American imperialism

American imperialism is the term, often pejorative, for a policy aimed at extending the political, economic, and cultural control of the United States government over areas beyond its boundaries. Depending on the commentator, it may include military conquest, gunboat diplomacy, unequal treaties, subsidization of preferred factions, economic penetration through private companies followed by intervention when those interests are threatened, or regime change.[4]

The US is generally agreed to have had a policy of formal imperialism in the late 19th century.[5] The government of the US does not refer to itself as an empire today, but some commentators refer to it that as such, including mainstream Western writers such as Max Boot, Arthur Schlesinger, and Niall Ferguson.[6]

The United States has also been accused of neocolonialism, sometimes defined as a modern form of hegemony that uses economic rather than military power, and sometimes used as a synonym for contemporary imperialism.

US military bases in the world 2007
U.S. military presence around the world in 2007. As of 2013, the U.S. still had many bases and troops stationed globally.[1] Their presence has generated controversy and opposition by some in foreign countries.[2][3]
  More than 1,000 U.S. troops
  100–1,000 U.S. troops
  Use of military facilities

History

Overview

Despite periods of peaceful co-existence, wars with Native Americans resulted in substantial territorial gains for colonists from the United Kingdom. Wars continued intermittently after independence, and an ethnic cleansing campaign known as Indian removal gained for ethnically European settlers more valuable territory on the eastern side of the continent.

George Washington began a tradition of United States non-interventionism which lasted into the 1800s. The United States protected the Americas against European colonial powers under the Monroe Doctrine in 1821, but desire for territorial expansion to the Pacific Ocean was explicit in the doctrine of Manifest Destiny. The giant Louisiana Purchase was peaceful, but the Mexican–American War of 1846 resulted in the annexation of 525,000 square miles of Mexican territory.[7][8] Elements attempted to expand pro-U.S. republics or U.S. states in Mexico and Central America, the most notable being filibuster William Walker's Republic of Baja California in 1853 and his intervention in Nicaragua in 1855. Senator Sam Houston of Texas even proposed a resolution in the Senate for the "United States to declare and maintain an efficient protectorate over the States of Mexico, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and San Salvador." The idea of U.S. expansion into Mexico and the Caribbean was popular among politicians of the slave states, and also among some business tycoons in the Nicarauguan Transit (the semi-overland and main trade route connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans before the Panama Canal). President Ulysses S. Grant attempted to Annex the Dominican Republic in 1870, but failed to get the support of the Senate.

Non-interventionism was wholly abandoned with the Spanish–American War, the United States acquired the remaining island colonies of Spain, with imperialist Theodore Roosevelt defending the permanent acquisition of the Philippines. The U.S. policed Latin America under Roosevelt Corollary, and sometimes using the military to favor American commercial interests (such as intervention in the banana republics and the annexation of Hawaii). Imperialist foreign policy was controversial with the American public, and domestic opposition allowed Cuban independence, though in the early 20th century the U.S. obtained the Panama Canal Zone and occupied Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The United States returned to strong non-interventionist policy after World War I, including with the Good Neighbor policy for Latin America. After fighting World War II, it administered many Pacific islands captured during the fight against Japan. Partly to prevent the militaries of those countries from growing threateningly large, and partly to contain the Soviet Union, the United States has promised to defend Germany (which is also part of NATO) and Japan (through the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan) which it had formerly defeated in war and which are now independent democracies. It maintains substantial military bases in both. The Cold War reoriented American foreign policy to focus on opposing Soviet communism, and prevailing U.S. foreign policy embraced its role as a nuclear-armed global superpower. Though the Truman Doctrine framed the mission as protecting free peoples against an undemocratic system, under later presidents and the Reagan Doctrine anti-Soviet foreign policy became more coercive and occasionally covert. United States involvement in regime change included overthrowing the democratically elected government of Iran, the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba, occupation of Grenada, and interference in various foreign elections.

Many saw the post-Cold War 1990–91 Gulf War as motivated by U.S. oil interests, even though it reversed the hostile invasion of Kuwait and protected treaty ally Saudi Arabia. After the September 11 attacks in 2001, questions of imperialism were raised again as the United States invaded Afghanistan (which harbored the attackers) and Iraq (which the U.S. mostly incorrectly claimed had weapons of mass destruction), and installed friendly governments.

In terms of territorial acquisition, the United States has integrated with full democratic voting rights, all of its acquisitions on the North American continent, including the non-contiguous Alaska. Hawaii has also become a state with equal representation to the mainland, but other island jurisdictions acquired during wartime remain territories, namely Guam, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands. The remainder of acquired territories have become independent with varying degrees of cooperation, ranging from three freely associated states which enjoy participation in federal government programs in exchange for military basing rights, to Cuba which became outright hostile during the Cold War. The United States was a strong advocate for European decolonization after World War II, having started a ten-year independence transition for the Philippines in 1934 with the Tydings–McDuffie Act. The United States has also granted citizenship to Native Americans and recognizes some degree of tribal sovereignty.

Indian Wars and Manifest Destiny

School Begins (Puck Magazine 1-25-1899)
Caricature showing Uncle Sam lecturing four children labelled Philippines, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and Cuba, in front of children holding books labelled with various U.S. states. A black boy is washing windows, a Native American sits separate from the class, and a Chinese boy is outside the door. The caption reads: "School Begins. Uncle Sam (to his new class in Civilization): Now, children, you've got to learn these lessons whether you want to or not! But just take a look at the class ahead of you, and remember that, in a little while, you will feel as glad to be here as they are!"

Thomas Jefferson, in the 1790s, awaited the fall of the Spanish Empire "until our population can be sufficiently advanced to gain it from them piece by piece".[9][10] In turn, historian Sidney Lens notes that "the urge for expansion – at the expense of other peoples – goes back to the beginnings of the United States itself".[7] Yale historian Paul Kennedy put it, "From the time the first settlers arrived in Virginia from England and started moving westward, this was an imperial nation, a conquering nation."[11] Detailing George Washington's description of the early United States as an "infant empire",[12] Benjamin Franklin's writing that "the Prince that acquires new Territory ... removes the Natives to give his own People Room ... may be properly called [Father] of [his] Nation",[13] and Thomas Jefferson's statement that the United States "must be viewed as the nest from which all America, North & South is to be peopled",[14] Noam Chomsky said that "the United States is the one country that exists, as far as I know, and ever has, that was founded as an empire explicitly".[15][16]

A national drive for territorial acquisition across the continent was popularized in the 19th century as the ideology of Manifest Destiny. It came to be realized with the Mexican–American War of 1846, which resulted in the annexation of 525,000 square miles of Mexican territory, stretching up to the Pacific coast.[7][8]

President James Monroe presented his famous doctrine for the western hemisphere in 1823. Historians have observed that while the Monroe Doctrine contained a commitment to resist colonialism from Europe, it had some aggressive implications for American policy, since there were no limitations on the US's own actions mentioned within it. Scholar Jay Sexton notes that the tactics used to implement the doctrine were "modeled after those employed by British imperialists" in their territorial competition with Spain and France.[17] Eminent historian William Appleman Williams dryly described it as "imperial anti-colonialism." [18]

The Indian Wars against the indigenous population began in the British era. Their escalation under the federal republic allowed the US to dominate North America and carve out the 48 continental states. This is now understood to be an explicitly colonial process, as the Native American nations were usually recognized as sovereign entities prior to annexation. Their sovereignty was systematically undermined by US state policy (usually involving unequal or broken treaties) and white settler-colonialism.[19] The climax of this process was the California genocide.[20][21]

New Imperialism and "The White Man's Burden"

Victor Gillam A Thing Well Begun Is Half Done 1899 Cornell CUL PJM 1136 01
This cartoon reflects the view of Judge magazine regarding America's imperial ambitions following a quick victory in the Spanish–American War of 1898.[22] The American flag flies from the Philippines and Hawaii in the Pacific to Cuba and Puerto Rico in the Caribbean.

A variety of factors converged during the "New Imperialism" of the late 19th century, when the United States and the other great powers rapidly expanded their overseas territorial possessions. Some of these are explained, or used as examples for the various forms of New Imperialism.

  • The prevalence of overt racism, notably John Fiske's conception of Anglo-Saxon racial superiority, and Josiah Strong's call to "civilize and Christianize"—all manifestations of a growing Social Darwinism and racism in some schools of American political thought.[23]
  • Early in his career, as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt was instrumental in preparing the Navy for the Spanish–American War[24] and was an enthusiastic proponent of testing the U.S. military in battle, at one point stating "I should welcome almost any war, for I think this country needs one".[25][26][27]

Roosevelt claimed that he rejected imperialism, but he embraced the near-identical doctrine of expansionism. When Rudyard Kipling wrote the imperialist poem "The White Man's Burden" for Roosevelt, the politician told colleagues that it was "rather poor poetry, but good sense from the expansion point of view." [28] Roosevelt was so committed to dominating Spain's former colonies that he proclaimed his own corollary to the Monroe Doctrine as justification,[29] although his ambitions extended even further, into the Far East. Scholars have documented the resemblance and collaboration between US and British military activities in the Pacific at this time.[30]

Industry and trade are two of the most prevalent motivations of imperialism. American intervention in both Latin America and Hawaii resulted in multiple industrial investments, including the popular industry of Dole bananas. If the United States was able to annex a territory, in turn they were granted access to the trade and capital of those territories. In 1898, Senator Albert Beveridge proclaimed that an expansion of markets was absolutely necessary, "American factories are making more than the American people can use; American soil is producing more than they can consume. Fate has written our policy for us; the trade of the world must and shall be ours."[31][32]

Editorial cartoon about Jacob Smith's retaliation for Balangiga
One of the New York Journal's most infamous cartoons, depicting Philippine–American War General Jacob H. Smith's order "Kill Everyone over Ten," from the front page on May 5, 1902.

American rule of ceded Spanish territory was not uncontested. The Philippine Revolution had begun in August 1896 against Spain, and after the defeat of Spain in the Battle of Manila Bay, began again in earnest, culminating in the Philippine Declaration of Independence and the establishment of the First Philippine Republic. The Philippine–American War ensued, with extensive damage and death, ultimately resulting in the defeat of the Philippine Republic.[33][34][35] According to scholars such as Gavan McCormack and E. San Juan, the American counterinsurgency resulted in genocide.[36][37]

The maximum geographical extension of American direct political and military control happened in the aftermath of World War II, in the period after the surrender and occupations of Germany and Austria in May and later Japan and Korea in September 1945 and before the independence of the Philippines in July 1946.[38]

Stuart Creighton Miller says that the public's sense of innocence about Realpolitik impairs popular recognition of U.S. imperial conduct.[39] The resistance to actively occupying foreign territory has led to policies of exerting influence via other means, including governing other countries via surrogates or puppet regimes, where domestically unpopular governments survive only through U.S. support.[40]

GreaterAmericaMap
A map of "Greater America" c. 1900, including overseas territories.

The Philippines is sometimes cited as an example. After Philippine independence, the US continued to direct the country through Central Intelligence Agency operatives like Edward Lansdale. As Raymond Bonner and other historians note, Lansdale controlled the career of President Ramon Magsaysay, going so far as to physically beat him when the Philippine leader attempted to reject a speech the CIA had written for him. American agents also drugged sitting President Elpidio Quirino and prepared to assassinate Senator Claro Recto.[41][42] Prominent Filipino historian Roland G. Simbulan has called the CIA "US imperialism's clandestine apparatus in the Philippines".[43]

The U.S. retained dozens of military bases, including a few major ones. In addition, Philippine independence was qualified by legislation passed by the U.S. Congress. For example, the Bell Trade Act provided a mechanism whereby U.S. import quotas might be established on Philippine articles which "are coming, or are likely to come, into substantial competition with like articles the product of the United States". It further required U.S. citizens and corporations be granted equal access to Philippine minerals, forests, and other natural resources.[44] In hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs William L. Clayton described the law as "clearly inconsistent with the basic foreign economic policy of this country" and "clearly inconsistent with our promise to grant the Philippines genuine independence".[45]

American exceptionalism

Puck cover2
On the cover of Puck published on April 6, 1901, in the wake of gainful victory in the Spanish–American War, Columbia—the National personification of the U.S.—preens herself with an Easter bonnet in the form of a warship bearing the words "World Power" and the word "Expansion" on the smoke coming out of its stack.

American exceptionalism is the notion that the United States occupies a special niche among the nations of the world[46] in terms of its national credo, historical evolution, and political and religious institutions and origins.

Philosopher Douglas Kellner traces the identification of American exceptionalism as a distinct phenomenon back to 19th century French observer Alexis de Tocqueville, who concluded by agreeing that the U.S., uniquely, was "proceeding along a path to which no limit can be perceived".[47]

President Donald Trump has once said that he does not "like the term" American exceptionalism because he thinks it is "insulting the world". He told tea party activists in Texas that "If you're German, or you're from Japan, or you're from China, you don't want to have people saying that."[48]

As a Monthly Review editorial opines on the phenomenon, "in Britain, empire was justified as a benevolent 'white man's burden'. And in the United States, empire does not even exist; 'we' are merely protecting the causes of freedom, democracy and justice worldwide."[49]

Wilsonian intervention

American troops in Vladivostok 1918 HD-SN-99-02013.JPEG
American troops marching in Vladivostok during the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War, August 1918

When World War I broke out in Europe, President Woodrow Wilson promised American neutrality throughout the war. This promise was broken when the United States entered the war after the Zimmermann Telegram. This was "a war for empire" to control vast raw materials in Africa and other colonized areas according to the contemporary historian and civil rights leader W. E. B. Du Bois.[50] More recently historian Howard Zinn argues that Wilson entered the war in order to open international markets to surplus US production. He quotes Wilson's own declaration that

Concessions obtained by financiers must be safeguarded by ministers of state, even if the sovereignty of unwilling nations be outraged in the process... the doors of the nations which are closed must be battered down.

In a memo to Secretary of State Bryan, the president described his aim as "an open door to the world".[51] Lloyd Gardner notes that Wilson's original avoidance of world war was not motivated by anti-imperialism; his fear was that "white civilization and its domination in the world" were threatened by "the great white nations" destroying each other in endless battle.[52]

Despite President Wilson's official doctrine of moral diplomacy seeking to "make the world safe for democracy", some of his activities at the time can be viewed as imperialism to stop the advance of democracy in countries such as Haiti.[53] The United States invaded Haiti in July 1915 after having made landfall eight times previously. American rule in Haiti continued through 1942, but was initiated during World War I. The historian Mary Renda in her book, Taking Haiti, talks about the American invasion of Haiti to bring about political stability through U.S. control. The American government did not believe Haiti was ready for self-government or democracy, according to Renda. In order to bring about political stability in Haiti, the United States secured control and integrated the country into the international capitalist economy, while preventing Haiti from practicing self-governance or democracy. While Haiti had been running their own government for many years before American intervention, the U.S. government regarded Haiti as unfit for self-rule. In order to convince the American public of the justice in intervening, the United States government used paternalist propaganda, depicting the Haitian political process as uncivilized. The Haitian government would come to agree to U.S. terms, including American overseeing of the Haitian economy. This direct supervision of the Haitian economy would reinforce U.S. propaganda and further entrench the perception of Haitians being incompetent of self-governance.[54]

In World War I, the US, Britain, and Russia had been allies for seven months, from April 1917 until the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia in November. Active distrust surfaced immediately, as even before the October Revolution, British officers had been involved in the Kornilov Affair which sought to crush the Russian anti-war movement and the independent soviets.[55] Nonetheless, once the Bolsheviks took Moscow, the British began talks to try and keep them in the war effort. British diplomat Bruce Lockhart cultivated a relationship with several Soviet officials, including Leon Trotsky, and the latter approved the initial Allied military mission to secure the Eastern Front, which was collapsing in the revolutionary upheaval. Ultimately, Soviet head of state V.I. Lenin decided the Bolsheviks would settle peacefully with the Central Powers at the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. This separate peace led to Allied disdain for the Soviets, since it left the Western Allies to fight Germany without a strong Eastern partner. The British SIS, supported by US diplomat Dewitt C. Poole, sponsored an attempted coup in Moscow involving Bruce Lockhart and Sidney Reilly, which involved an attempted assassination of Lenin. The Bolsheviks proceeded to shut down the British and US embassies.[56][57]

Tensions between Russia (including its allies) and the West turned intensely ideological. Horrified by mass executions of White forces, land expropriations, and widespread repression, the Allied military expedition now assisted the anti-Bolshevik Whites in the Russian Civil War, with the British and French giving armed support to the brutal General Alexander Kolchak. Over 30,000 Western troops were deployed in Russia overall.[58] This was the first event which made Russian–American relations a matter of major, long-term concern to the leaders in each country. Some historians, including William Appleman Williams and Ronald Powaski, trace the origins of the Cold War to this conflict.[59]

Wilson launched seven armed interventions, more than any other president.[60] Looking back on the Wilson era, General Smedley Darlington Butler, a leader of the Haiti expedition and the highest-decorated Marine of that time, considered virtually all of the operations to have been economically motivated.[61] In a 1933 speech he said:

I was a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism. I suspected I was just part of a racket at the time. Now I am sure of it...I helped make Mexico, especially Tampico, safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefits of Wall Street ... Looking back on it, I feel that I could have given Al Capone a few hints. The best he could do was to operate his racket in three districts. I operated on three continents.[62]

Views of American imperialism

Go Away Little Man Charles Green Bush
1903 cartoon, "Go Away, Little Man, and Don't Bother Me", depicts President Roosevelt intimidating Colombia to acquire the Panama Canal Zone

Journalist Ashley Smith divides theories of the U.S. imperialism into 5 broad categories: (1) "liberal" theories, (2) "social-democratic" theories, (3) "Leninist" theories, (4) theories of "super-imperialism", and (5) "Hardt-and-Negri" theories.[63]

There is also a conservative, anti-interventionist view as expressed by American journalist John T. Flynn:

The enemy aggressor is always pursuing a course of larceny, murder, rapine and barbarism. We are always moving forward with high mission, a destiny imposed by the Deity to regenerate our victims, while incidentally capturing their markets; to civilise savage and senile and paranoid peoples, while blundering accidentally into their oil wells.[64]

1899BalanceCartoon
In 1899, Uncle Sam balances his new possessions which are depicted as savage children. The figures are Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Cuba, Philippines and "Ladrone Island" (Guam, largest of the Mariana Islands, which were formerly known as the Ladrones Islands).

A "social-democratic" theory says that imperialistic U.S. policies are the products of the excessive influence of certain sectors of U.S. business and government—the arms industry in alliance with military and political bureaucracies and sometimes other industries such as oil and finance, a combination often referred to as the "military–industrial complex". The complex is said to benefit from war profiteering and the looting of natural resources, often at the expense of the public interest.[65] The proposed solution is typically unceasing popular vigilance in order to apply counter-pressure.[66] Chalmers Johnson holds a version of this view.[67]

Alfred Thayer Mahan, who served as an officer in the U.S. Navy during the late 19th century, supported the notion of American imperialism in his 1890 book titled The Influence of Sea Power upon History. Mahan argued that modern industrial nations must secure foreign markets for the purpose of exchanging goods and, consequently, they must maintain a maritime force that is capable of protecting these trade routes.[68][69]

A theory of "super-imperialism" argues that imperialistic U.S. policies are not driven solely by the interests of American businesses, but also by the interests of a larger apparatus of a global alliance among the economic elite in developed countries. The argument asserts that capitalism in the Global North (Europe, the U.S., Japan, among others) has become too entangled to permit military or geopolitical conflict between these countries, and the central conflict in modern imperialism is between the Global North (also referred to as the global core) and the Global South (also referred to as the global periphery) rather than between the imperialist powers.

Empire

Raising of American flag at Iolani Palace with US Marines in the foreground (detailed)
Ceremonies during the annexation of the Republic of Hawaii, 1898

Following the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the idea of American imperialism was reexamined. In November 2001, jubilant marines hoisted an American flag over Kandahar and in a stage display referred to the moment as the third after those on San Juan Hill and Iwo Jima. All moments, writes Neil Smith, express US global ambition. "Labelled a war on terrorism, the new war represents an unprecedented quickening of the American Empire, a third chance at global power."[70]

On October 15, the cover of William Kristol's Weekly Standard carried the headline, "The Case for American Empire".[71] Rich Lowry, editor in chief of the National Review, called for "a kind of low-grade colonialism" to topple dangerous regimes beyond Afghanistan.[72] The columnist Charles Krauthammer declared that, given complete U.S. domination "culturally, economically, technologically and militarily", people were "now coming out of the closet on the word 'empire'".[11] The New York Times Sunday magazine cover for January 5, 2003, read "American Empire: Get Used To It". The phrase "American empire" appeared more than 1000 times in news stories during November 2002 – April 2003.[73] Two Harvard Historians and their French colleague observed:

Since September 11, 2001 ... if not earlier, the idea of American empire is back ... Now ... for the first time since the early Twentieth century, it has become acceptable to ask whether the United States has become or is becoming an empire in some classic sense."[74]

It used to be that only the critics of American foreign policy referred to the American empire ... In the past three or four years [2001–2004], however, a growing number of commentators have begun to use the term American empire less pejoratively, if still ambivalently, and in some cases with genuine enthusiasm.[75]

US historians have generally considered the late 19th century imperialist urge as an aberration in an otherwise smooth democratic trajectory ... Yet a century later, as the US empire engages in a new period of global expansion, Rome is once more a distant but essential mirror for American elites ... Now, with military mobilisation on an exceptional scale after September 2001, the United States is openly affirming and parading its imperial power. For the first time since the 1890s, the naked display of force is backed by explicitly imperialist discourse.[76]

In the book "Empire", Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue that "the decline of Empire has begun".[77] Hardt says the Iraq War is a classically imperialist war, and is the last gasp of a doomed strategy.[78] They expand on this, claiming that in the new era of imperialism, the classical imperialists retain a colonizing power of sorts, but the strategy shifts from military occupation of economies based on physical goods to a networked biopower based on an informational and affective economies. They go on to say that the U.S. is central to the development of this new regime of international power and sovereignty, termed "Empire", but that it is decentralized and global, and not ruled by one sovereign state: "the United States does indeed occupy a privileged position in Empire, but this privilege derives not from its similarities to the old European imperialist powers, but from its differences".[79] Hardt and Negri draw on the theories of Spinoza, Foucault, Deleuze and Italian autonomist Marxists.[80][81]

US Navy 030402-N-5362A-004 U.S. Army Sgt. Mark Phiffer stands guard duty near a burning oil well in the Rumaylah Oil Fields in Southern Iraq
A U.S. soldier stands guard duty near a burning oil well in the Rumaila oil field, Iraq, April 2003

Geographer David Harvey says there has emerged a new type of imperialism due to geographical distinctions as well as unequal rates of development.[82] He says there has emerged three new global economic and political blocs: the United States, the European Union and Asia centered on China and Russia.[83] He says there are tensions between the three major blocs over resources and economic power, citing the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the motive of which, he argues, was to prevent rival blocs from controlling oil.[84] Furthermore, Harvey argues that there can arise conflict within the major blocs between business interests and the politicians due to their sometimes incongruent economic interests.[85] Politicians live in geographically fixed locations and are, in the U.S. and Europe, accountable to an electorate. The 'new' imperialism, then, has led to an alignment of the interests of capitalists and politicians in order to prevent the rise and expansion of possible economic and political rivals from challenging America's dominance.[86]

Classics professor and war historian Victor Davis Hanson dismisses the notion of an American Empire altogether, with a mocking comparison to historical empires: "We do not send out proconsuls to reside over client states, which in turn impose taxes on coerced subjects to pay for the legions. Instead, American bases are predicated on contractual obligations — costly to us and profitable to their hosts. We do not see any profits in Korea, but instead accept the risk of losing almost 40,000 of our youth to ensure that Kias can flood our shores and that shaggy students can protest outside our embassy in Seoul."[87]

The existence of "proconsuls", however, has been recognized by many since the early Cold War. In 1957, French Historian, Amaury de Riencourt, associated the American "proconsul" with "the Roman of our time".[88] Expert on recent American history, Arthur M. Schlesinger detected several contemporary imperial features, including "proconsuls": Washington does not directly run many parts of the world. Rather, its "informal empire" was one "richly equipped with imperial paraphernalia: troops, ships, planes, bases, proconsuls, local collaborators, all spread wide around the luckless planet."[89] "The Supreme Allied Commander, always an American, was an appropriate title for the American proconsul whose reputation and influence outweighed those of European premiers, presidents, and chancellors."[90] US "combatant commanders ... have served as its proconsuls. Their standing in their regions has usually dwarfed that of ambassadors and assistant secretaries of state."[91] Harvard Historian Niall Ferguson calls the regional combatant commanders, among whom the whole globe is divided, the "pro-consuls" of this "imperium".[92] Günter Bischof calls them "the all powerful proconsuls of the new American empire. Like the proconsuls of Rome they were supposed to bring order and law to the unruly and anarchical world".[93] In September 2000, Washington Post reporter Dana Priest published a series of articles whose central premise was Combatant Commanders' inordinate amount of political influence within the countries in their areas of responsibility. They "had evolved into the modern-day equivalent of the Roman Empire's proconsuls—well-funded, semi-autonomous, unconventional centers of US foreign policy".[94] The Romans often preferred to exercise power through friendly client regimes, rather than direct rule: "until Jay Garner and L. Paul Bremer became US proconsuls in Baghdad, that was the American method too".[95]

Another distinction of Victor Davis Hanson—that US bases, contrary to the legions, are costly to America and profitable for their hosts—expresses the American view. The hosts express a diametrically opposite view. Japan pays for 25,000 Japanese working on US bases. 20% of those workers provide entertainment: a list drawn up by the Japanese Ministry of Defense included 76 bartenders, 48 vending machine personnel, 47 golf course maintenance personnel, 25 club managers, 20 commercial artists, 9 leisure-boat operators, 6 theater directors, 5 cake decorators, 4 bowling alley clerks, 3 tour guides and 1 animal caretaker. Shu Watanabe of the Democratic Party of Japan asks: "Why does Japan need to pay the costs for US service members' entertainment on their holidays?"[96] One research on host nations support concludes:

At an alliance-level analysis, case studies of South Korea and Japan present that the necessity of the alliance relationship with the US and their relative capabilities to achieve security purposes lead them to increase the size of direct economic investment to support the US forces stationed in their territories, as well as to facilitate the US global defense posture. In addition, these two countries have increased their political and economic contribution to the US-led military operations beyond the geographic scope of the alliance in the post-Cold War period ... Behavioral changes among the US allies in response to demands for sharing alliance burdens directly indicate the changed nature of unipolar alliances. In order to maintain its power preponderance and primacy, the unipole has imposed greater pressure on its allies to devote much of their resources and energy to contributing to its global defense posture ... [It] is expected that the systemic properties of unipolarity–non-structural threat and a power preponderance of the unipole–gradually increase the political and economic burdens of the allies in need of maintaining alliance relationships with the unipole.[97]

In fact, increasing the "economic burdens of the allies" is one of the major priorities of President Donald Trump.[98][99][100][101] Classicist Eric Adler notes that Hanson earlier had written about the decline of the classical studies in the United States and insufficient attention devoted to the classical experience. "When writing about American foreign policy for a lay audience, however, Hanson himself chose to castigate Roman imperialism in order to portray the modern United States as different from—and superior to—the Roman state."[102] As a supporter of a hawkish unilateral American foreign policy, Hanson's "distinctly negative view of Roman imperialism is particularly noteworthy, since it demonstrates the importance a contemporary supporter of a hawkish American foreign policy places on criticizing Rome".[103]

U.S. foreign policy debate

American Empire1
Map of the United States and directly-controlled territory at its greatest extent from 1898–1902, after the Spanish–American War
10kMiles
1898 political cartoon: "Ten Thousand Miles From Tip to Tip" meaning the extension of U.S. domination (symbolized by a bald eagle) from Puerto Rico to the Philippines. The cartoon contrasts this with a map of the smaller United States 100 years earlier in 1798.

Annexation is a crucial instrument in the expansion of a nation, due to the fact that once a territory is annexed it must act within the confines of its superior counterpart. The United States Congress' ability to annex a foreign territory is explained in a report from the Congressional Committee on Foreign Relations, "If, in the judgment of Congress, such a measure is supported by a safe and wise policy, or is based upon a natural duty that we owe to the people of Hawaii, or is necessary for our national development and security, that is enough to justify annexation, with the consent of the recognized government of the country to be annexed."[104]

Prior to annexing a territory, the American government still held immense power through the various legislations passed in the late 1800s. The Platt Amendment was utilized to prevent Cuba from entering into any agreements with foreign nations, and also granted the Americans the right to build naval stations on their soil.[105] Executive officials in the American government began to determine themselves the supreme authority in matters regarding the recognition or restriction of independence.[105]

When asked on April 28, 2003, on Al Jazeera whether the United States was "empire building", Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld replied, "We don't seek empires, we're not imperialistic. We never have been."[106]

However, historian Donald W. Meinig says the imperial behavior by the United States dates at least to the Louisiana Purchase, which he describes as an "imperial acquisition—imperial in the sense of the aggressive encroachment of one people upon the territory of another, resulting in the subjugation of that people to alien rule". The U.S. policies towards the Native Americans he said were "designed to remold them into a people more appropriately conformed to imperial desires".[107]

Writers and academics of the early 20th century, like Charles A. Beard, in support of non-interventionism (sometimes referred to as "isolationism"), discussed American policy as being driven by self-interested expansionism going back as far as the writing of the Constitution. Some politicians today do not agree. Pat Buchanan claims that the modern United States' drive to empire is "far removed from what the Founding Fathers had intended the young Republic to become."[108]

Andrew Bacevich argues that the U.S. did not fundamentally change its foreign policy after the Cold War, and remains focused on an effort to expand its control across the world.[109] As the surviving superpower at the end of the Cold War, the U.S. could focus its assets in new directions, the future being "up for grabs" according to former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz in 1991.[110] Head of the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, Stephen Peter Rosen, maintains:

A political unit that has overwhelming superiority in military power, and uses that power to influence the internal behavior of other states, is called an empire. Because the United States does not seek to control territory or govern the overseas citizens of the empire, we are an indirect empire, to be sure, but an empire nonetheless. If this is correct, our goal is not combating a rival, but maintaining our imperial position, and maintaining imperial order.[111]

In Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, the political activist Noam Chomsky argues that exceptionalism and the denials of imperialism are the result of a systematic strategy of propaganda, to "manufacture opinion" as the process has long been described in other countries.[112]

Thorton wrote that "[...]imperialism is more often the name of the emotion that reacts to a series of events than a definition of the events themselves. Where colonization finds analysts and analogies, imperialism must contend with crusaders for and against."[113] Political theorist Michael Walzer argues that the term hegemony is better than empire to describe the US's role in the world;[114] political scientist Robert Keohane agrees saying, a "balanced and nuanced analysis is not aided ... by the use of the phrase 'empire' to describe United States hegemony, since 'empire' obscures rather than illuminates the differences in form of rule between the United States and other Great Powers, such as Great Britain in the 19th century or the Soviet Union in the twentieth".[115]

Since 2001,[116] Emmanuel Todd assumes that USA cannot hold for long the status of mondial hegemonic power due to limited resources. Instead, the USA is going to become just one of the major regional powers along with European Union, China, Russia, etc. Reviewing Todd's After the Empire, G. John Ikenberry found that it had been written in "a fit of French wishful thinking".[117] The thinking proved to be "wishful" indeed, as the book became a bestseller in France for most of the year 2003.[118]

Other political scientists, such as Daniel Nexon and Thomas Wright, argue that neither term exclusively describes foreign relations of the United States. The U.S. can be, and has been, simultaneously an empire and a hegemonic power. They claim that the general trend in U.S. foreign relations has been away from imperial modes of control.[119]

Cultural imperialism

McDonalds in St Petersburg 2004
McDonald's in Saint Petersburg, Russia

Some critics of imperialism argue that military and cultural imperialism are interdependent. American Edward Said, one of the founders of post-colonial theory, said that,

... so influential has been the discourse insisting on American specialness, altruism and opportunity, that imperialism in the United States as a word or ideology has turned up only rarely and recently in accounts of the United States culture, politics and history. But the connection between imperial politics and culture in North America, and in particular in the United States, is astonishingly direct.[120]

International relations scholar David Rothkopf disagrees and argues that cultural imperialism is the innocent result of globalization, which allows access to numerous U.S. and Western ideas and products that many non-U.S. and non-Western consumers across the world voluntarily choose to consume.[121] Matthew Fraser has a similar analysis, but argues further that the global cultural influence of the U.S. is a good thing.[122]

Nationalism is the main process through which the government is able to shape public opinion. Propaganda in the media is strategically placed in order to promote a common attitude among the people. Louis A. Perez Jr. provides an example of propaganda used during the war of 1898, "We are coming, Cuba, coming; we are bound to set you free! We are coming from the mountains, from the plains and inland sea! We are coming with the wrath of God to make the Spaniards flee! We are coming, Cuba, coming; coming now!"[105]

American progressives have been accused of engaging in cultural imperialism.[123][124] In contrast, many other countries with American brands have incorporated themselves into their own local culture. An example of this would be the self-styled "Maccas", an Australian derivation of "McDonald's" with a tinge of Australian culture.[125]

U.S. military bases

Combined Air Operations Center 151007-F-MS415-022
Combined Air and Space Operations Center (CAOC) at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, 2015

Chalmers Johnson argued in 2004 that America's version of the colony is the military base.[126] Chip Pitts argued similarly in 2006 that enduring U.S. bases in Iraq suggested a vision of "Iraq as a colony".[127]

While territories such as Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa and Puerto Rico remain under U.S. control, the U.S. allowed many of its overseas territories or occupations to gain independence after World War II. Examples include the Philippines (1946), the Panama canal zone (1979), Palau (1981), the Federated States of Micronesia (1986) and the Marshall Islands (1986). Most of them still have U.S. bases within their territories. In the case of Okinawa, which came under U.S. administration after the Battle of Okinawa during the Second World War, this happened despite local popular opinion.[128] In 2003, a Department of Defense distribution found the United States had bases in over 36 countries worldwide.[129]

By 1970, the United States had more than 1,000,000 soldiers in 30 countries, was a member of four regional defense alliances and an active participant in a fifth, had mutual defense treaties with 42 nations, was a member of 53 international organizations, and was furnishing military or economic aid to nearly 100 nations across the face of the globe.[130] In 2015 the Department of Defense reported the number of bases that had any military or civilians stationed or employed was 587. This includes land only (where no facilities are present), facility or facilities only (where there the underlying land is neither owned nor controlled by the government), and land with facilities (where both are present).[131] Also in 2015, David Vine's book Base Nation, found 800 US military bases located outside of the US, including 174 bases in Germany, 113 in Japan, and 83 in South Korea, the total costs, an estimated $100 billion a year.[132]

According to The Huffington Post, "The 45 nations and territories with little or no democratic rule represent more than half of the roughly 80 countries now hosting U.S. bases. ... Research by political scientist Kent Calder confirms what's come to be known as the "dictatorship hypothesis": The United States tends to support dictators [and other undemocratic regimes] in nations where it enjoys basing facilities."[133]

Benevolent imperialism

Roosevelt monroe Doctrine cartoon
Political cartoon depicting Theodore Roosevelt using the Monroe Doctrine to keep European powers out of the Dominican Republic.

One of the earliest historians of American Empire, William Appleman Williams, wrote, "The routine lust for land, markets or security became justifications for noble rhetoric about prosperity, liberty and security."[134]

Max Boot defends U.S. imperialism by claiming: "U.S. imperialism has been the greatest force for good in the world during the past century. It has defeated communism and Nazism and has intervened against the Taliban and Serbian ethnic cleansing."[135] Boot used "imperialism" to describe United States policy, not only in the early 20th century but "since at least 1803".[135][136] This embrace of empire is made by other neoconservatives, including British historian Paul Johnson, and writers Dinesh D'Souza and Mark Steyn. It is also made by some liberal hawks, such as political scientists Zbigniew Brzezinski and Michael Ignatieff.[137]

British historian Niall Ferguson argues that the United States is an empire and believes that this is a good thing: "What is not allowed is to say that the United States is an empire and that this might not be wholly bad."[138] Ferguson has drawn parallels between the British Empire and the imperial role of the United States in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, though he describes the United States' political and social structures as more like those of the Roman Empire than of the British. Ferguson argues that all of these empires have had both positive and negative aspects, but that the positive aspects of the U.S. empire will, if it learns from history and its mistakes, greatly outweigh its negative aspects.[139]

Another point of view implies that United States expansion overseas has indeed been imperialistic, but that this imperialism is only a temporary phenomenon; a corruption of American ideals or the relic of a past historical era. Historian Samuel Flagg Bemis argues that Spanish–American War expansionism was a short-lived imperialistic impulse and "a great aberration in American history", a very different form of territorial growth than that of earlier American history.[140] Historian Walter LaFeber sees the Spanish–American War expansionism not as an aberration, but as a culmination of United States expansion westward.[141]

Historian Victor Davis Hanson argues that the U.S. does not pursue world domination, but maintains worldwide influence by a system of mutually beneficial exchanges.[142] On the other hand, a Filipino revolutionary General Emilio Aguinaldo felt as though the American involvement in the Philippines was destructive, "the Filipinos fighting for Liberty, the American people fighting them to give them liberty. The two peoples are fighting on parallel lines for the same object."[143] American influence worldwide and the effects it has on other nations have multiple interpretations according to whose perspective is being taken into account.

Liberal internationalists argue that even though the present world order is dominated by the United States, the form taken by that dominance is not imperial. International relations scholar John Ikenberry argues that international institutions have taken the place of empire.[144]

International relations scholar Joseph Nye argues that U.S. power is more and more based on "soft power", which comes from cultural hegemony rather than raw military or economic force.[145] This includes such factors as the widespread desire to emigrate to the United States, the prestige and corresponding high proportion of foreign students at U.S. universities, and the spread of U.S. styles of popular music and cinema. Mass immigration into America may justify this theory, but it is hard to know for sure whether the United States would still maintain its prestige without its military and economic superiority.

See also

Notes and references

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  137. ^ "The Unconscious Colossus: Limits of (Alternatives to) American Empire", Daedalus, 134/2, (2005): p 21.
  138. ^ Ferguson, Niall (June 2, 2005). Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire. Penguin. ISBN 0-14-101700-7.
  139. ^ Miller, Stuart Creighton (1982). "Benevolent Assimilation" The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899–1903. Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-02697-8. p. 3.
  140. ^ Lafeber, Walter (1975). The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898. Cornell University Press. ISBN 0-8014-9048-0.
  141. ^ Hanson, Victor Davis (November 2002). "A Funny Sort of Empire". National Review. Retrieved October 8, 2009.
  142. ^ Aguinaldo, Emilio (September 1899). "Aguinaldo's Case Against the United States" (PDF). North American Review.
  143. ^ Ikenberry, G. John (March–April 2004). "Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order". Foreign Affairs. Archived from the original on 2012-07-09. Retrieved 2006-03-06.
  144. ^ Cf. Nye, Joseph Jr. (2005). Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. Public Affairs. 208 pp.

Further reading

  • Bacevich, Andrew (2008). The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism. Macmillan. ISBN 0-8050-8815-6.
  • Boot, Max (2002). The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power. Basic Books. ISBN 0-465-00721-X.
  • Brown, Seyom (1994). Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Clinton. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-09669-0.
  • Burton, David H. (1968). Theodore Roosevelt: Confident Imperialist. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. ASIN B0007GMSSY.
  • Callahan, Patrick (2003). Logics of American Foreign Policy: Theories of America's World Role. New York: Longman. ISBN 0-321-08848-4.
  • Card, Orson Scott (2006). Empire. TOR. ISBN 0-7653-1611-0.
  • Daalder, Ivo H.; James M. Lindsay (2003). America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. ISBN 0-8157-1688-5.
  • Fulbright, J. William; Seth P. Tillman (1989). The Price of Empire. Pantheon Books. ISBN 0-394-57224-6.
  • Gaddis, John Lewis (2005). Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (2nd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-517447-X.
  • Grandin, Greg, "The Death Cult of Trumpism: In his appeals to a racist and nationalist chauvinism, Trump leverages tribal resentment against an emerging manifest common destiny", The Nation, 29 Jan./5 Feb. 2018, pp. 20–22. "[T]he ongoing effects of the ruinous 2003 war in Iraq and the 2007–8 financial meltdown are... two indicators that the promise of endless growth can no longer help organize people's aspirations... We are entering the second 'lost decade' of what Larry Summers calls 'secular stagnation,' and soon we'll be in the third decade of a war that Senator Lindsey Graham... says will never end. [T]here is a realization that the world is fragile and that we are trapped in an economic system that is well past sustainable or justifiable.... In a nation like the United States, founded on a mythical belief in a kind of species immunity—less an American exceptionalism than exemptionism, an insistence that the nation was exempt from nature, society, history, even death—the realization that it can't go on forever is traumatic." (p. 21.)
  • Hardt, Michael; Antonio Negri (2001). Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-00671-2. online
  • Huntington, Samuel P. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-684-81164-2.
  • Immerwahr, Daniel (2019). How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. ISBN 978-0-374-17214-5.
  • Johnson, Chalmers (2000). Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire. New York: Holt. ISBN 0-8050-6239-4.
  • Johnson, Chalmers (2004). The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic. New York: Metropolitan Books. ISBN 0-8050-7004-4.
  • Johnson, Chalmers (2007). Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic. New York, NY: Metropolitan Books. ISBN 0-8050-7911-4.
  • Kagan, Robert (2003). Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. New York: Knopf. ISBN 1-4000-4093-0.
  • Kerry, Richard J. (1990). The Star-Spangled Mirror: America's Image of Itself and the World. Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 0-8476-7649-8.
  • Lears, Jackson, "Imperial Exceptionalism" (review of Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Empire in Retreat: The Past, Present, and Future of the United States, Yale University Press, 2018, ISBN 978-0-300-21000-2, 459 pp.; and David C. Hendrickson, Republic in Peril: American Empire and the Liberal Tradition, Oxford University Press, 2017, ISBN 978-0190660383, 287 pp.), The New York Review of Books, vol. LXVI, no. 2 (February 7, 2019), pp. 8-10. Bulmer-Thomas writes: "Imperial retreat is not the same as national decline, as many other countries can attest. Indeed, imperial retreat can strengthen the nation-state just as imperial expansion can weaken it." (NYRB, cited on p. 10.)
  • Lundestad, Geir (1998). Empire by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-878212-8.
  • Meyer, William H. (2003). Security, Economics, and Morality in American Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues in Historical Context. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. ISBN 0-13-086390-4.
  • Nye, Joseph S., Jr (2002). The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-515088-0.
  • Odom, William; Robert Dujarric (2004). America's Inadvertent Empire. Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-10069-8.
  • Patrick, Stewart; Forman, Shepard, eds. (2001). Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. ISBN 1-58826-042-9.
  • Perkins, John (2004). Confessions of an Economic Hit Man. Tihrān: Nashr-i Akhtarān. ISBN 1-57675-301-8.
  • Rapkin, David P., ed. (1990). World Leadership and Hegemony. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. ISBN 1-55587-189-5.
  • Ruggie, John G., ed. (1993). Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-07980-8.
  • Smith, Tony (1994). America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-03784-1.
  • Tomlinson, John (1991). Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 0-8018-4250-6.
  • Todd, Emmanuel (2004). After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-13103-2.
  • Tremblay, Rodrigue (2004). The New American Empire. Haverford, PA: Infinity Pub. ISBN 0-7414-1887-8.
  • Zepezauer, Mark (2002). Boomerang!: How Our Covert Wars Have Created Enemies Across the Middle East and Brought Terror to America. Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press. ISBN 1-56751-222-4.

External links

1991 United States embassy sniper attack in Bonn

On February 13, 1991, three members of the Red Army Faction (RAF) fired about 250 bullets using a sniper rifle at the United States embassy in Bonn, Germany.The suspects fired at the embassy from a distance of about 500 metres from Villa Von-Weiß-Straße 8, located across the Rhine river in Königswinter. The incident was linked to the ongoing Gulf War. In a note left at the scene, the RAF said the attack was done to combat American imperialism and to get it out of Iraq. The attackers escaped their positions in a stolen Volkswagen Passat car and were never caught. The embassy received some bullet holes and broken windows, but no major damage was caused.The same G1 rifle was used by the RAF in the killing of Detlev Karsten Rohwedder afterwards.In October 2001, new DNA tests of a hair left in the passenger seat of the Passat revealed that Daniela Klette may have been one of the suspects. Klette is an RAF member who was already suspected in other attacks, such as the prison bombing in Weiterstadt in 1993. Klette remains at large and nobody else has ever been convicted for the attack.

American Empire

American Empire may refer to:

American imperialism

American Empire, a fictional country in the world of Ghost in the Shell series

American Empire, a fictional country in the works of Chinese political theorists Tingyang Zhao and Qiao Liang (writer).

American Empire (film), a 1942 Western

American Empire (Harry Turtledove), series of alternate history novels

American Empire style

List of United States military bases around the world

List of pre-Columbian cultures

American colonies

American colonies may refer to:

Thirteen Colonies, which became the United States of America in 1776

European colonization of the Americas

American imperialism

Bourbon Democrat

Bourbon Democrat was a term used in the United States in the later 19th century (1872–1904) to refer to members of the Democratic Party who were ideologically aligned with conservatism or classical liberalism, especially those who supported presidential candidates Charles O'Conor in 1872, Samuel J. Tilden in 1876, President Grover Cleveland in 1884–1888/1892–1896 and Alton B. Parker in 1904.

After 1904, the Bourbons faded away. Woodrow Wilson, who had been a Bourbon, made a deal in 1912 with the leading opponent of the Bourbons, William Jennings Bryan, who endorsed Wilson for the Democratic nomination and Wilson named Bryan Secretary of State. Bourbon Democrats were promoters of a form of laissez-faire capitalism which included opposition to the high-tariff protectionism that the Republicans were then advocating as well as fiscal discipline. They represented business interests, generally supporting the goals of banking and railroads, but opposed to subsidies for them and were unwilling to protect them from competition. They opposed American imperialism and overseas expansion, fought for the gold standard against bimetallism and promoted hard and sound money. Strong supporters of states' rights and reform movements such as the Civil Service Reform and opponents of the corrupt city bosses, Bourbons led the fight against the Tweed Ring. The anti-corruption theme earned the votes of many Republican Mugwumps in 1884.The term "Bourbon Democrats" was never used by the Bourbon Democrats themselves. It was not the name of any specific or formal group and no one running for office ever ran on a Bourbon Democrat ticket. The term "Bourbon" was mostly used disparagingly by critics complaining of viewpoints they saw as old-fashioned. A number of splinter Democratic parties, such as the Straight-Out Democratic Party (1872) and the National Democratic Party (1896), that actually ran candidates, fall under the more general label of Bourbon Democrats.

Luo Guibo

Luo Guibo (Chinese: 罗贵波) (1907–1995) was a Chinese diplomat and People's Republic of China politician. He was born in Nankang County, Jiangxi (modern Nankang District, Ganzhou). He joined the Communist Party of China in 1927. During the Second Sino-Japanese War, he was a general officer in the Eighth Route Army. Luo served as director of the Administrative Office of the CCP Military Affairs committee, and in January 1950 was sent to Vietnam as liaison to Ho Chi-Minh.

He was the first Ambassador of China to North Vietnam (1954–1957).

From October 1957 to October 1970, he was China's Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. During Hong Kong's 1967 riots, he denounced the British colonial government's "atrocities", "sanguinary oppression" and "collusion with American imperialism against China" in a formal protest presented to the British chargé d'affaires in Beijing.Luo was governor of Shanxi.

Manifest destiny

In the 19th century, manifest destiny was a widely held belief in the United States that its settlers were destined to expand across North America. There are three basic themes to manifest destiny:

The special virtues of the American people and their institutions

The mission of the United States to redeem and remake the west in the image of agrarian America

An irresistible destiny to accomplish this essential dutyHistorian Frederick Merk says this concept was born out of "a sense of mission to redeem the Old World by high example ... generated by the potentialities of a new earth for building a new heaven".Historians have emphasized that "manifest destiny" was a contested concept—pre-civil war Democrats endorsed the idea but many prominent Americans (such as Abraham Lincoln, Ulysses S. Grant, and most Whigs) rejected it. Historian Daniel Walker Howe writes, "American imperialism did not represent an American consensus; it provoked bitter dissent within the national polity ... Whigs saw America's moral mission as one of democratic example rather than one of conquest."Newspaper editor John O'Sullivan is generally credited with coining the term manifest destiny in 1845 to describe the essence of this mindset, which was a rhetorical tone; however, the unsigned editorial titled "Annexation" in which it first appeared was arguably written by journalist and annexation advocate Jane Cazneau. The term was used by Democrats in the 1840s to justify the war with Mexico and it was also used to divide half of Oregon with the United Kingdom. But manifest destiny always limped along because of its internal limitations and the issue of slavery, says Merk. It never became a national priority. By 1843, former U.S. President John Quincy Adams, originally a major supporter of the concept underlying manifest destiny, had changed his mind and repudiated expansionism because it meant the expansion of slavery in Texas.Merk concluded:

From the outset Manifest Destiny—vast in program, in its sense of continentalism—was slight in support. It lacked national, sectional, or party following commensurate with its magnitude. The reason was it did not reflect the national spirit. The thesis that it embodied nationalism, found in much historical writing, is backed by little real supporting evidence.

Mark Zwonitzer

Mark Zwonitzer is an American author and documentary filmmaker.

Michael Rogin

Michael Paul Rogin (June 29, 1937 – November 25, 2001) was an American political scientist who taught at the University of California, Berkeley. His intellectual interests included American literature and cinema. His work is notable for its critique of American imperialism, and he was viewed as one of the members of the Berkeley school of political theory. He was influential to many students, including cultural critic Greil Marcus.

Paper tiger

"Paper tiger" is a literal English translation of the Chinese phrase zhilaohu (纸老虎/紙老虎). The term refers to something that seems threatening but is ineffectual and unable to withstand challenge. The expression became well known in the West as a slogan used by Mao Zedong's Chinese communist state against its opponents, particularly the U.S. government.

Pax Americana

Pax Americana (Latin for "American Peace", modeled after Pax Romana, Pax Britannica, and Pax Mongolica) is a term applied to the concept of relative peace in the Western Hemisphere and later the world beginning around the middle of the 20th century, thought to be caused by the preponderance of power enjoyed by the United States. Although the term finds its primary utility in the latter half of the 20th century, it has been used with different meanings and eras, such as the post-Civil War era in North America, and regionally in the Americas at the start of the 20th century.

Pax Americana is primarily used in its modern connotations to refer to the peace among great powers established after the end of World War II in 1945, also called the Long Peace. In this modern sense, it has come to indicate the military and economic position of the United States in relation to other nations. For example, the Marshall Plan, which spent $13 billion to rebuild the economy of Western Europe, has been seen as "the launching of the pax americana".The Latin term derives from Pax Romana of the Roman Empire. The term is most notably associated with Pax Britannica (1815–1914) under the British Empire, which served as the global hegemon and constabulary from the late 18th century until the early 20th century.

Peace camp

Peace camps are a form of physical protest camp that is focused on anti-war activity. They are set up outside military bases by members of the peace movement who oppose either the existence of the military bases themselves, the armaments held there, or the politics of those who control the bases. They began in the 1920s and then became world-famous in 1982 due to the tremendous worldwide publicity generated by the Greenham Common Women's Peace Camp. They were particularly a phenomenon of the United Kingdom in the 1980s where they were associated with sentiment against American imperialism but Peace Camps have existed at other times and places since the 1920s.

Peter Schat

Peter Ane Schat (5 June 1935, in Utrecht – 3 February 2003, in Amsterdam) was a Dutch composer.

Schat studied composition with Kees van Baaren at the Utrecht Conservatoire and the Royal Conservatory of The Hague from 1952 until 1958, and then went on to study in London with Mátyás Seiber in 1959 and with Pierre Boulez in Basle in 1960–61. His early training with van Baaren and Seiber disposed him toward twelve-tone technique, and his earliest compositions, such as the Introductie en adagio in oude stijl (1954) and the Septet (1957), combine traditional forms with dodecaphony. Boulez, however, led him to a more radical, strict form of serialism, and he was regarded in the Netherlands as one of the outstanding representatives of the avant garde (Groot 2001). While still a student he created his opus 1, Passacaglia and Fugue for organ (1954), and Septet (1957). In 1957 he also won the Gaudeamus International Composers Award.

In the late sixties Schat became associated with the Provo (movement); their publications were printed in his cellar (Adlington 2013; Waa 2003) He was involved in the notorious 1969 "notenkrakersactie" (Nutcracker Action) in which a group of activists interrupted a concert by the Concertgebouw Orchestra, demanding an open discussion of music policy (Beer 1994). That same year, Schat contributed, together with the composers Reinbert de Leeuw, Louis Andriessen, Jan van Vlijmen, and Misha Mengelberg, and the writers Harry Mulisch and Hugo Claus, in Reconstructie, a sort of opera, or "morality" theatre work, about the conflict between American imperialism and liberation (Groot 2001).

In February 1969 he co-founded the Studio for Electro-Instrumental Music (STEIM) in Amsterdam. Among his most widely noted works are Thema (from 1970) and To You (from 1972). To You was performed at the Holland Festival.

The 1970s also brought Schat's most distinctive contribution to 20th-century music theory, the "tone clock". It lends its name to a translation of his collected essays, The Tone Clock (Contemporary Music Studies) (1993, ISBN 3-7186-5369-9).

Schat died in 2003 from cancer.

Progressive Party (United States, 1924–34)

The Progressive Party of 1924 was a new party created as a vehicle for Robert M. La Follette, Sr. to run for president in the 1924 election. It did not run candidates for other offices, and it disappeared after the election. The party advocated progressive positions such as government ownership of railroads and electric utilities, cheap credit for farmers, the outlawing of child labor, stronger laws to help labor unions, more protection of civil liberties, an end to American imperialism in Latin America, and a referendum before any president could lead the nation into war.

After winning election to the United States Senate in 1905, La Follette had emerged as a leader of progressives. He sought the Republican presidential nomination in the 1912 election, but many of his backers switched to Theodore Roosevelt after the former president entered the race. La Follette refused to join Roosevelt's Progressive Party, and that party collapsed after 1916. However, the progressives remained a potent force within both major parties. In 1924, La Follette and his followers created their own Progressive Party which challenged the conservative major party nominees, Calvin Coolidge of the Republican Party and John W. Davis of the Democratic Party.

The Progressive Party was composed of La Follette supporters, who were distinguished from the earlier Roosevelt supporters by being generally more agrarian, populist, and midwestern in perspective, as opposed to urban, elite, and eastern. The party held a national convention in July 1924 that nominated a ticket consisting of La Follette for president, and La Follete later selected Democratic Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana as his running mate. The ticket enjoyed support among many farmers and laborers and was endorsed by the Socialist Party of America and the American Federation of Labor.

In the 1924 election, the party carried only La Follette's home state of Wisconsin. The ticket won 16.6% of the national popular vote and carried many counties in the Midwest and West with large German American elements or strong labor union movements. The party's share of the vote represents one of the best performances by a third party in presidential election history. After the election, La Follette continued to serve as a Republican Senator until his death in 1925. After his death, La Follette's family founded the Wisconsin Progressive Party and briefly dominated Wisconsin politics.

Sino-Albanian split

The Sino-Albanian split was the gradual worsening of relations between the People's Socialist Republic of Albania and the People's Republic of China in the period 1972–78. Both countries had supported each other in the Soviet–Albanian and Sino-Soviet splits, together declaring the necessity of defending Marxism–Leninism against what they regarded as Soviet revisionism within the international communist movement. By the early 1970s, however, Albanian disagreements with certain aspects of Chinese policy deepened as the visit of Nixon to China along with the Chinese announcement of the "Three Worlds Theory" produced strong apprehension in Albania's leadership under Enver Hoxha. Hoxha saw in these events an emerging Chinese alliance with American imperialism and abandonment of proletarian internationalism. In 1978, China broke off its trade relations with Albania, signalling an end to the informal alliance which existed between the two states.

Smart power

In international relations, the term smart power refers to the combination of hard power and soft power strategies. It is defined by the Center for Strategic and International Studies as "an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions of all levels to expand one's influence and establish legitimacy of one's action."Joseph Nye, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs under the Clinton administration and author of several books on smart power strategy, suggests that the most effective strategies in foreign policy today require a mix of hard and soft power resources. Employing only hard power or only soft power in a given situation will usually prove inadequate. Nye utilizes the example of terrorism, arguing that combatting terrorism demands smart power strategy. He advises that simply utilizing soft power resources to change the hearts and minds of the Taliban government would be ineffective and requires a hard power component. In developing relationships with the mainstream Muslim world, however, soft power resources are necessary and the use of hard power would have damaging effects.

According to Chester A. Crocker, smart power "involves the strategic use of diplomacy, persuasion, capacity building, and the projection of power and influence in ways that are cost-effective and have political and social legitimacy" – essentially the engagement of both military force and all forms of diplomacy.

United States territorial acquisitions

This is a United States territorial acquisitions and conquests list, beginning with American independence. Note that this list primarily concerns land the United States of America acquired from other nation-states. Early American expansion was tied to a national concept of manifest destiny.

Wolfowitz Doctrine

Wolfowitz Doctrine is an unofficial name given to the initial version of the Defense Planning Guidance for the 1994–99 fiscal years (dated February 18, 1992) published by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz and his deputy Scooter Libby. Not intended for public release, it was leaked to the New York Times on March 7, 1992, and sparked a public controversy about U.S. foreign and defense policy. The document was widely criticized as imperialist as the document outlined a policy of unilateralism and pre-emptive military action to suppress potential threats from other nations and prevent any other nation from rising to superpower status.

Such was the outcry that the document was hastily re-written under the close supervision of U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell before being officially released on April 16, 1992. Many of its tenets re-emerged in the Bush Doctrine, which was described by Senator Edward M. Kennedy as "a call for 21st century American imperialism that no other nation can or should accept."Although Wolfowitz was ultimately responsible for the Defense Planning Guidance, as it was released through his office and was reflective of his overall outlook, he did not participate in its drafting, nor saw it before it was publicly released. The task of preparing the document fell to Libby, who delegated the process of writing the new strategy to Zalmay Khalilzad, a member of Libby's staff and longtime aide to Wolfowitz. In the initial phase of drafting the document, Khalizad solicited the opinions of a wide cross-section of Pentagon insiders and outsiders, including Andrew Marshall, Richard Perle, and Wolfowitz's University of Chicago mentor, the nuclear strategist Albert Wohlstetter. Completing the draft in March 1992, Khalizad requested permission from Libby to circulate it to other officials within the Pentagon. Libby assented and within three days Khalizad's draft was released to the New York Times by "an official who believ[ed] this post-cold war strategy debate should be carried out in the public domain."

World Congress of Intellectuals in Defense of Peace

The World Congress of Intellectuals in Defense of Peace (Polish: Światowy Kongres Intelektualistów w Obronie Pokoju) was an international conference held on 25 to 28 August 1948 at Wrocław University of Technology. It was organized in the aftermath of the Second World War by the authorities of the Polish People's Republic and the Soviet Union, and aimed against American imperialism.

The congress was part of Soviets and Stalin’s goal of slowing down the Western nuclear weapon program by the West, by influencing the world public opinion through framing of the communist powers as supporters of peace, and on the opposite side, portraying the West as a threat to peace.

Youth Union of Turkey

Youth Union of Turkey (Turkish: Türkiye Gençlik Birliği, TGB) is a Turkish left-wing nationalist, Kemalist revolutionary youth organization closely associated with the Patriotic Party. Founded on 19 May 2006, it comprises 65 student clubs and societies from over 40 Turkish universities.

TGB opposes any future Turkish membership in the European Union and any cooperation with what it calls "American imperialism". It has organized mass protests against the Justice and Development Party.

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