A bailout is a colloquial term for the provision of financial help to a corporation or country which otherwise would be on the brink of failure or bankruptcy.
The term is maritime in origin and describes the act of removing water from a sinking vessel using a bucket. A bailout differs from the term bail-in (coined in 2010) under which the bondholders and/or depositors of global systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs) are forced to participate in the recapitalization process, but taxpayers are not. Some governments also have the power to participate in the insolvency process: for instance, the U.S. government intervened in the General Motors bailout of 2009–2013. A bailout can, but does not necessarily, avoid an insolvency process.
A bailout could be done for profit motives, as when a new investor resurrects a floundering company by buying its shares at fire-sale prices or for social objectives, as when, hypothetically speaking, a wealthy philanthropist reinvents an unprofitable fast food company into a non-profit food distribution network. But the common use of the phrase occurs where government resources are used to support a failing company typically in order to prevent a greater problem or financial contagion to other parts of the economy. For example, the U.S. government assumes transportation to be critical to America's general economic prosperity. As such, it has sometimes been the policy of the U.S. government to protect major American companies responsible for transportation (aircraft manufacturers, train companies automobile companies, etc.) from failure through subsidies and low-interest loans. These companies, among others, are deemed "too big to fail" because their goods and services are considered by the government to be constant universal necessities in maintaining the nation's welfare and often, indirectly, its security.
Emergency-type government bailouts can be controversial. Debates raged in 2008 over if and how to bail out the failing auto industry in the United States. Those against it, like pro-free market radio personality Hugh Hewitt, saw this bailout as unacceptable to him. He argued that the companies should be dismantled organically by the free-market forces so that entrepreneurs may arise from the ashes; that the bailout signals lower business standards for giant companies by incentivizing risk, creating moral hazard through the assurance of safety nets that ought not be, but unfortunately are, considered in business equations; and that a bailout promotes centralized bureaucracy by allowing government powers to choose the terms of the bailout. Furthermore, government bailouts are criticized as corporate welfare, which encourages corporate irresponsibility.
Others, such as economist Jeffrey Sachs have characterized this particular bailout as a necessary evil and have argued that the probable incompetence in management of the car companies is an insufficient reason to let them fail completely and risk disturbing the (current) delicate economic state of the United States, since up to three million jobs rest on the solvency of the Big Three and things are bleak enough as it is.Randall D. Guynn noted similar arguments for the financial bailouts of 2008, explaining that most policymakers considered bailouts to be the lesser of two evils given the lack of effective resolution options at that time.
In the Financial crisis of 2007-2008, large amounts of government support were used to protect the financial system, and many of these actions were attacked as bail-outs. Over $1 trillion of government support was deployed in this period and “voters were furious”. The U.S. TARP program authorized up to $700bn of government support of which $426bn was invested in banks, American International Group, automakers, and other assets. The program saved the affected industries and returned a profit to the U.S. Treasury of $441bn from these investments. In the United Kingdom, the bank rescue package was even larger, totaling some GBP 500bn. Controversial bail-outs occurred in other countries as well, such as Germany (the SoFFin rescue fund), Switzerland (the rescue of UBS), Ireland (the “blanket guarantee” of Irish domestic banks issued in September 2008)"Bank Guarantee Scheme". NTMA.</ref>, and several other countries across Europe.
A bail-in is the opposite of a bail-out because it does not rely on external parties, especially government capital support. Bail-in creates new capital to rescue a failing firm through an internal recapitalization. It forces the borrower's creditors to bear the burden, by having part of the debt they are owed written off or converted into equity.(For example in the case of the Cyprus banks in 2013, the creditors in question were bondholders, and depositors with more than €100,000 in their accounts.)
This bail-in tool was first proposed publicly in an Economist Op-Ed “From Bail-out to Bail-in” in January 2010, by Paul Calello and Wilson Ervin. It was described as a new alternative between “taxpayer bail-outs (bad) and systemic financial collapse (probably worse).” It envisioned a high-speed recapitalization financed by “bailing-in’ (i.e. converting) bondholder debt into fresh equity. The new capital would absorb losses and provide new capital to support critical activities, thereby avoiding a sudden disorderly collapse or fire sale, as seen in the Lehman failure. Management would be fired and shareholders would displaced by the bailed-in bondholders, but the franchise, employees and core services could continue, supported by the newly converted capital.
At around the same time, the Bank of England was developing similar architecture, given the pressing need for a better tool to handle failing banks in the wake of the financial crisis. The first official discussion of bail-in was set out in a speech by Paul Tucker, who chaired the Financial Stability Board (FSB) Working Group on Cross Border Crisis Management, and was also deputy governor for Financial Stability at the Bank of England. In March 2010, Tucker began to outline the properties of a new ‘bail-in’ strategy to handle the failure of a large bank:
“A quite different, and rather more profound approach would be to deploy a super special resolution framework that permitted the authorities, on a rapid timetable, to haircut uninsured creditors in a going concern.”
By October 2011, the FSB Working Group had developed this thinking considerably and published the “Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions". This document set out core principles to be adopted by all participating jurisdictions, including the legal and operational capability for such a super special resolution regime (now known as ‘bail-in’).
The scope of the planned resolution regime was not just limited to large domestic banks. In addition to these "systemically significant or critical" financial institutions, the scope also applies to two further categories of institutions, a) Global SIFIs, in other words, cross-border banks which happen to be incorporated domestically in a country that is implementing the bail-in regime, and b) "Financial Market Infrastructures (FMIs)", such as clearing houses. The inclusion of FMIs in potential bail-ins is in itself a major departure. The FSB defines these market infrastructures to include multilateral securities and derivatives clearing and settlement systems, and a whole host of exchange and transaction systems, such as payment systems, central securities depositories, and trade depositories. This would mean that an unsecured creditor claim to, for example, a clearing house institution, or to a stock exchange, could in theory be affected if such an institution needed to be bailed-in.
Outgoing Deputy Director of the Bank of England Paul Tucker chose to open his academic career at Harvard with an October 2013 address in Washington to the Institute of International Finance in which he argued that resolution had advanced enough in several countries that bail-outs would not be required, and henceforward would be bailed-in., notably the U.S. G-SIBs. Although they were still large, they were no longer too big to fail given the improvements in resolution technology.
In a similar vein, a GAO report in 2014 determined that the market expectation of bail-out for the largest “too big to fail” banks had been largely eliminated by the reforms. This was determined by various methods, especially by comparing the funding cost of the biggest banks with smaller banks that are subject to ordinary FDIC resolution. This differential, which had been large in the crisis, had been reduced to roughly zero by the advance of reform, although the GAO also cautioned that these results should be interpreted with caution.
In Europe, the EU financial community symposium on the "Future of Banking in Europe" (December 2013) was attended by Irish Finance Minister Michael Noonan, who proposed a bail-in scheme in light of the banking union that was under discussion at the event. Deputy BoE Director Jon Cunliffe suggested in a March 2014 speech at Chatham House that the domestic banks were too big to fail (TBTF), but instead of the nationalisation process used in the case of HBOS, RBS and threatened for Barclays (all in late 2008), these banks could henceforth be bailed-in.
A form of bail-in was used in small Danish institutions (such as Amagerbanken) as early as 2011, as well as the later conversion of junior debt at the Dutch Bank SNS REALL. However, the process did not receive extensive global attention until the bail-in of the main banks of Cyprus during 2013, which is discussed below. The restructuring of the “Co-op” bank in the UK (2013) has been described as a voluntary or negotiated bail-in.
The Dodd-Frank Act legislates bank resolution procedures for the United States under Title I and Title II. Title I refers to the preferred route, which is to resolve a bank under bankruptcy procedures aided by extensive pre-planning (i.e. a “living will”).
Title II establishes additional powers, and which can be used in the event that bankruptcy was seen to pose “serious and adverse effects on financial stability in the United States”, as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, together with a 2/3 vote of the Federal Reserve Board and 2/3 of the FDIC board. Like Title 1, it would force shareholders and creditors to bear the losses of the failed financial company, "removing management that was responsible for the financial condition of the company". The procedures also establish certain protections for creditors, in particular setting a requirement that the payout to claimants is at least as much as the claimants would have received under a bankruptcy liquidation.
The FDIC has drawn attention to the problem of post-resolution governance, and suggested that a new CEO and Board of Directors should be installed under FDIC receivership guidance.
Claims are paid in the following order (and any deficit to the government must be recouped by assessments on the financial industry):
A number of strategies were explored early on to determine how Title 1 and Title 2 powers could be best used to resolve a large failing bank, including “Purchase and Assumption” and “Loss Sharing”. Over time, the preferred approach evolved to a bail-in strategy which is more direct as it does not require an acquisition party. This approach was developed under the FDIC Office of Complex Financial Institutions group led by James R. Wigand. The approach is described in a slide deck from January 2012, as well as in congressional testimony.
The specific strategy for implementing bail-in under the Dodd Frank Act requirements has been described as the “Single Point of Entry mechanism”. This innovative FDIC strategy was described by Federal Reserve Governor Jerome Powell as a “classic simplifier, making theoretically possible something that seemed impossibly complex.” It created a relatively simple path by which bail-in could be implemented under the existing Dodd-Frank powers. Powell explained:
“Under single point of entry, the FDIC will be appointed receiver of only the top-tier parent holding company of the failed financial group. Promptly after the parent holding company is placed into receivership, the FDIC will transfer the assets of the parent company (primarily its investments in subsidiaries) to a bridge holding company. Equity claims of the failed parent company's shareholders will be wiped out, and claims of its unsecured debt holders will be written down as necessary to reflect any losses in the receivership that the shareholders cannot cover. To capitalize the bridge holding company and the operating subsidiaries, and to permit transfer of ownership and control of the bridge company back to private hands, the FDIC will exchange the remaining claims of unsecured creditors of the parent for equity and/or debt claims of the bridge company. If necessary, the FDIC would provide temporary liquidity to the bridge company until the "bail-in" of the failed parent company's creditors can be accomplished.”
A comprehensive overview of this strategy is available in the Bipartisan Policy Center report “Too Big to Fail: The Path to a Solution”.
The Eurogroup proposed on 27 June 2013 that after 2018 bank shareholders will be first in line for assuming the losses of a failed bank before bondholders and certain large depositors. Insured deposits under £85,000 (€100,000) are exempt and, with specific exemptions, uninsured deposits of individuals and small companies are given preferred status in the bail-in pecking order for taking losses. This agreement formalised the practice seen earlier in Cyprus. Under this proposal, all unsecured bondholders must be hit for losses before a bank can eligible to receive capital injections directly from the European Stability Mechanism. A tool known as the Single Resolution Mechanism, which was agreed amongst Eurogroup members on 20 March 2014, is part of an EU effort to prevent future financial crises by pooling responsibility for euro-area banks, a project known as banking union. In a first step, the ECB will fully assume supervision of the 18-nation currency bloc's lenders in November 2014. The deal needed formal approval by the European Parliament and by national governments. The resolution fund was to be paid for by the banks themselves, and will gradually merge national resolution funds into a common European one until it hits its €55 billion target funding level. See the EC FAQ on the SRM. The legislative item was split into three initiatives by Internal Market and Services Commissioner Michel Barnier: BRRD, DGS and SRM.
A form of bail-in was used in small Danish institutions (such as Amagerbanken) as early as 2011. The Dutch authorities converted the junior debt of SNS REAAL in 2013 as part of a privately-funded recapitalization.
However, the difference between a bailout and a bail-in was first brought to public attention by the events of the 2012-2013 Cypriot financial crisis. Two Cypriot banks were exposed to a haircut of upwards of 50% in 2011 during the Greek government-debt crisis, leading to fears of a collapse of the Cypriot banks. Rumours circulated for a time, then in early 2013 matters came to a head. On 25 March 2013, a €10 billion bailout was announced by the Troika — a loose coalition of the European Union, European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund — in return for Cyprus agreeing to close its second largest bank, the Cyprus Popular Bank (also known as Laiki Bank). The Cypriots had to agree to levy all uninsured deposits there, and possibly around 40% of uninsured deposits in the Bank of Cyprus (the island's largest commercial bank). After an initial proposal was replaced with the final proposal, no insured deposit of €100k or less was to be affected. The levy of deposits that exceeded €100k was termed a "bail-in", to differentiate it from a government- backed bailout. The Bank of Cyprus executed the depositor bail-in on 28 April 2013.
The execution of the Cyprus event included some controversial elements, especially with respect to the initial plan which included a contribution from insured depositors, which was described as “not smart” by ECB President Draghi. This proposal was amended the following day to affect only uninsured depositors and creditors. In a broader review of the events of Cyprus, President Draghi addressed some of the criticism of this event in a press conference:
“A bail-in in itself is not a problem: it is the lack of ex ante rules known to all parties and the lack of capital buffers or other “bail-inable” assets that may make a bail-in a disorderly event. The existence of buffers of “bail-inable” assets is therefore essential. In the case of Cyprus, one peculiarity was the fact that these assets were actually quite limited by comparison with the size of the banks’ assets. Furthermore, the absence of ex ante rules gives the impression of an ad hoc approach in such situations . . .”
In recent years, considerable effort has been made to ensure that a large supply of bail-inable liabilities is in place for the largest banks. The rules for “Total Loss Absorption Capacity’ (or TLAC) in the U.S. have led the 8 U.S. G-SIFIs to issue approximately $1.0 trillion of long-term holding company liabilities that could be used for this purpose. When combined with equity and other capital securities, this establishes an aggregate TLAC of roughly $2 trillion for the 8 U.S. G-SIFIs. In the U.K., the Bank of England has set out the TLAC requirements for its largest banks (described as MREL) at between 25.2% and 29.3% of risk-weighted assets. Switzerland has imposed requirements on its 2 G-SIFIs of 28.6% of risk-weighted assets. The EU is currently debating how best to implement the FSB requirements across its banking system, and what the appropriate size of this requirement should be.
Paul Volcker, chairman of Barack Obama's White House Economic Recovery Advisory Board, said that bailouts create moral hazard: they signal to the firms that they can take reckless risks, and if the risks are realized, taxpayers pay the losses, also in the future. "The danger is the spread of moral hazard could make the next crisis much bigger".
On November 24, 2008, American Republican Congressman Ron Paul (R–TX) wrote, "In bailing out failing companies, they are confiscating money from productive members of the economy and giving it to failing ones. By sustaining companies with obsolete or unsustainable business models, the government prevents their resources from being liquidated and made available to other companies that can put them to better, more productive use. An essential element of a healthy free market is that both success and failure must be permitted to happen when they are earned. But instead with a bailout, the rewards are reversed – the proceeds from successful entities are given to failing ones. How this is supposed to be good for our economy is beyond me.... It won’t work. It can’t work.... It is obvious to most Americans that we need to reject corporate cronyism, and allow the natural regulations and incentives of the free market to pick the winners and losers in our economy, not the whims of bureaucrats and politicians."
Can impose significant costs on governments and taxpayers. In extreme cases, this can raise the country’s borrowing costs or even bankrupt the country, as in the Ireland bailout of 2008. The IMF said that: “the failure to bail-in unsecured creditors to a bank rescue that cost Irish taxpayers E64 bn and bankrupted the country was based on the view that doing so would have serious adverse “spillover” effects in other eurozone countries, even though such risks were “not obvious”. In the 2012 eurozone crisis, other countries such as Italy were affected by a so-called “doom loop” which increased the cost of government borrowing because bailouts can “torpedo state finances if banks need to be bailed out”.
Governments and, thus ultimately taxpayers, have largely shouldered the direct costs of banking system collapses. These costs have been large: in our sample of 40 countries governments spent on average 12.8 percent of national GDP to clean up their financial systems.
The Irish banking crisis of 2008 has similarities to other banking crisis, but it was unique in that it was the first banking crisis in a country that was a member of the Eurozone. Because of this the Irish government and central bank faced unique constraints when the crisis struck. The Post-2008 Irish economic downturn was also unusually steep. The impact on Irish government credit was so severe that it was forced to seek assistance from the European Union and the IMF.
During 1991–1992, a housing bubble in Sweden deflated, resulting in a severe credit crunch and widespread bank insolvency. The causes were similar to those of the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007–2008. In response, the government took the following actions:
This bailout initially cost about 4% of Sweden's GDP, later lowered to between 0–2% of GDP depending on various assumptions due to the value of stock later sold when the nationalized banks were privatized.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, over 1000 thrift institutions failed as part of the savings and loan crisis. In response, the United States established the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) in 1989; the cost of this bailout was estimated at $132.1bn to taxpayers.
In 2008–09 the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve System bailed out numerous very large banks and insurance companies, as well as General Motors and Chrysler. Congress at the urgent request of President George W. Bush passed the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), authorized at $700 billion. The bank sectors has repaid the money and the net cost of TARP has actually returned a modest profit to taxpayers over time. The (separate) bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which insure mortgages, totaled $135 billion by October 2010.