, within Ostróda County, Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship, in northern Poland. It lies approximately 22 kilometres (14 mi) south of Ostróda and 41 km (25 mi) south-west of the regional capital Olsztyn. The village has a population of 1,000.

In 1914 the fields around the village were the main battlefield of the Battle of Tannenberg, which was eventually named after the nearby village of Tannenberg (Stębark), whence the final victory note was dispatched by the German commanders.

Before 1945 the area was part of Germany (East Prussia).

Grunwald, Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship

Grunwald [ˈɡrunvalt] (German: Grünfelde, green field; Lithuanian: Žalgiris) is a village in the administrative district of Gmina Grunwald, within Ostróda County, Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship, in northern Poland. It lies approximately 26 kilometres (16 mi) south of Ostróda and 43 km (27 mi) south-west of the regional capital Olsztyn. The village has a population of 800.

After the Battle of Grunwald (also known as Battle of Tannenberg (1410)), the King of Poland, Jogaila, intended to erect a chapel on the battlefield near Grünfelde at "loco conflictus nostri ... dicto Grunenvelt". As he did win the battle, but not the war, the battle site remained under the control of the Teutonic Order, and they built a chapel dedicated to Mary instead. The chronicler Longinus later wrongly reported the name as Grunwald (which would mean green wood in German), and that name was used in Polish historiography. In the Lithuanian historiography the battle is known as Žalgirio mūšis or Battle of Žalgiris.

In 1945, Grünfelde (German name) was taken over by Poland. A museum and memorial site are located in the fields where the battle was fought, roughly in the middle of a triangle, with Stębark (Tannenberg) and Łodwigowo (Ludwigsdorf).

Kiur Aarma

Kiur Aarma (born June 25, 1975) is an Estonian television journalist. He graduated from the University of Tartu in 1997. Aarma is also a writer and producer; among the films upon which he has worked is 2006's Sinimäed, a documentary about the Battle of Tannenberg Line, which he produced and helped write.

Olsztynek

Olsztynek [ɔlʂˈtɨnɛk] (German: Hohenstein in Ostpreußen) is a town in Olsztyn County, in Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship of Poland. It is the administrative seat of Gmina Olsztynek.

Sinimäed Hills

The Sinimäed Hills (or Blue Hills; Estonian: Vaivara Sinimäed) are three linked hills in northeastern Estonia. The heights which are aligned west-east, consist of Tornimägi, Põrguaugu mägi (also known as Grenadierimägi) and Pargimägi (also known as Lastekodumägi). They lie in Narva-Jõesuu municipality near the coastal town of Sillamäe in Ida-Viru County.

The hills are best known as the location of the Battle of Tannenberg Line, fought in World War II on July 26–August 12, 1944. There, the Waffen-SS defeated a Soviet offensive against Germany.

Stębark

Stębark [ˈstɛmbark] (German: Tannenberg) is a village in the administrative district of Gmina Grunwald, within Ostróda County, Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship, in northern Poland. The village is chiefly known for two historic battles which took place there: the 1410 Battle of Grunwald and the (Second) Battle of Tannenberg in World War I.

Tannenberg

Tannenberg may refer to

Tannenberg, Saxony, a town in the district of Annaberg in the German state of Saxony

Tannenberg, East Prussia, modern Stębark in the Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship, Poland

Battle of Tannenberg (1410) or Battle of Grunwald

Battle of Tannenberg (1914) in World War I

Battle of Tannenberg Line in World War II, fought in 1944 in Estonia

Tannenberg Memorial, commemorating the World War I battle

Operation Tannenberg, codename of an extermination action directed at the Polish people during World War II

Tannenbergbund, a far right German political society founded by the German Army general Erich Ludendorff in 1925

Tannenberg (minelayer), a World War II era German minelayer converted from civilian vessel, see List of World War II ships

Tannenberg (film), a 1932 Swiss-German War film

Tannenberg (video game), a first-person shooter released in November 2017 for Microsoft Windows, OS X and Linux

David Tannenberg, a Moravian organ builder

Führerhauptquartier Tannenberg, a Führer Headquarters

Tannenberg (film)

Tannenberg is a 1932 Swiss–German war film directed by Heinz Paul and starring Hans Stüwe, Käthe Haack and Jutta Sauer. The film is based on the 1914 Battle of Tannenberg during the First World War. It focuses on a German landowner Captan von Arndt and his family.

Tannenberg Memorial

The Tannenberg Memorial was a monument to the German soldiers of the Battle of Tannenberg (1914), the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes and the medieval Battle of Tannenberg (1410). The victorious German commander, Generalfeldmarschall Paul von Hindenburg, became a national hero, and was later elected Reichspräsident.

Dedicated by Hindenburg on the 10th anniversary of the Battle of Tannenberg in 1924 near Hohenstein (Ostpreußen) (now Olsztynek, Poland), the structure, which was financed by donations, was built by the architects Johannes and Walter Krüger of Berlin and completed in 1927. The octagonal layout with eight towers, each 20 metres high, was influenced by Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II's Castel del Monte and Stonehenge.When Reichspräsident Hindenburg died in 1934, his coffin and that of his wife, who had died in 1921, were placed there despite his wishes to be buried at his family plot in Hanover. Adolf Hitler ordered the monument to be redesigned and renamed "Reichsehrenmal Tannenberg". As the Red Army approached in 1945, German troops removed Hindenburg's remains and partly demolished key structures. In 1949, Polish authorities razed the site, leaving few traces.

The Blue Hills

The Blue Hills (Estonian: Sinimäed) is a 2006 Estonian film directed by Raimo Jõerand. It is a documentary film about the 1944 Battle of Tannenberg Line. Based upon the war diaries of Paul Maitla, the film tells the story of the battle and the young Estonian men who had to choose between two totalitarian powers. The film received special mention at the 10th Tallinn Black Nights Film Festival.

This page is based on a Wikipedia article written by authors (here).
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 3.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.